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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, democracy has expanded noticeably both internationally and in Latin
America.1 From 1990 to 2012, the number of democratic regimes in the world increased from 69
to 117. Of no less significance, in Latin America, by 2008, freely elected governments existed
everywhere except in Cuba, and polls consistently showed strong support throughout the region
for democratic governments. Although substantial progress has been made, serious problems do
remain.
Three interrelated objectives guide my comparative study of Colombia and Venezuela.
My first objective is to identify the myriad of obstacles and setbacks that Colombia and
Venezuela faced throughout their histories, and explain how those factors affected each nation’s
processes of state and regime creation. To complete such task, I conduct two separate but
interrelated analyses of each country’s political history. I begin with an examination of each
nation’s relevant topographical attributes and pre-Columbian societies. I complete this part of the
analysis at present day. After documenting the political trajectory of each nation from the
moment the Spaniards arrive until the present, I explain the way colonialism; the development of
distinct competing regions with correspondingly disparate regional identities; the presence or
absence of natural resources; adverse political subcultures; clientelism; and international factors
hindered the capacity of each nation to create stable democratic regimes.
My second interrelated objective is to evaluate the explanatory value of existing theories
of state creation and democratization, and to propose alternative arguments. The Colombian case
is unique in that the nation possesses a long history of regularly held and successful electoral
contests that should have led to the creation of a stable democratic regime. And yet, democracy
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in Colombia is severely undermined by a relatively weak state unable to enforce the rule of law
and to protect essential freedoms, and by the prolonged presence of internal armed conflict. In
regards to the Venezuelan case, I attribute the regime’s recent reversion to authoritarianism to
the fact that throughout much of its contemporary history, the nation retained an overbearing and
highly centralized state that facilitated the creation of a paternalistic political culture. As a result,
in times of economic or political crisis, the desire for security and stability has led to the
condemnation and collapse of the whole regime, rather than to widespread social and political
reconciliation. In the absence of institutional mechanisms that seek to resolve differences and
accommodate the interests of all factions in society, democracy will falter.
My last objective is to briefly assess the current state of democracy in Latin America.
Although most countries in the region have successfully traveled from dictatorship to electoral
democracy, save for Cuba and for the most part, Venezuela, the consolidation of democracy has
yet to be achieved. The comparative analysis of the aforementioned nations serves to provide
important insights into the nature of democracy, as well as about the factors that continue to
inhibit its establishment in the region. The conclusions reached by this study could help lay the
foundation for the analysis of other Latin American cases, as well as contribute to the existing
literature that seeks to explain the process of democratization throughout Latin America.
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Literature Review
Democracy is not inevitable and it is revocable -- it is a choice, not a necessity.2 A
substantial amount of conceptual and theoretical work on the processes of state creation and
democratization exists in the realm of political science. Scholars have relied on much of this
work to try to explain the ways democracies have been constructed throughout the various Latin
America states. Democracy has generally been defined as a political system of that meets three
conditions: 1) competition among individuals and organized groups for all positions of
government, determined at regular intervals and without the use of force; 2) a highly inclusive
level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies through regular and fair
elections; 3) and a level of civil and political liberties sufficient enough to guarantee the integrity
of political competition and participation.3 Additionally, in order for a democracy to be stable it
must possess political legitimacy. Political legitimacy is attained only when all significant
political actors (elites and organizations) along with the public, “…believe that the democratic
regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic
alternative they can imagine.”4 However, the process of regime legitimization can only occur
within the boundaries of a well-structured state. As a result, although the processes of state
creation and democratization may differ, they are inextricably bound to one another in myriad
ways.
As a result, there exists a wide array of theories that tend to explain why democracies
emerge, mature, consolidate, break down, and reemerge, as well as why some countries have
enjoyed greater success in the construction of stable democratic regimes than others. In order to
provide a comprehensive review of the existing literature that analyzes the processes of statebuilding and democratization, I have separated this chapter into two parts. In the first section, I
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begin by discussing general theories surrounding the processes of state creation and
democratization. I then focus on the literature that directly pertain to Latin America, and pay
particular attention to the factors that have generally affected the consolidation of democracy in
the region.
All relevant theories of state creation and democratization retain an analytical framework
that is based upon a few fundamental principles. First, it is essential to note that a stable
democracy will not emerge in a state that has failed to consolidate its power. Moreover, the
processes of state consolidation and legitimization are never fully complete. These processes are
constantly changing in tandem with socioeconomic, cultural and political shifts experienced
within the confines of a specific territory. Additionally, external conditions dictated by the
international environment have a profound impact on the processes of state creation and
democratization. As a result, changes in both the climate of the international arena as well as the
existing social, economic and political conditions of a given territory have the ability to either
hinder or facilitate the process of democratization.
Lastly, it is important to emphasize that most Latin American nations emerged from their
respective wars of independence retaining different political, economic and social institutions.
Due to the lack of administrative uniformity exerted by the Spanish empire upon its colonies, the
strength, efficacy and legitimacy of these institutions varied drastically. After achieving
independence in the 1820s (with the exception of Cuba who gained independence from Spain in
1898), these newly formed nations were challenged by a host of internal disputes and domestic
troubles ranging from: lengthy periods of civil war and instability that destroyed the wealth and
infrastructure of the colonial period, mounting public debt, economic hardship as trade had come
to a complete standstill, and the subsequent rise of ‘strong-men’, or caudillos to political
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prominence among other setbacks.5 In the cases of Colombia and Venezuela these internal
complications would subsequently serve as preliminary obstacles to the consolidation of
democracy; they would also make both nations particularly susceptible to disruptive economic,
military and political pressures emanating from the international arena.

The Contemporary State and Theories of State Creation
The state of the past few centuries differs tremendously from the modern state. Samuel E.
Finer proposes that the contemporary state has acquired five salient characteristics over the
duration of several centuries. First, each state encompasses a particular territory that is inhabited
by a population that acknowledges the legitimacy of a central organ of government. Second, the
organ of government consists of a civil service that carries out decisions, and a military service
that backs the decisions by force when necessary and protects the association from other
similarly constituted associations. Third, each state recognizes the sovereignty of other similarly
constituted states. Fourth, each state strives to create a sense of community based on a common
nationality. And fifth, members of the internal community mutually distribute and share duties
and benefits.6
Most importantly, Finer posits that the contemporary state can be differentiated from the
state of the Middle Ages along two major variables: territoriality and function. During the
medieval period, a vassal may have had to make up his own mind as to where his allegiances lay
in times of conflict since political allegiance was a, “man-to-man relationship, and obedience
might be due, in different circumstances, to several overlords.”7 By contrast, in modern times,
political obedience is a function of territorial location, whereby allegiance is owed to a single
authority of a specified territory – usually a government, dictator, prince and so forth. The
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second distinction between the medieval and modern state that Finer emphasizes is functionality.
As Gaetano Mosca puts it, “by ‘feudal state’ we mean that type of political organization in which
all the executive functions of society – the economic, the judicial, the administrative, the military
– are exercised simultaneously by the same individuals…”8 Finer contends that within the
contemporary state the aforementioned functions are not consolidated in one office or individual,
but are differentiated among various state apparatuses. Thus, Finer comes to conclude that the,
“…twin process – from consolidated service to differentiated service and from differentiated
territory to consolidated territory – is what constitutes the development of the modern state.”9
Finer’s distinction between medieval and contemporary state serves as a foundational
definition that Charles Tilly builds upon via his assertion that a territory is a state in so far as it is
differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; it is autonomous; it is
centralized; and its divisions are formally coordinated with one another.10 Tilly posits seven
distinct conditions that contributed to Europe’s success in satisfying the aforementioned
requirements. According to Tilly, the probability that a European territory would be able to
engage in the state creation process relied upon its:
(1) Access to extractable resources;
(2) A relatively protected position from military conquest for substantial periods of time;
(3) A continuous supply of capable political leaders;
(4) A powerful military and success in war;
(5) A homogenous population;
(6) Strong coalitions of the central power with a unified landed elite; and
(7) An advantageous position within the international system11
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Among these seven conditions, a few are of particular relevance to the processes of state
building and regime creation in Latin America. They are: the abundance of fertile land, mineral
wealth and in some cases oil (condition one); the ascension and subsequent proliferation of local
strongmen or caudillos to head of government (condition three); varying degrees of
heterogeneity in ethnicity, class, and religious beliefs (condition 5); and the ability of economic
and political elites to unify and subject themselves to the authority of a centralized organization
(condition 6). While the remaining conditions are also significant, those just mentioned have had
the greatest effect on shaping the political landscape of the region.
Similar to Tilly, Stein Rokkan constructs a state-building paradigm with the goal of
performing two tasks. The model must focus upon crucial dimensions of variation across
political systems and discuss alternative time sequences in the interaction of such dimensions;
and must serve as a conceptual mapping of variations within and between regions. Rokkan adds
that the initial state-building process can be divided into four phases.
The first phase relates back to Tilly’s sixth condition, which is the period of political,
economic, and cultural unification at the elite level. During that time the elites strike a series of
bargains and establish a variety of cultural bonds across networks of local power-holders. They
also build institutions for the purpose of extracting the resources necessary to create a common
defense, to maintain internal order and adjudicate disputes, to protect established rights and
privileges, and to protect and advance the economy and the polity.”12 The second phase entails
the creation of channels of direct contact between the central elite and peripheral populations as a
means of establishing widespread feelings of identity with the political system. In the third
phase, the new channels of contact engender the active participation of the masses via political
parties, opposition groups and additional organs of representation. In the fourth phase, the
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growth of agencies of redistribution allows for the building of public welfare services and the
equalization of economic conditions among other administrative services.13
Jorge Dominguez’s conception of state creation is similar to both Tilly’s and Rokkan’s.
Dominguez asserts that a state is a set of institutions that retains a legitimate monopoly of force
over a given territory, and has the authority to exercise said force.14 Therefore, a state must have
the capacity to both exert its authority over a given population, as well as be clearly
distinguishable from other organizations present within the same territory. While both Tilly and
Rokkan would agree that these conditions are essential, Dominguez goes further and emphasizes
that state control over a population is a “function of the state’s claim to the monopoly of force.”15
This assertion relates to the idea of the territorial consolidation posited by Finer, which remains
an integral distinction between medieval and contemporary states.
Before I move on to discuss theories of democracy, there are two other theories that are
pertinent to the present analysis. The dependency theory is of particular relevance to Venezuela
as well as Colombia. The theory is constructed on the premise that the sovereign states of the
Southern hemisphere have long been dependent for advanced technology, financing, markets,
and basic imports on an international economic system dominated by northern capitalist powers.
As a result, less developed countries cannot exist as independent nations for they are
economically and politically constrained by their dependence. Furthermore, the structure of the
international system ostensibly confines the economies of countries such Colombia and
Venezuela to either agricultural or extractive industries – industries that inherently provide for
less dynamic forms of growth.16 This asymmetrical relationship undermines the authority and
legitimacy of the weaker state, because it impairs its ability to generate sufficient funds. As a
result, external forces are increasingly able to dictate and influence the development of state
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institutions. In the words of Andre Gunder Frank, “under-development was and still is generated
by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the
development of capitalism itself.”17 The second relevant theory is the resource curse, or paradox
of plenty theory. According to this theory, states rich in minerals and petroleum are predisposed
to generate high levels of corruption, ineffective governance and violence. This theory is
particularly useful when analyzing the impact petroleum has had on the Venezuelan state.18

Theories of Democratization
Robert Dahl, Wolfgang Merkel, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stephan have advanced the most
comprehensive and salient scholarship on the process of democratization in Europe and Latin
America. In his work Regimes and Opposition, Dahl asserts that democratic governments are
fundamentally characterized by their ability to respond to citizens’ preferences without
establishing differences between them. In order for this to transpire, all citizens must have an
equal opportunity to formulate their preferences; publicly manifest their preferences among their
fellow partisans and before the government, both individually and collectively; and be treated
equally by the government. For those three basic conditions to be met, they must be
accompanied by eight essential guarantees:

1. Freedom of association;
2. Freedom of expression;
3. The right to vote;
4. Eligibility for public office;
5. The right of political leaders to compete for votes;
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6. Diverse sources of information;
7. Free and fair elections;
8. Government policies that depend on the vote and other forms of preference expression.19

For Dahl, the extent to which any number of those guarantees is present in a contemporary
political regime can be represented along two dimensions: public contestation and participation.
Four types of regimes are derived from those dimensions: polyarchy, competitive oligarchy,
inclusive hegemony, and closed hegemony. The regime classifications are absolutes – the
extremes of both dimensions. Thus, it is possible and probable that a majority of political
regimes fall somewhere in between these classifications. Dahl’s theoretical framework can be
clearly illustrated by the diagram below:

Competition

Competitive

Polyarchy

Oligarchy

Closed
Hegemony

Inclusive
Hegemony

Participation

In the upper right corner of the diagram are polyarchies. These regimes are considered by Dahl
to be the most democratic since they impose the fewest restrictions on essential freedoms.
Moreover, polyarchies provide various ways for political parties, opposition groups and other
organizations to participate through representative government. Diagonally across from
polyarchy on the diagram are closed hegemonic regimes. In this type of regime all forms of
expression and organization are banned; dissent and opposition are prohibited. Although public
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contestation is nonexistent in both closed and inclusive hegemonic regimes, in the latter,
participation is unconstrained. In Inclusive hegemonies, although there exist hardly any
institutional barriers to participation, the participants lack access to organizations with the
authority to voice their dissent and oppose the government. Finally, located in the upper left
corner of the diagram are competitive oligarchies. Those regimes possess high levels of public
contestation, but restrict participation.20
The scholarship of Wolfgang Merkel differs from Dahl’s. Merkel proposes that a liberal
democracy must consist of five partial regimes. It must have an electoral regime that permits
free, fair, and regular elections; a second one that protects freedoms of speech and association; a
third one that guards civil rights and liberties; a fourth one that ensures the separation of powers
between executive, legislative and judicial branches; and a fifth one that shields elected officials
from attempts by nonelected groups to overrule or overthrow them. Merkel also contends that for
a political regime to be considered democratic, the aforementioned requirements must be
mutually embedded. Simply put, partial conditions are contingently interconnected.21
In turn, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan assert that in addition to a well-functioning state,
five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must be present, or be crafted, in
order for a democracy to be consolidated. The prerequisites are the existence of a free and lively
civil society; of a relatively autonomous political society; of an established rule of law that
protects individual freedoms and associational life; of an effective state bureaucracy; and of an
institutionalized economic society.22 Linz and Stepan go a step further and identify two major
obstacles to democratic consolidation. They are the dangers posed by ethnic conflict in
multinational states, and by disappointed popular hopes for economic improvement in states
undergoing simultaneous political and economic reform. Although Linz and Stepan label those
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photos as “surmountable obstacles”, they are nevertheless, potentially inhibiting factors to the
consolidation of democracy.
Lastly, it is imperative to draw a clear boundary between democratic and non- democratic
regimes. It is counterproductive to claim that some democracies are more or less democratic than
others, for democracy is directly related to the presence of all of the aforementioned conditions.
For instance, it is false to consider a regime that prohibits competitive elections to be democratic
even if it satisfies other conditions of democracy. Thus, terms such as “illiberal democracy” or
“partial democracy” are useless as they are counterintuitive.23

Latin American Theories of State Creation and Democratization
To present a comprehensive review of the variety of theories related to state creation and
democratization in Latin America, I will separate this section into two, with one focusing on
factors that have affected the process of state creation, and the second one on the elements that
have impacted the process of democratization.
In addition to the state-creation theories posited by Tilly and Rokkan, there are several
salient theories of state-creation specific to Latin America. Frank Safford and Fernando LopezAlvez have posited two of the most comprehensive arguments. According to Frank Safford, an
assemblage of seven factors has either enabled or inhibited state development in nineteenthcentury Latin America. They are:

1.

Economic geography, including topography, resources, and relative economic
integration;
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2.

Political geography, including geographic and transportation conditions
affecting political integration;

3.

Relative economic and fiscal strength;

4.

Public acceptance of the political systems, whether framed in constitutions or
not;

5.

The degree to which the military was under the control of civil authorities;

6.

The role of the Catholic Church; and

7.

The nation’s vulnerability to external attack or pressure.

Safford emphasizes that the relative importance and effects of each variable differs from
case to case.24 For example, whereas the Catholic Church was not a significant source of division
in Venezuela, it was a major source of conflict and armed struggle in Colombia. Control over the
military was also a very important factor that if achieved, enhanced the ability of a state to
consolidate its power. Lastly, Safford concludes that vulnerability to external pressure appears to
have been a relatively unimportant variable in the grand scheme of state creation.
Lopez-Alvez posits an argument that diverges from the one advanced by Safford. LopezAlvez asserts that feudal characteristics of rural life in several Latin American countries are not
accurate predictors of state-creation. Rather, more relevant to the process, are conflict and
concomitant collective action. For Lopez-Alvez, those two factors together have determined
access to the means of production, altered property relations, created new classes, and displaced
old land and trade monopolies in Latin American states. In relation to conflict, those who strive
to consolidate the power of the state relied principally on the support of members of the nobility
during wars. The degree to which they were successful, in turn, affected the timing and character
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of class alliances and the development of state bureaucracies. Lastly, Lopez-Alvez postulates that
the state creation process was less cumbersome when the members of the rebellious upper class
were unable to unite against the elites at the center; when the landed gentry were defeated in
their own domains; and when battles took place in distant regions not controlled by the
government.25

Conditions of Democratic Consolidation
There are a number of conditions that have affected the consolidation, or lack thereof, of
democracy throughout Latin America. For Jeff Haynes they are the political culture and
legitimacy of the post-authoritarian regime; the nature of political participation and institutions;
and the economic and international conditions under which the drive to consolidate the
democratic regime ensued. Haynes also asserts that the development of a strong civic culture
imbued with high levels of mutual trust, tolerance of diversity and a propensity to compromise,
is essential to the stability of a democratic regime. Larry Diamond builds upon this idea with his
contention that, “these elements [moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation] of
political culture were necessary…to cope with one of the central dilemmas of democracy: to
balance cleavage and conflict with the need for consensus.”26 The way in which such a culture is
created and maintained is through the healthy functioning of democratic institutions and
structures over a long duration of time. Due to the cyclical resurgence of authoritarian rule
generally experienced throughout Latin America however, these institutions remain relatively
weak. As a result, a strong civic culture imbued with the aforementioned qualities remains
particularly elusive in most nations throughout Latin America.
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Moreover, Hayes argues that political leaders in developing states are rarely willing to
relinquish their power. This obstacle to democratic consolidation is quite common amongst most
Latin American countries, not only because public participation is routinely sidestepped, but also
because military intervention is frequently relied upon to either retain power or to topple those in
power.27 Regarding Haynes’ second condition, John Peeler asserts that from 1900-1975 liberal
democracies were able to persist when regimes proved able to absorb and co-opt substantial
forms of political participation without altering the balance of political power. As such, the
successful establishment of liberal democracy in Latin America was contingent upon the
regime’s ability to include major interests in the decision-making process, as to avoid rebellion.
In his study of five early democratic regimes (Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Venezuela) Peeler concluded that all of the regimes remained politically stable for decades
because each was structured to maintain social and economic stability. Simply put, while most
Latin American countries dealt with expanding political participation either through populist
authoritarianism and electoral manipulation, repression, or revolution, the five aforementioned
regimes were able to remain democratic due to a highly institutionalized political system as well
as by political pacts formed at the elite levels.28
Lastly, Haynes, relies on the works of Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio
Chibub, and Fernando Limongi, to contend that for democracy to survive, a country must already
have a democracy in place, must be affluent, must generate economic growth, allow moderate
inflation and reduce income inequality, must have parliamentary institutions and be positioned in
an amicable international environment.29 By looking at the relationship between economic
performance and democratic stability, Przeworski and his three co-authors conclude that while
there is a strong correlation between economic performance and the consolidation and
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persistence of democratic regimes in Latin America, a country’s level of economic development
alone could not predict whether a regime will become democratic.30 Many of Haynes’ arguments
are expanded in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset’s,
Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America.31
With this brief discussion of a number of theories of state creation and democratization
and their applications to Latin America, I have established a base upon which I will conduct my
analysis. In the following chapters, I discuss the processes of state-building and regime
formation that transpired in Colombia and Venezuela, and posit a theoretical argument for each
as to why both nations have problems creating solid democratic regimes.
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CHAPTER 1
Colombia: An Unconsolidated Democracy

Introduction
Today state authority in Colombia is formally exercised in accordance with the 1991
constitution, which defines Colombia as a “decentralized, unitary Republic, with autonomous
territorial entities, democratic, participatory, and pluralist”. Although the ‘state-of-siege’ powers
that Colombian presidents have repeatedly relied on to exercise legislative as well as judicial
power have been significantly curtailed, the executive continues to be the key political office in
Colombia. Moreover, in 2015 a series of constitutional amendments known as the Balance of
Power reform eliminated immediate presidential reelection to further deter executive
concentration of power. Elections have been relatively peaceful, although the 2014 legislative
elections were marred by accusations of fraud, vote buying, and connections with criminals. This
latest incident of perceived electoral tampering has engendered a flurry of debate primarily
amongst intellectuals and government officials surrounding the strengthening of financing and
political contribution laws, as well as the implementation of more efficient vote-counting
mechanisms.
Ever since the constitutional reform of 1991, the traditional Liberal-Conservative partisan
duopoly in Congress has been on the decline. The new system is comprised of the traditional
parties as well as regional movements, ideological groups (both from the right and left), and
technocratic or issue-oriented parties. Corruption still occurs at multiple levels of public
administration, albeit to a lesser degree than in previous years. Civil liberties, associational and
organizational rights, and rule of law all remain weakly enforced by the state. The inability of the
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state to protect civil liberties and ensure the rule of law greatly inhibits liberal democratic
governance in Colombia.
In this chapter I justify the aforementioned contentions. To do so, I divide Colombia’s
history into distinct periods. Following the section that focuses on the era of independence, I
identify and analyze the political, economic, social, cultural and geographical factors that
affected the state creation process. At the end of this historical overview, I briefly discuss the
current state of democracy in Colombia.

Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times
Ever since pre-colonial times, the twin aspects of geography and climate have had a
decisive impact on the social, political and economic development of Colombia. In order to
comprehend the processes of state-creation and democratization that have transpired in
Colombia, it is essential to develop a better understanding of the natural and human
environments that existed within the region.
Located in the northwest corner of South America, Colombia shares its borders with
Venezuela and Brazil to the east, Ecuador to the south, while the Panamanian isthmus provides a
land route into Central America. On either side of the isthmus there is a coastline – a Caribbean
Sea coastline and a Pacific Ocean one. Primarily dominated by three Andean mountain ranges
separated by two broad river valleys (that of the Magdalena and Cauca rivers), Colombia’s
topographical attributes also include the tropical rain forest of the Amazon jungle, the grasslands
of the Orinoco River, and other tropical rain forests located on both the Caribbean and Pacific
coasts.
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The fourth largest country in Latin America covering approximately 440,829 square
miles in area, Colombia can be separated into three distinct regions: 1) the mountainous region of
the west, where three principal ranges of the Andes (the Western, Eastern and Central
Cordilleras) cut the country and provide for its climatic variations; 2) the eastern region, which
consists of low-lying flat lands to the north composed of extensive plains (llanos) and the
Amazonian Jungle to the south; and 3) the area shaped by the Pacific and Caribbean coasts.32
The Andean region covers around 30 percent of the country’s surface area but retains upwards of
75 percent of the population. The eastern region constitutes approximately 58 percent of the
territory, but only 5.5 percent of the population lives there. The Caribbean coast, which
encompasses around 12 percent of the territory, holds close to 20 percent of the population.33
Colombia is imbued with a climate that is tropical not only in the relative constancy of
local temperatures, but also in the abundance of rainfall experienced throughout most of the
national territory.34 The combination of constant temperature and ample rain allows for the
vigorous growth of a wide variety of vegetation both in the hot lowland areas and in the Andes.
The Andes, which range from 500 meters at their lowest point to more than 5700 meters at their
highest, make the existence of three main climatic regions possible. Since temperature changes at
varying altitudes, these regions can be separated into: the cold highlands, the temperate slopes,
and the hot valleys. Historically, the most inhabited regions have been the highlands, for the
moderate climate provides an escape from the heat and the tropical diseases associated with the
lower territories. Additionally, fertile intermountain valleys offer favorable conditions for
agriculture.35 The valleys, troughs, and basins among the ranges, at altitudes varying between
2,500 and 4,000 meters, have presented and continue to present living conditions favorable
enough to attract and support large populations.36 It is within these intermountain valleys where
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the most complex Amerindian societies developed. Settlement on the warmer slopes and hot
plains occurred solely because of the pressures generated by land concentration and population
growth in the 19th century.

Pre-Columbian Societies
Pre-Columbian peoples of many different tongues and cultural attributes were dispersed
throughout Colombia. The three most dominant linguistic families were: the Chibcha, the Carib,
and the Arawak.37 These dialects were mutually unintelligible, which resulted in political
fragmentation as well as the presence of cultural dissimilarities that served to further isolate them
from one another. Moreover, the complexity of sociopolitical organization, levels of economic
development, and settlement patterns of these indigenous populations varied substantially. The
largest and most developed indigenous groups were the Muisca, the Tairona, and the Cenu.38 The
Muisca, or Chibcha, lived in the Cordillera Oriental east of the upper Magdalena River in eastcentral Colombia. The Tairona were located in what now is part of northern Colombia – between
the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and the coast, and the Cenu occupied an area to the south-west
of the Tairona.39
Upon their arrival, the Spanish encountered both large, socially stratified, indigenous
kingdoms such as the Muisca, the Tairona and the Cenu, as well as a variety of smaller, less
hierarchical chiefdoms. The larger more complex societies generally relied upon a firm
economic base in intensive, and often irrigated, agriculture, supplemented by hunting and
fishing. Commerce between chiefdoms flourished, although fierce antagonisms and chronic
conflict between some groups persisted due to cultural and linguistic differences. The
establishment of trading centers within the more economically advanced chiefdoms facilitated

24

the frequent exchange of goods such as: gold, sea salt, fish, cotton textiles, peccaries and slaves,
over longer distances primarily along the Magdalena river as well as other river routes. The
construction of elaborate agricultural works, temples, roads, stairways, plazas and bridges found
in the settlements of the Tairona and the Cenu, implied the development of elaborately
hierarchical societies. As for sociopolitical organization, most of the developed chiefdoms of the
West (specifically in the Cauca region), as well as in the lowlands of northern Colombia, were
divided into territorial or state-like political organizations each under the jurisdiction of a local
chief, albeit federated under a paramount chieftain. The aristocratic class within these states
included warrior leaders, chiefs and other prominent members of society who received tribute
from commoners, enjoyed the privilege of polygyny, wore golden plates and other ornaments of
gold, and were given special burial at death.40
Political fragmentation and chronic warfare within chiefdoms as well as between rivaling
indigenous groups enabled the Spaniards to conquer with little difficulty even the largest of the
indigenous chiefdoms. Once the Spaniards had achieved their intended objective, they essentially
imposed their own sociopolitical hierarchies atop those already in existence. In areas where there
was a more permanently and densely settled indigenous population, such as in the Eastern
highlands, the Spaniards began to extract wealth through a system of indirect rule in which
native leaders were charged with collecting tribute in gold from their vassals.41 Alternatively,
indigenous groups such as the Tairona, who were able to escape from the European onslaught by
retreating into swamps, mountains or other nearby undesirable regions, deprived the Spaniards of
an easily subdued native labor force. The presence of a dense and docile indigenous labor force
in some regions and the absence of one in others resulted in salient demographic distinctions that
would subsequently affect the economic, social and political development of each region

25

throughout the colonial period. In the decades directly following the arrival of the Spaniards, the
indigenous population of the Colombian territory declined rapidly under the pressure of warfare,
disease, miscegenation, and abortion.42 Between 1537, when the Spaniards first passed through
the greater part of the Cauca Valley, and the 1570s, the indigenous populations along the Cauca
River diminished in many places between 80 and 95 percent.43

Spanish Conquest and the Colonial Period
The Spaniards created their largest posts in areas that had a dense and subdued
indigenous population, whom they exploited to supply food, cheap and reliable labor force, and
revenue. The absence of a large docile indigenous population, as was the case in the Eastern
Cordillera, would have generally precluded the successful establishment of early Spanish
settlements. However, the presence of precious minerals – such as gold, and occasionally silver
– and the temptation striking it rich swiftly, compelled many Spaniards to settle. As gold
deposits became scarce and the indigenous labor supply died out, mining towns disappeared.
The first Europeans arrived in present day Colombia at the 15th century and soon began to
establish trade relations with local indigenous groups. In 1508 the Crown authorized two projects
for permanent settlement. One of the projects entailed the establishment of permanent
settlements along the mainland shores of New Andalucía – a domain originally stretching from
the Gulf of Uraba east to Cabo de la Vela on the Guajira Peninsula. Two years later, the assigned
leader started the first colony in Colombian territory at San Sebastian de Uraba.44 After fighting
and enslaving several members of the native population, the colonizers were forced to abandon
the settlement due to increasing indigenous hostilities. Subsequently, the Spaniards established a
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new base at Santa Maria de la Antigua. Lacking the support of the indigenous peoples, who had
been decimated by disease, the Spaniards abandoned Santa Maria de la Antigua in 1524.45
As they moved westward, the colonizers settled near the Gulf of Urabá, in the Darien
region. The settlement became the foundation of the Spanish colony of Castilla del Oro on the
Isthmus of Panama. Providing a base from which the Spanish would extend their influence and
establish more permanent control over the Gulf of Urabá, the colony also became a jumping-off
point for Francisco Pizarro’s expedition into Peru. In 1526, another important settlement was
constructed at the eastern end of the Caribbean coast – Santa Marta. The territorial limits
associated with this settlement came to be Cabo de la Vela to the east and the Magdalena River
to the west. Soon thereafter, Coro, located east of Santa Marta on the coast of Venezuela, was
founded, providing for another strategic base of operations. In 1533, the founding of the town of
Cartagena de Indias supplied the Spaniards with yet another permanent foothold on the
Caribbean coast. The settlement attracted hundreds of adventurers and covered a large swath of
land located between the Gulf of Uraba and the Magdalena River. Gold discovered in the tombs
of the Cenu further attracted the Spanish to plunder the area at the expense of indigenous
populations. In both Santa Marta and Cartagena de Indias, the governing practices of the Spanish
resulted in the drastic depopulation of these areas as well as the exploitation of indigenous
communities. Natives were often looted for gold, provisions, and were enslaved; if the Spaniards
encountered any form of indigenous resistance, they set fire to their homes and fields.
Eventually, Spanish looting engendered a more systematic exploitation of the land and its
peoples. In the 1540s those indigenous peoples who had survived the initial plundering of the
Spanish in Cartagena, were gathered into encomiendas to provide the tribute required to sustain
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the Spanish settlement. Santa Marta and Cartagena both served as permanent bases from which
the Spanish conquered and colonized the Colombian interior.46
By 1535, native tombs not far inland revealed gold almost on the scale found in Peru or
Mexico. This discovery provided the impetus for the organization of numerous expeditions into
the surrounding area. By 1538, three separate expeditionary forces had emerged onto the
mountain plains inhabited by the Muisca. Within a year, using the well-tried combination of
intimidation, warfare, and politics, most of the Muisca territory had been conquered.47 Given the
ambitions of the conquistadores to accumulate wealth and consolidate their power, the three
leaders of each exposition agreed to an arrangement that gave the authorities in Spain the power
to decide to whom the newly founded territory should belong. Ultimately, the conquistadores
bestowed the title of “el Nuevo Reino de Granada” (the New Kingdom of Granada) on the new
territory and founded the present capital of Colombia, Santafe de Bogotá.48
With the establishment of Santafe de Bogota, the Spanish were able to easily consolidate
their control over the eastern highlands as well as to use the settlement as a base for further
conquest and colonization. Fanning out into neighboring territories, the Spanish ventured to the
north, extending to Velez, Tunja, and Pamplona; and to the west, crossing the Magdalena River
and founding towns at Ibague, Mariquita, and Honda. They also spread eastward, moving down
the slopes of the Andes to the edge of the llanos, establishing bases at Medina de las Torres,
Santiago de las Atalyas, and San Juan de los Llanos. Finally, to the South, they traversed the
Quindio Mountains, opening up contact with the fledgling settlements of the Cauca region;
which had already established communication with the conquered zones in Quito.49
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By the end of the 16th century it had become evident that these nascent cities from which
the Spanish sought to dominate the surrounding countryside did not immediately constitute a
coherent colonial dominion.50 The two chief regional centers of Spanish control in the interior
were the eastern highlands and the upper Cauca region. These two regions were physically
separated from each other by the Central Cordillera, which was often impassable by mule, as
well as particularly vulnerable to sporadic attacks orchestrated by the native peoples living in the
mountains. The physical separation created a considerable barrier to transportation as well as to
communication, which in turn resulted in the relative isolation of these regions from one another.
Not only were these two regions physically disconnected from one another, but they were also
separated administratively. This divide was primarily due to the patterns of conquest carried out
by different conquistadores. As a result, Popayan and much of the rest of the Cauca region
remained under the authority of Quito until 1549 when Santafe de Bogota became the seat of an
audiencia. However, much of the western region was then returned to the jurisdiction of Quito
when it became an audiencia in 1563. Physically and administratively separated, these two
regions had become economically self-sufficient by the start of the 17th century.51
In the eastern highlands, the production of grains and the weaving of textiles became the
principal economic activities, while in the west the extraction of gold became the motor of the
economy. By the 1580s, gold dust from the West was paying for the textiles woven by Indians in
the Eastern Cordillera, while grains, textiles, and easily preserved foods (hardtack, cheese, and
hams) from the Eastern region were being sent to some mining centers on the western side of the
Magdalena River. However, due to high transportation costs, the volume of this trade between
the two regions was not substantial.52 The third major region of Spanish settlement, the
Caribbean coast and the lower Magdalena River Valley, retained its own special functions. It
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nearly developed a monopoly on all external commerce – namely the legal imports of European
luxury products and African slaves. Being situated on the Caribbean, Cartagena became the New
Kingdom of Granada’s leading port, for it allowed the Spanish to easily deliver goods to and
extract gold from the interior. Cartagena also had a complementary relationship with the two
major interior regions. It sent most of its imported luxury goods to Santafe de Bogota – the chief
consumption and distribution center in the eastern highlands, and imported slaves to the mining
towns of the west. In return, the Caribbean coastal region received agricultural and manufactured
consumer goods from the East, and gold from the West.
During the early colonial period, the amount of gold produced by the Kingdom of New
Granada far surpassed that of the other colonial regions of the Spanish empire, and continued to
do so into the 16th century and beyond.53 Production began at Popayan (located in the southern
area of the Western Cordillera) before 1540, and at Antioquia (located in the northern area of the
Western Cordillera) in 1546. Though by the 17th century gold production in the existing mining
towns had diminished measurably, it regained momentum in the next century as new deposits
were discovered. The discovery of the new gold deposits resulted in the founding of new mining
frontiers in two regions – the Pacific lowlands of Western Colombia, specifically in the Choco,
and in the province of Antioquia located in the highlands of the Central Cordillera.54
The Spaniards placed great value on gold for it was Colombia’s only significant export as
well as their principal means for the payment of imported European luxuries.55 Although the
Kingdom of New Granada (becoming New Granada in 1717) assumed the role as the single
largest producer of gold in colonial Spanish America, the wealth generated by this industry paled
in comparison to the wealth generated by the silver mining industries in Mexico and Peru:
“Between 1735 and 1800, the gold registered in New Granada’s western mining regions
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represented less than one-thirteenth of the value of Mexican bullion mined in the same years.”56
The lure of gold may first have drawn Spain and the conquistadores to America, however it was
the presence of silver that prolonged their stay.
Because the extraction of silver took precedence over the extraction of gold, the large
fixed investments, and complex or expensive technology that was present in the silver mining
colonies of Mexico and Peru was absent in New Granada. This difference had an important
impact on the development of New Granada’s elite. Since the wealth produced in New Granada
was less substantial relative to the other colonies, it did not develop an elite as wealthy as the
elites of either Mexico or Peru. Nevertheless, by the end of the colonial period, the gold mine
boom in both Popayan and Antioquia had helped generate a large commercial bourgeoisie.57
The regions in Colombia also developed distinct ethnic features. In the agrarian eastern
highlands, the dense indigenous population did not die as fast as it did in the mining regions.
Thus, by the eighteenth century, miscegenation in the eastern highlands between Spaniards and
the indigenous peoples had become a common occurrence, imbuing the region with a largely
mestizo population. In the West and on the Caribbean coast, however, the natives died at a much
higher rate, facilitating the introduction of African slaves as a method to replenish a declining
indigenous labor force. Soon thereafter, African slaves came to provide much of the
demographic base in these two regions.
Differing population profiles compounded by distinctive regional economic roles led to
the development of a variety of institutions designed to enforce colonial socio-economic
hierarchies and to organize indigenous labor according to specific regional attributes. In the
eastern highlands, the exploitation and Christianization of the large indigenous population was a
central theme. Questions of how and how much the natives should work for the Spaniards
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became the focus of imperial governance in the sixteenth century. Faced with a rapidly shrinking
indigenous population, the Spaniards were also preoccupied with the ethical dilemmas generated
by their imposition of forced labor on those who survived and the obligation dictated by the
Catholic Church to convert them, civilize them, and treat them well.58 The encomienda was
created to resolve the dilemma. The system’s rules dictated that the native peoples would provide
the encomenderos goods and labor, and in return, would receive spiritual guidance, protection
and stability. The outcome proved to be very different. As the steadily accumulated great wealth
and frequently contested the authority of the crown, the encomenderos exploited the natives, and
neglected to ‘enlighten’ and fully convert them.59
The continuous decline of the native population made the encomienda system obsolete.
Religious acculturation and political control of the native population presented additional
concerns. Since encomiendas constituted large expanses of land, in the later part of the sixteenth
century, native peasants lived relatively dispersed on individual plots or in small communities.
This arrangement, in turn, enabled them to preserve many of their own cultural and religious
practices despite their formal conversion to Christianity.60 Convinced that the natural dispersion
of the indigenous population inhibited indigenous religious acculturation, and thus Spanish
political control, between 1590 and 1620 Spanish administrators implemented a policy that
facilitated the concentration of indigenous peoples into large towns.
The creation of collective communities, called resguardos, effectively removed the
indigenous peoples from the plots of land that they had previously occupied. The transferal of
native peasants to smaller plots of land generated a large supply of indigenous labor for the
Spanish haciendas. Moreover, the larger indigenous labor force also served to increase the
ability of the Spaniards to engage members of the native population in a wider variety of labor
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obligations, such as providing designated terms of service to residents in cities, to mines, and to
Spanish farmers.61 Finally, the forced consolidation of the native population into resguardos
opened up large areas of fertile land for acquisition by Spaniards, who in turn used their
landholdings to grow European crops and to raise livestock for sale in city markets and mining
zones. Soon thereafter, landholdings of this kind began to replace the encomienda as a major
source of wealth.62 Similarly to what had occurred in the East Cordillera, in the West, wherever
there was a large indigenous population – such as in the Cauca region – the Spaniards initially
relied upon the encomienda to generate a labor force. As the indigenous population declined,
however, the Spaniards began to establish large landholdings where they raised cattle and grew
food crops.
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the production of gold remained the dominant
economic activity of the Colombian region. In the sixteenth century, the labor force of most
gold-mining towns was composed of black slaves and free prospectors, known as mazamorreros.
In the Pacific lowland mining zones, slavery was the dominant form of labor, and mine
ownership was concentrated amongst few individuals. Conversely, in Antioquia, ownership was
less concentrated, and although slaves constituted a large portion of the labor force, the free labor
provided by these mazamorreros played an essential role in gold production.63 One of the
reasons the mazamorreros played a central role was because it costs more to transport legally
African slaves than it did to rely on the indigenous peoples of the region. However, as the native
population declined, African slaves began to constitute most of the labor force in the mines. The
Caribbean region followed a similar path. However, instead of using African slaves to work on
the gold mines, they were used primarily to cultivate beans, cassava, and plantains on plots near
Cartagena, and maize in the Cenu region.64
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Spanish colonial society after conquest was highly complex and extremely stratified. On
top of the social hierarchy were the original conquistadores, who for the most part were members
of Spain’s manual trades or lower professions. Some were hidalgos with noble backgrounds, but
they typically came from Spain’s lowest social strata. By taking part in major conquests,
however, these men constructed a socio-economic hierarchy in which they assumed the
dominant position. Their elevated social status was closely intertwined with their ability to
extract and amass large quantities of wealth at the expense of the existing indigenous population.
Post-conquest settlers – the primeros pobladores – also enjoyed a high socio-economic status, as
many of them became encomenderos. In general, encomenderos tended to surround themselves
with the material comforts associated with Spanish nobility - large houses set on broad estates,
and a retinue of relatives and vassals. Occupying the lower rungs of Spanish colonial society in
descending socio-economic order were mestizos – the progeny of Spanish and native
miscegenation among other racial intermixtures including mulattoes, zambos etc., the indigenous
population, and lastly black slaves. Although these populations were primarily relegated to the
lower social and economic positions in society, fluidity, rather than rigidity within certain limits,
was the essence of being mestizo in colonial Spanish America.65
By the 18th century, with its population growing and changing, New Granada had become
a largely mestizo society. This process had started in the late 16th century, with the
implementation of the resguardos. Despite strict legal proscriptions against intrusion into the
resguardos by non-Indians, demand for land generated by a growing colonial population,
combined with the natives’ need to obtain money as to meet their tributary obligations, resulted
in the illegal leasing of resguardo lands to small numbers of white and mestizo farmers. By
1778, invasion of indigenous lands and racial mixing was so advanced that the government’s
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“Protector of Indians” no longer found it feasible to distinguish between the native and mestizo
elements of the rural population.66 According to the 1778-1780 censuses, the population was
divided into the four basic racial categories: whites, blacks, Indians, and “free people of all
colors”.
The census showed that people of mixed race made up 46 percent of New Granada’s
population, whites constituted 26 percent, Indians 20 percent, and black slaves 8 percent.67 As
exemplified by the census, the native population had drastically declined, being displaced by
mestizos and whites. The process of miscegenation, or mestizaje, that drew natives into mestizo
society, was the driving force behind the growth of the population. Either through marriage or
cohabitation with mestizos, members of the indigenous populations became part of the mestizo
population and thus reduced the reproductive base of their original communities. The growth in
the white population on the other hand, stemmed from a natural increase amongst American-born
Spaniards who constituted an emerging social class: the creoles. Although the creole class
enjoyed a higher socio-economic status, the Spaniards - especially those among the higher social
classes – stood above them. However, among the majority of whites who were not included
within the ranks of the elites, marriage or cohabitation with members of other racial groups
resulted in an increase in the population of those who may have passed as white.
The white ruling class viewed the substantial increase in the size of the mestizo
population with fear. They perceived the rapid expansion of this demographic to be a potential
threat to their socio-economic dominance. As a result, claims to ‘limpieza de sangre’ (pure
Spanish decent) were fiercely contested during the eighteenth century, as whites fought to
distinguish themselves from the expanding mestizo and mulatto groups in order to reinforce the

35

existing colonial socio-economic hierarchies. Notwithstanding these developments, as the
number of mestizos increased they assumed a wider array of roles in colonial society.68
Despite the socially divisive measures implemented by members of the white class,
colonial society in New Granada became less rigid than those where native cultures had
remained strong, and indigenous populations remained segregated from the white populations such as was the case in the southern Andean regions of Peru, or southern Mexico.69 Simply put,
since colonial society in New Granada was more of an ethnic hybrid, racial divisions tended to
be less important in social and political life. Moreover, without alternative native languages and
cultures, lower social classes were more thoroughly hispanicized.70 That being said, it would be a
mistake to infer that society in New Granada had achieved greater integration than other colonial
regions of the Spanish empire, or that the colonial elites had attained greater control. Rather,
without a strong sense of ethnic separateness, the mestizo and poor white populations tended to
identify with their localities. Thus, as white and mestizo villages grew, they generally cultivated
local rights and privileges and sought official recognition as autonomous municipalities able to
manage their own affairs.
As the highly specialized development of regional economies engendered substantial
differences between the racial compositions of regional populations as well as regional social
structures, the fragmentation of political authority within the territory did much to exacerbate an
incipient sense of regional autonomy. Initially, under the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Santafe
de Bogota from 1546-1717, the centralized authority over New Granada was fragmented and
generally weak. Moreover, throughout much of the 16th and 17th centuries, the Audiencia lacked
formal authority over much of what is now western Colombia, which was governed by the
Audiencia of Quito after its inception in 1563. Due to Colombia’s divisive topological features,
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transportation and communication difficulties also restricted the ability of the Audiencia of
Santafe to assert control over its designated territory. As a result, provincial governors remained
independent of the authority of the Audiencia, while internecine conflict between the Church
authorities and the Audiencia further inhibited the governing capacity of the colonial state.71
At the beginning of the 18th century, the Spanish Monarchs acknowledged that its
colonies were being governed inefficiently and that they lacked formal authoritative powers.
Moved partly by the exigencies of war (due to multiple military engagements with England and
France over the duration of the 18th century), Spain’s rulers understood that greater military
power required increased governmental revenues, which depended on their capacity to increase
administrative efficiency and economic production. This realization facilitated the promulgation
of various reforms designed to augment military strength, collect more revenues, achieve greater
administrative effectiveness, as well as solidify Spanish authority within its colonies. Under the
stewardship of the Bourbons, Spain created the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 and
designated Santafe de Bogota as its capital. The new viceroyalty consisted of present-day
Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, and much of Venezuela. Due to the lack of sufficient revenues to
sustain an efficient bureaucracy, the viceroyalty was disbanded in 1723. The renewed threat of
war with England in 1738 compelled Spain to reinstitute the viceroyalty to protect the port of
Cartagena from mounting English hostilities within the region. This time, the viceroyalty
encompassed a larger swath of colonial territory, including what is now Colombia, Ecuador,
Panama, most of Venezuela, and the islands of Trinidad and Margarita. From its reinstatement
all the way through the second half of the 18th century, the Viceroyalty of New Granada
underwent a wide array of administrative, economic and social reforms. Ironically, these reforms
set the stages for rebellion rather than for the further consolidation of Spanish colonial rule.
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In the vice-royal government, the Spaniards dominated the highest administrative
positions in society, primarily due to the Spanish Monarchs’ beliefs that men governing outside
of their homelands would be more loyal to the Crown and less entangled in local interests.
Additionally, Spanish royal administrators, both in Spain and the Viceroyalty, were naturally
more inclined to trust men born in Spain than those born in the colonial territory. Generally
denied the highest political positions, creoles of higher socio-economic status were primarily
relegated to the middle or lower levels of the colonial administration. Frequently serving as
provincial administrators (corregidores), lieutenant governors, or lawyers practicing before the
Audiencia, the creole elite were often highly educated aspirants for government office. By the
end of the 18th century, the rapidly emerging cadre of creole lawyers began to voice openly their
resentment, which led to a series of tense and hostile confrontations between the two
administrative groups preceding independence.
Of the plethora of concerns that preoccupied those who governed the viceroyalty of New
Granada, the need to produce more gold and deliver it back to Spain, along with maintaining the
defenses of Cartagena - the port through which all commerce flowed back to the mother country
– were of utmost importance. In a drive to combat contraband and thus increase the amount of
gold that would reach Spain, the Bourbons established more avenues of legal trade and attempted
to diversify colonial exports. In New Granada, however, illicit commerce continued despite the
creation of the new trading avenues. Moreover, the diversification of colonial exports generally
conflicted with the production of bullion. Continued defense of bullion shipments also entailed
massive investment in the fortification of the Caribbean coast, particularly the port of Cartagena.
As a result the Spanish crown was unable to finance basic development projects, as well as
improve overland transportation. While legal trade routes were generally infringed upon due to
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Spain’s armed engagement with England for most of the eighteenth century, most cities in New
Granada – primarily the coastal cities of Santa Marta and Riohacha - had no alternative but to
engage in illegal trading to export their crops and animal products. Moreover, Spanish authorities
tended to extend the benefits of neutral trade as well as eliminate export taxes to Cuba and
Venezuela, while denying these same advantages to New Granada. These seemingly unfair
conditions of trade became a significant source of irritation to creole elites determined to expand
their exports. From around 1790 onward, educated creoles began to point out the ineptitudes of
the Spanish regime. They primarily focused their criticisms on the lack of efficient means of
internal communication and the obstruction of unrestricted external trade.72
Although tackling the dilemma of smuggling and fostering economic development were
two primary objectives of the Bourbon reforms, the crown’s chief preoccupation was to increase
revenue. As already noted, additional revenues were needed to cover the costs associated with
war, pay for the elaborate administrative establishment of a vice-regal government, and help to
finance and sustain frontier missions.73 Therefore, in the 1750s, vice-regal administrators began
to advocate for more efficacious revenue collection methods, which included the monopolization
of tobacco and cane liquor, a rise in the prices of goods, and an increase in sales tax. While these
innovations increased revenues, and enabled the viceroyalty to become less dependent upon the
wealthier viceroyalties for military expenditures, in general, it was unable to entirely support the
costs of its own administration and defense.74
By the late 18th century, patterns of war-induced tax exactions, accompanied by riots and
protests, had become a common occurrence. This cycle was exacerbated by the diffusion of the
North American and French revolutionary ideals amongst the creole elite.75 According to
Michael Taussig, the appearance of slave rebellions and flights in the late eighteenth century
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represented, “a major social factor alongside the growing restlessness of free blacks and a
general wave of discontent in the colony as a whole.”76 The most striking manifestation of this
discontent in New Granada was the Comunero movement of 1780-1781, in which the imposition
of a new tax on tobacco and cane liquor provoked the eruption of riots in the province of
Soccoro. Initially, a protest generated by the masses rather than orchestrated by the local elites,
the Comuneros demanded that in all future administrative appointments, creoles, not Spaniards,
should be extended preferential treatment. As the movement subsided, it was later revealed that
most of the creole elite were frightened by the mass rioting of the Comunero rebellion, and either
acquiesced or supported its repression.77 While many scholars who have studied the Comunero
rebellion have disagreed upon its significance, it is most prudent to consider the movement as a
foreshadowing event to independence. The public display of anger toward Spanish
administrators as well as the overwhelming desire for local governance on the part of the masses
indicated a growing resentment towards the continuation of foreign colonial domination.
Although the drive for independence had yet to gain extensive backing, the events that transpired
in 1781 represented a step toward the formation of a nationalist sentiment.
In summary, the patterns of conquest that originally divided the territory into three
relatively disconnected regions, communication and transportation problems caused by harsh
topographical attributes, as well as the initial fragmentation of authority within the region,
gradually resulted in a pervasive sense of regional autonomy that would have significant
implications upon the subsequent development of Kingdom of New Granada. Additionally,
while a large, compliant indigenous population located primarily in the eastern highlands
allowed for the rapid transformation of numerous Spanish settlements into commercial hubs,
much of the western region, imbued with gold deposits, generally lacked a consistent and readily

40

accessible labor force. However, the importation and transportation of African slaves to the
mining towns in the West gradually yielded an increase in regional population that in turn
generated an overall surge in gold productivity. As a Spanish colonial possession, New
Granada’s economic significance was primarily as a producer of gold, and quickly assumed the
role as the principal source of gold in the Spanish Empire.78
As already noted, although the Comunero rebellion was not orchestrated by the creole
elite, many of its members became incredibly critical of the Spanish regime, especially regarding
the ability of Spanish administrators to govern effectively. This nascent skepticism surrounding
the efficacy of Spanish colonial administration was influenced by the French Revolution of 1789,
and by Haiti’s independence from France in 1804. However, creole discontent in New Granada
tended to remain hidden, because many creoles enjoyed the socio-economic advantages
associated with being members of the dominant class. Generally, creoles did not agree with the
notions of inherent human freedom and equality, nor did they accept that government should be
representative of the popular will.

Independence and its Aftermath
In 1808, the Spanish monarchs were forced to abdicate the throne to Napoleon, thrusting
Spain as well as its colonies into political disarray. Those loyal to the Crown quickly established
a Central Junta tasked with the unification of the provinces (and the colonies) under a central
authority. Over time it became clear that the Junta was unable to organize resistance efforts
against the French and maintain the unity of provincial Juntas under its authority. As the
legitimacy of the Junta waned, uncertainty and insecurity regarding the future administration of
the colonies pervaded the colonial elite. Creole notables became increasingly concerned with,
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and even skeptical of how colonial society would be changed if the last surviving Spanish Junta
were to be eliminated. They were especially preoccupied with whether their colonial governors
would recognize the French regime, just as they had recognized the Spanish Junta, so that they
could protect their superior vice-regal and administrative positions.
As Spain staggered through successive crises, the accumulated resentments and
developing aspirations of New Granada’s educated elites were rapidly transmuted into
antagonism toward the vice-regal government and demands for political autonomy.79 Moreover,
as Spanish control over Spain diminished, the importance of Spanish America within the empire
increased significantly. Cognizant of their growing importance, the creole class further
embedded themselves within the colonial administration and in other significant positions, thus
augmenting their own influence within the colonial structure.
The disappearance of legitimate authority in Spain, the uncertainty about the political
future of Spain, and the insecurity of colonial officials, led to the growth of a mutual distrust
between Spaniards and the creole elite. As tensions intensified between Spanish governors and
resident Spaniards, on the one hand, and creole notables on the other, major conflict between the
two factions gripped Quito in 1809. In August, the creole elite of Quito deposed the president of
the Quito Audiencia and established an autonomous Junta that declared loyalty to Ferdinand VII.
The new Junta also denounced peninsular officials as the creatures of a corrupt, pro-French
regime, and urged other cities within the viceroyalty to follow Quito’s example. Viceroy Amar y
Borbon, upon receiving word of the coup, assembled a cohort of government officials, the
Bogota Cabildo, members from the upper echelons of the clergy and military, as well as leading
citizens, to counter the apparent threat to his authority and the existing political order. Because
the action did not lead to a formal resolution, the Viceroy sent a diplomat to negotiate with the
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Quito Junta, and dispatched troops to restore royal authority should conciliation fail. Far from
drawing the elites together, the meetings simply exacerbated the mistrust that existed between
Spanish governors and creole notables.
The clear political division that had been established within the first decade of the 19th
century between creoles and peninsulares in Spanish America was further intensified by the
collapse of the last remnants of monarchical authority in Spain. In February 1810, a newly
formed Council of Regency, which governed little more than the port of Cadiz, issued a
proclamation designed both to stabilize the Spanish empire and to sway the creole elite to not to
break away from Spain. The new edict stated:

From this moment, American Spaniards, you see yourselves elevated to the dignity
of free men; you are no longer the same men bent under a yoke made…heavier by
being…distant from the center of power; looked upon with indifference, harassed by
greed, and destroyed by ignorance…[Y]our destinies now depend neither upon
ministers nor viceroys, nor governors; they are in your hands.80
Instead of bolstering the Regency’s authority in Spanish America by conceding political rights to
colonial subjects, the explicit repudiation of the old regime, with the overt recognition of colonial
claims to self-government, gave the viceroy’s opponents the opportunity to mobilize against the
colonial government.
Beginning on June 14, 1810, local notables began to exercise their newly ratified right to
political autonomy by ejecting royal governors throughout New Granada. Creole notables in
Cartagena mobilized to displace the Spanish governor, which occurred shortly after their
counterparts in Caracas blocked the captain-general of Venezuela from entering the city council,
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established a Junta, and proclaimed it to be the political authority within the region.81 The coup
in Cartagena unfolded in a similar fashion, with creoles removing their local governor, and then
establishing a self-governing Junta. Playing a decisive role in the coup in Cartagena were creole
military officers who commanded largely American-born units, as well as a group of common
folk from the relatively poor barrio of Getsemani. In November 1811, Cartagena established a
Supreme Junta, and declared its complete independence from Spain.82
As news regarding the establishment of autonomous juntas in both Caracas and
Cartagena spread from region to region, creoles in other towns within New Granada began to
take similar steps. As a result, the deposition of the governor of Cartagena in mid-June was
followed by Cabildo-led revolts against local officials in Cali, Pamplona, and Socorro. In most
cases, the creole elite influenced the masses to revolt against the viceregal government in order
to establish an autonomous junta free of peninsular influence. Once the new governing apparatus
was erected, the creole elite pledged their allegiance to the Ferdinand VII. This step was taken to
avoid the internal conflict that would most likely ensue if they were to completely break with
Spanish authority. The creole elite relied on the support of the masses to overthrow the viceregal
government in Santafe de Bogota on July 20, 1810. However, as was to occur in Cartagena, a
faction of creole agitators rallied the masses in Santafe de Bogotá to insist on a more definitive
break with the past. Under the pressure of popular will, the Bogotá Junta disavowed the authority
of the Spanish Regency, and broke with the colonial government entirely.
Unlike the Comunero rebellion of 1781, the movement towards rebellion in New
Granada did not originate from popular discontent among the masses; instead it was engineered
by a faction of the creole elite upon seeing the dissipation of the royal authority within the
surrounding provinces. The willingness of crowds composed of urban lower classes to support
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the revolt, as well as the creoles’ success in neutralizing military forces in the capital, also
contributed to the successful transition of power from colonial officials to creole elite.
At its first session on July 21, the newly established Junta in Bogota declared itself to be
the provisional supreme government of New Granada, calling upon Cabildos throughout the
territory to send delegates to the capital to form a federal government, “on the bases of the
freedom and respective independence” of the provinces.83 Many provincial capitals were
reluctant to cooperate with the Bogota Junta. Wherever a Junta in a provincial capital thrust aside
colonial authorities, it proclaimed its province to be a sovereign state and its unwillingness to
forfeit its absolute sovereignty. Cartagena espoused the most vehement opposition to Bogota’s
scheme to organize a new central government in the viceregal capital. The provinces of Tunja,
Socorro, Pamplona, and Antioquia also expressed their determination to retain their sovereignty.
In addition to the construction of autonomous governing bodies in provincial capitals,
further fragmentation occurred as secondary towns sought to split away from provincial capitals
and to establish themselves as the head of new provinces. In most instances, enduring regional
and local rivalries deeply rooted in the colonial period fueled the desire to secede and assert a
‘natural right’ to sovereignty. Creole ambitions to imbue their towns with power and prestige
became additional objectives behind the attempted separations. In short, once New Granada was
released from the yoke of Spanish colonial rule, the regional economic differences as well as
highly localized factional politics that had been suppressed within the framework of the colonial
apparatus surfaced, splintered the country into autonomous units.84
As the territory succumbed to regional and local fragmentation, it became apparent
almost immediately that there was no central entity powerful enough to unify the existing
factions and that there was a profound division amongst regional elites as to the type of system
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of governance they should adopt. Of no less significance, the provinces, preoccupied with local
and regional affairs, neglected to organize to defend themselves against royalist forces. Those
who chose to remain loyal to the Crown still controlled substantial parts of the country and posed
a significant threat to the nascent independent regions. The years between 1810-1816 in
Colombia, which is generally referred to as the Patria Boba (Foolish Fatherland) period, was
accentuated primarily by conflicting regional political aspirations.
During this period, two dominant regional confederations emerged, each attempting to
consolidate its own authority and subjugate the other. Struggling against one another were
Cundinamarca (previously Santafe de Bogota), which encompassed present-day Colombia east
of the Magdalena River, and the provincial coalition of Cartagena, Antioquia, Tunja, Pamplona,
and Neiva, later represented by the Congress of New Granada. By 1811, Bogotá had formed the
new state of Cundinamarca, and sought to reassert the city’s authority over much of the former
viceroyalty. Convinced that a federal system would be too weak, Antonio Nariño, the first leader
of Cundinamarca, began to consolidate his power in order to establish a centralist government.85
As royalist forces began to threaten the nascent confederations, the government of
Cundinamarca declared absolute independence from Ferdinand VII in July 1813. Antioquia took
the same steps in August, but Popayan, Panama, and Santa Marta did not. Napoleon’s abdication
in April 1814 strengthened the likelihood that Ferdinand VII would return to power and that
Spain would deploy its forces to suppress the creole governments. Apprehensive of this
impending threat, the Congress of New Granada, which had been formerly committed to a weak
federalist structure, gradually began to exert more centralized authority, particularly over its
finances and military operations.
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The Congress of Granada also sought to incorporate Cundinamarca into a more united
system as to engender a cohesive military front to royalist forces. However, the governor of
Cundinamarca refused to cooperate. In December 1814, the forces of the Congress of Granada,
under the command of Simon Bolivar, forced Bogotá to accept a general union. However, soon
after Bolivar’s victory, Spanish forces arrived in Santa Marta from Venezuela, and by July 1815,
Cartagena was under siege. After Cartagena had succumbed to Spain’s army, the conquest of the
remaining sovereign territories in New Granada was achieved quite rapidly. Due to profound
regional fragmentation, lack of a unified military front, and the presence of a pervasive weariness
at both the elite and popular levels, Spain re-conquered New Granada in 1816. Spain’s reconquest, however, was short-lived.
From 1816-1819, Spanish military officers and royalist collaborators almost completely
controlled New Granada as well as Venezuela and Ecuador, while rebel forces offered sporadic
resistance from the lowland plains of Casanare.86 Over the following three years, the harshness
of Spanish colonial rule in the wake of the initial movements for independence rekindled popular
opposition and once again augmented creole resentment toward the imperial order.87 The thrust
of the rebellion gained momentum in the last quarter of the 19th century. In August 1819, Bolivar
and his forces crossed the Andes and defeated the Spanish handily at the battle of Boyacá.
Bolivar’s victory changed the course of the independence struggle in New Granada, as well as in
Venezuela and Ecuador.
Prior to the battle of Boyacá, Spanish authorities had commanded the more populated
regions within Venezuela and New Granada, and remained unchallenged in Ecuador. After their
defeat at Boyacá, Spanish authorities panicked and fled from the vice-regal capital. Their action
enabled Bolivar and his forces to assume control over a large expanse of the territory that
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included the eastern highlands from Bogotá to Pamplona, the gold-mining regions of Antioquia
and the Choco, and the Upper Magdalena Valley. Using New Granada as his base of operations,
Bolivar proceeded to defeat royalist forces in Venezuela, Ecuador and ultimately Peru and
Bolivia. However, significant contingencies of royalist forces remained on the Caribbean coast
through 1821, and in southwestern Colombia until 1825. Nevertheless, between 1819 and 1822,
the creole elite who had constituted the leadership of the rebel forces began the task of
constructing an independent republic.88
The Confederation of Gran Colombia was formally proclaimed in 1821. It consisted of
the territories of Venezuela, and New Granada. Ecuador was incorporated after it was liberated
from Spanish control in 1822. In May 1821, delegates from Venezuela and New Granada
convened in the border town of Rosario de Cucuta to determine the form of government the
fledgling republic would adopt. The constituent assembly, known as the Congress of Cucuta,
promulgated a constitution that closely resembled that of the U.S. model. The document
provided for the strict separation of powers in which a president and vice president would both
serve four-year terms. It also stipulated that legislative authority would be held by a bicameral
congress and that a judiciary, whose members were to be determined jointly by the executive and
the legislature, was charged with enforcing the law. However, the Colombian constitution’s
emphasis on centralized authority differed tremendously from the federalist nature of the U.S
constitution. The Colombian president was granted the power to appoint intendants, who retained
legal jurisdiction over expansive regions as well as their subordinate provincial governors. The
U.S. president was never extended such power.
Participation in the political process was essentially relegated to the educated elite. The
Congress instituted a plethora of voting restrictions as well as requirements to hold office
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specifically designed to disenfranchise the masses. As a result, political participation was limited
to males who were either twenty-one years of age or married, owned property worth a hundred
pesos or independently exercised a craft or profession, and who were literate. The impediments
limited political participation to ten percent of free adult males.89 Notwithstanding the political
restrictions, the Congress adopted several broad-minded measures. It enforced a nationwide freebirth principle designed to gradually abolish slavery and it passed a provision that relieved the
remaining indigenous population of any obligation to pay tribute or provide involuntary labor.
The objective of these laws was to end the colonial period’s legal distinctions among racial
castas through the gradual incorporation of historically marginalized factions of society into the
general body of citizens. And yet, despite the adopted measures, the dominant class remained
unwilling to consider blacks and natives as their equals.90
Amongst some of the first acts of legislature produced by the Congress of Cucuta were
mandates designed to bolster economic growth and development. Mostly, the laws entailed the
removal of institutional obstacles to private initiatives, promoted foreign trade, and encouraged
the construction of free land and labor markets. Many of New Granada’s elite adhered to the
belief that direct access to foreign markets and capital, state involvement in the economy, and
participation by local entrepreneurs in external commerce, would help generate economic growth
and lay the foundation for future prosperity.91 The Congress of Cucuta made Bogota the capital
of the republic, partly because of the centrality of its location, as well as due to its previous role
as the vice-regal capital. The Congress elected Bolivar as president, and General Francisco de
Paula Santander, a Venezuelan soldier, as vice-president. An issue that Congress purposefully
avoided was whether or not it would tolerate religious diversity.
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Since the constitution proposed by the Congress of Cucuta increased greater civilian role
in governance, political leaders coming from relatively high-status families and having attained
university educations, began to contest the authority that the military held in government. To the
emerging civilian elite, it was important to bring the military under the rule of law since
Bolivar’s army constituted a centralizing force that conflicted with their respective localized and
regional ambitions.92 The military on the other hand, asserted it had claims to authority by virtue
of having liberated the country. In February 1826, Vice President Francisco de Paula Santander,
who often allied himself with liberal lawyers, summed up the situation as follows:

The discontent of the military is spreading because everywhere they are treated with
distrust, and even with scorn, the effect on the one hand of the bad conduct and worse
manners of some of our officers, and on the other of the fact that the ambitious lawyers
want to destroy anyone that can oppose them.93
The tension between the civilians and the military in New Granada was exacerbated by
two developments. It started when the Congress decided to place the national capital in Bogota
rather than in Caracas. To Caracas’s elites and military officers, the establishment of the national
capital in Bogota reaffirmed their belief that Venezuelans would be relegated to a subservient
role as a provincial dependent under the ultimate jurisdiction of Bogota, and that New Granadans
intended to monopolize government positions in Bogota, making Venezuelans semi-colonists.
Enraged by their apparent loss of sovereignty, the Caracas elite questioned the legitimacy of the
1821 constitution on the grounds that Caracas had not been adequately represented at the
Congressional convocation, and thus that the constitution had not been properly ratified. The fact
that many of the military officers were Venezuelans, while the lawyers who dominated the
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judiciary, legislative, and central executive positions were natives of New Granada served to
increase their mutual distrust.
Relations between New Granadan civilian elite and Venezuelan military officers
worsened in 1826, when the Congress in New Granada accused General Jose Antonio Paez - a
llanero chieftain from Venezuela who had played a leading role in the military liberation of
Venezuela - of abuse of power. Determined to demonstrate civilian authority over the military,
and despite Santander’s pleas not to act, the Congress pressed ahead. As a result of the
congressional accusation, Paez called for Venezuela’s independence from Colombia.
Encouraged by both civilian and military dissidents in Venezuela, Paez led a separatist
movement that began in Valencia at the end of April 1826, and quickly spread throughout
Caracas and other cities in central Venezuela.94
Upon learning about Paez’s separatist movement, Bolivar responded by encouraging
military pronouncements that favored martial law with himself in power. The pronouncements
were to be followed by the implementation of a newly drafted constitution. The document was
dubbed the Bolivarian constitution. With the new constitution, Bolivar believed he had found the
ideal remedy for the prevailing political ills of Spanish America. The perceived ills included but
were not limited to insufficient government revenues, an excess amount of government
employees, a complex administration of justice, and the existence of too many laws few of which
were understood by the public.95 The general persistence of the problems left many dissatisfied
within the fledgling republic and often led to the rise of independence movements – as evidenced
by Paez’s rebellion. Concerned about the growing divisiveness, Bolivar sought to achieve a
balance by strengthening the authority of the executive, and providing greater representation to
local interests. He believed that greater executive power to a president serving for life would help
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engender stability and security to the nascent republic, and that the creation of legislative bodies
that consisted of local representatives hailing from various states would help quell the internal
movements of independence.
Santander, however, disliked several aspects of Bolivar’s suggested solution. The vice
president asserted that there was no legal avenue for constitutional reform until ten years after
the ratification of the constitution, as stipulated by the document itself. Furthermore, the vice
president condemned the military-organized pronouncements as unconstitutional. Lastly, New
Granadan liberals, along with Santander, objected to the Bolivarian constitution for it would
effectively violate the fundamental republican principle of alternation in power.96 Nevertheless,
Bolivar, rather than bringing Paez and Venezuela under the control of constitutional processes
and the authority of the national government as Santander believed he would do, granted Paez
complete amnesty and confirmed him as the ruling chief in Venezuela. It was this action taken
by Bolivar that ruptured his relations with Santander. As a result, two rivaling camps emerged
within the political sphere, providing an additional confrontational nuance to the existing
political order - on one side stood Santander and his supporters and on the other stood Bolivar
and his followers.
By 1827 the tensions between Venezuelans and New Granadans, the military and civilian
elites, and the Santanderistas and Bolivarians had pushed Gran Colombia to its breaking point.
Of no lesser consequence was the external debt crisis. The collapse of the British bond market
imposed on the federation an external debt that raised it to approximately five times its annual
revenues. Prior to the crisis, Gran Colombia’s debt had been caused primarily by its intensive
borrowing to finance the prolonged wars of independence, the bankrolling of large governmental
and military apparatuses, and by its nearly moribund foreign trade. As a result of the financial
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crisis of 1825-1826, Gran Colombia’s fiscal problems intensified, subsequently resulting in a
crisis of authority.
In an attempt to preserve the fragile union and consolidate his authority, Bolivar used the
military in 1828 to impose an authoritarian constitution, with himself at the helm. However,
shortly after his death two years later, the authoritarian regime was dismantled and the power of
the military, the apparatus that had been most loyal to Bolivar, was drastically reduced. By 1831,
the liberals (Santanderistas) had eclipsed the power of the Bolivarians, and two rival parties
began to form.
Venezuela and Ecuador broke away from Gran Colombia and established their own
sovereign states, while Santander gave the new Republic of New Granada a new constitution.
Santander’s 1832-1837 tenure as president was defined by conflict between two liberal factions
that had opposed Bolivar’s authoritarian rule. Liberal exaltados (“extremists” or “purists”) opted
for the permanent exclusion of Bolivarians from political office, whereas moderate liberals
advocated their reincorporation into the political arena to curtail political tension. Although
conflict between the two nascent political factions intensified as time went by, ideologically they
differed little. Moderates, however, considered the approach generally utilized by the exaltados
imprudent and counterproductive. An issue that divided the two groups substantially was the role
the Catholic Church should play in society. Exaltados were determined to break the political
power held by the Catholic Church; moderates on the other hand did not want to address the
issue because they believed that the Church could help maintain social order.
These differences were magnified and accentuated by personal rivalries and hostilities
amongst the leaders of the two groups as they competed for public office. The extent personal
rivalries that pervaded the political system and polarized Colombian society was exemplified by
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the election of 1836, in which Jose Ignacio de Marquez captured the majority vote and assumed
the presidency. Although there was little that differentiated Marquez’s administration from
Santander’s in terms of policy, the ideological difference about the proper role of the Catholic
Church in society once again became the focal point. Whereas both liberal factions viewed
religious orders as outdated, unproductive, and a waste of land, the Santanderistas accused
Marquez and his supporters of attempting to enhance the authority of the Catholic Church in
society. This accusation was intended to incite political as well as popular disapproval against
the Marquez regime. As a result, tensions between the exaltados, represented by Santander, and
moderates who were more closely aligned with Marquez, erupted into a civil war.97 Lasting from
1840 until 1842, the war involved the more populated areas of the country, and brought about
economic devastation and substantial losses of life. The political loyalties and animosities
cemented during this civil war came to define the relationship between the exaltados (Liberals)
and the moderates (Conservatives) for a long time to come. 98
The Conservatives, as the advocates of administrative centralization, Church privileges,
religious intolerance, and limited suffrage, dominated the political arena until 1849. Thereafter,
until around 1880, the Liberals, as the promoters of federalism, the separation of Church and
state, secularization, religious tolerance, and universal suffrage, ostensibly controlled the
political system. They were out of power during two brief periods - the first one in 1854 when
the military took over, and the second one between 1855-1861 when the Conservatives regained
control of the government.99 During the Liberals’ political dominance, they took certain powers
away from the central government and passed them on to the provincial governments. Moreover,
they continued to reduce the power of the military as well as the Catholic Church, and authorized
the people of the various regions to elect their own governors.100 This process of decentralization
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was bolstered by the promulgation of the constitutional reform of 1853, which extended suffrage
to all adult males without any property or literacy restriction. Additional constitutional reforms
instituted in 1858 and 1863, which focused on resolving the question of state sovereignty,
imbued New Granada as one of the most federalist systems in the world.
The 1863 constitution, often referred to as the Rionegro Constitution, ambiguously
stipulated that the duty of the national executive was to ‘watch over, ‘guard’, ‘or protect’ the
general order of the sovereign federated states.101 However, the constitution did not specify
conditions under which the national government may have the right to intervene in the affairs of
the states. Moreover, the nearly absolute sovereignty extended to the states by the newly ratified
constitution did not impose any limits upon individual liberties, and granted states the authority
to establish regional armies. Such measures spawned an era defined by rampant civil wars and
violence. Between 1863 and 1885, the country was afflicted by more than fifty insurrections, as
well as forty-two constitutions in the nine states.102 Federalism and free trade also helped bring
the country to the brink of economic ruin, destroying its incipient industrial base, and impeding
national integration.103 National economic stability and integration were partly achieved in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries solely due to a coffee boom.
During the Liberal era, from 1845 to 1880, economic policies designed to enhance free
trade were implemented based on the assumption that an increase in foreign trade as well as
greater external economic integration would yield substantial growth. New Granada’s elites
understood that their state was composed of a relatively impoverished cluster of unevenly
developed regions loosely connected by a primitive network of transport by river and mountain
trains. As such, they began to experiment with a few export commodities in the hopes of
generating profit.
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The first commodity they focused on was tobacco, which had experienced an externally
motivated boom in the 1850s and 1860s, but then took a sharp decline. Next was Chinchona
bark, also a significant export from the 1850s until its bust in the 1880s.104 It was not until 1870
when coffee became one of Colombia’s primary export commodities that elites began to generate
substantial profits. As noted by Dugas, “coffee accounted for less than 2 percent of export
earnings during the early 1840s but grew to nearly 50 percent of export earnings by 1898.”105
Those earnings enhanced the ability of the state to consolidate its power and allowed the
government to meet its debt obligations, maintain a large standing army, and claim credit for the
economic revival.106
Extreme federalism was abandoned in 1885 after Conservative forces, in one of the many
regional conflict-turned civil wars that came to characterize 19th century Colombia, had defeated
Liberal radicals. In the wake of the war, Conservatives and independent Liberals formed a
coalition to support President Rafael Nuñez Moledo, who promoted the creation of a new
constitution. The coalition, known as La Regeneracion, led to the formation of a new political
organization called the National Party. The promulgation of the Constitution of 1886 marked the
end of a quarter century of Liberal party leadership and set the stage for an era of Conservative
rule lasting until 1930.
The new constitution gave way to a centralized structure in which the president appointed
the governors of the departments and elected legislative assemblies replaced sovereign states.
Additionally, the president and senators were elected indirectly for six-year terms,
representatives for four-year terms, and civil rights were subject to restriction. Suffrage for
elections of national scope was limited to all literate men over the age of 21. Under the new
charter, the government possessed the sole right to import, manufacture, and obtain arms and
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munitions of war. Finally, the constitution branded Catholicism as Colombia’s official religion
and empowered civil authorities to enforce respect for the Catholic Church.107 A concordat with
the Vatican in 1887 further consolidated the role of the Church. In short, the 1886 alliance
between Rafael Nuñez, the Independents and the Conservative resulted in the promulgation of a
constitution that symbolized the triumph of a clear set of principles – centralism, strong
institutional authority, and close church-state cooperation.108 The new constitution would remain
in place until 1991.

Initial Considerations of Colombia’s State Creation Process
The period extending from post-independence until the end of the nineteenth century was
characterized by regional fragmentation, political instability, pervasive violence, economic
stagnation, intense partisan socialization of the masses and institutionalized decentralization. By
1849, the Liberal and Conservative parties had become organized and advanced different
programs. The Liberals were federalists, who advocated free trade, universal suffrage and
religious toleration. The Conservatives on the other hand, favored a unitary government,
protectionist policies, religious intolerance and limited suffrage. While party officials on both
sides could generally tolerate various aspects of opposition party’s platform, the two factions
vehemently disagreed about the proper role in society of the Catholic Church. Conservatives
sought to preserve the social order engendered by the Catholic Church, and often used their proclerical position to mobilize the masses. Conversely, the Liberals opposed clerical activism
outside of the religious sphere.109 Plagued by a multitude of violent civil wars and inter-regional
conflicts throughout most of the 19th century, the ratification of the 1886 Constitution effectively
enabled the Colombian state to consolidate its power and provide relative peace and stability for
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a significant period. Nevertheless, civil conflict would continue into the early 20th century,
resulting in enormous loss of life as well as the loss of Panama in 1903.
By the turn of the century, Colombia had already chartered a path that differed from that
followed by most other Latin American nations. Generally, the experience of most other Latin
American countries throughout the 19th century showed that armies and police forces led by
regional caudillos tended to usurp civilian power to gain control over a politically and
economically important region or entity. 110 Nineteenth century Colombia was also marked by
several hard-fought, and particularly violent civil wars led by elites as well as the existence of
fierce regional antagonisms. However, the ability of civilian-led political parties to retain
substantial autonomy over the authority of the state; mobilize and polarize the Colombian polity
to the extent that internal conflict was primarily a function of party identification; and hinder the
development of strong centralized military imbued Colombia with a powerful and domineering
party system not seen in most other Latin American states during this time. The establishment of
such a polarizing and sectarian system came to constitute a major barrier towards the
establishment of a legitimate state as well as a stable democratic regime.

The Twentieth Century until the Present
Following the War of the Thousand Days and the loss of Panama, a spirit of interparty
collaboration came to characterize political life. Under the purview of the Conservative
administration of Rafael Reyes (1904-1909), Liberals were permitted some representation in
government at the national level. Moreover, a new system of voting for Congress was introduced,
in which two-thirds of the seats within an electoral district would be allotted to the party receiving
the most votes, while the other third of the seats would go to the losing party. With these electoral
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reforms, Reyes hoped to reduce the intensity of the liberal opposition and bring about peace. 111
Liberals, for the most part, also rejected violence as a means of promoting their aims or of seeking
political office. As a result, consociational practices were employed in an attempt to prevent
renewed violence. Although Reyes was forced from power in 1909, coalition governments
steeped in bipartisan consensus and political demobilization began to characterize the political
landscape. In addition to a profound transition towards bipartisanism, the ability for minority
parties to participate in the national government was confirmed by a constituent assembly
immediately following Reyes’ removal from office in 1909. Moreover, this assembly decreed
direct presidential elections for a four-year term with no immediate reelection.112
From 1910 until around 1949, Colombia had, as Alexander Wilde has argued, an
oligarchical democracy “of notable stability, openness, and competitiveness.”113 This political
stability was in part derived from several factors, the most influential being a sustained coffee
boom beginning in 1870 and lasting until the mid-twentieth century. Despite the loss of Panama
at the turn of the century, the expansion of the coffee export sector gave life to Colombia’s
struggling economy. From 1910 – 1940, the volume of exports increased by an average of 7.4
percent per year. By the mid-1920s, earnings from coffee exports facilitated economic
modernization in Colombia, as the nation became the second-largest producer in the world and
the leading producer of mild coffees.114 In addition to the coffee bonanza, the sustained rise of
banana exports, the promising takeoff of oil, along with a payment of 25 million U.S. dollars by
the United States as an indemnity for the seizure of Panama, attracted the interest of lenders in
New York.115 By 1929, U.S. investments in Colombia had tripled, reaching six percent of its
Latin American total. The wave of foreign investment that occurred in the late 1920s has been
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referred to as the ‘dance of millions’, due to the fact that millions of dollars in U.S. loans had
been injected into the nation at all levels of government.
Although foreign investment and the U.S. indemnity contributed to Colombia’s economic
growth in the 1920s, the income generated by coffee exports was three times higher than the
amount of the indemnity and the loans put together.116 As a result, the larger producers and those
who processed as well as exported the coffee came to constitute the most dynamic and powerful
economic group in Colombia. This group consisted of factions of both Liberals and Conservatives
who were significantly involved the export trade. Throughout this period, coffee production in the
latifundia of primarily Liberal landowners came into competition with the small, predominantly
Conservative family-owned farms established in the western highlands.117 Although these two
factions competed with one another, no major conflicts between the two sectors emerged.
Ultimately, both groups owned land and controlled the means of production, placing them within
an oligarchical elite that became focused on the consolidation of political power as a means of
preserving their own economic dominance. The most notable of these groups is the Federation of
Coffee Growers. Founded in 1927, the group consisted primarily of small, politically
Conservative coffee growers in western Colombia, who had practically monopolized control over
the entire stock of Colombian coffee. By 1940 they had become the sole administers of
international coffee pacts with large multinational firms.118 By assuming a central role in the
state’s most important export commodity, this group tended to have a substantial influence over
politics in Colombia. This oligarchy actively inhibited the development of nationalist radical
political movements who opposed the increase in international economic integration.119
The coffee boom, along with the large-scale infusion of foreign capital, helped the
emerging elites to solo the Colombian state.120 Managing to utilize the export income generated
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from coffee and greatly aided by foreign loans, the Colombian government rapidly developed its
transportation industry, established a market for the trade of other consumer goods, and founded a
national bank - the Banco de la Republica in 1923. Improvements in road and rail transport to
facilitate coffee exports were crucial developments leading to enhanced international integration
as well as the creation of a national market. By 1950, 13,125 miles of highway integrated the
country in a way that would have been unimaginable at the end of the nineteenth century.121
Moreover, as total income derived from coffee exports improved, wages, profits and rents also
increased, leading to a corresponding rise in disposable income. With a general increase in
disposable income, consumption naturally followed, generating a market for other goods and
services. As a result, industrial production took off and a wide range of basic consumer goods
began to be produced, albeit on a small scale. In Medellin, Barranquilla and Bogota, some
tobacco, beer, soft drinks and textile firms employed as many as 250 workers.122 Finally, the
creation of the Banco de la Republica facilitated the organization of Colombia’s monetary system
through the creation of a single monetary unit and credit regulation.
With an expanding economy, the legitimization of federal financial institutions to regulate
credit, greater regional integration with advancements in transportation, and a seemingly endless
influx of dollars, by the second half of the 20th century Colombia had achieved greater levels of
industrialization and diversification of its economic output. As a result, industries associated with
the production of nontraditional exports and the mining and production of coal, nickel and oil
expanded exponentially.123 Nevertheless, while the state had been strengthened during this period
of economic change, it remained fragile and under-resourced. From very early on, the coffee
bourgeoisie controlled its own affairs, remaining autonomous from the state apparatus and more
invested in regional or local development. Adhering to the doctrine of economic liberalism
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enforced by prominent capitalist economies (primarily the United States, to which Colombia was
significantly indebted), the bourgeoisie utilized the two-party system to protect their power in
their respective regions and keep the Colombian state weak.124
The Great Depression slowed down the period of rapid industrialization and urbanization
and forced Colombians to question the free market policies and political liberalism of the early
decades. The election of moderate Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera to the presidency in 1930
marked the definitive end to almost 45 years of Conservative hegemony. His election also
engendered the emergence of a ‘Liberal Republic’ that would last until 1946. All four Liberal
administrations active during the 1930-1946 period tended to enforce policies that heavily favored
unionization, systems of financial controls, deficit spending and greater executive power within
the government. The peaceful constitutional transfer of power between political parties was
unprecedented in the history of the nation. It was made possible by several conditions. First, the
political faction called Concentracion Nacional, spearheaded by Olaya Herrera included
moderates from both parties. Second, internal divisions within the Conservative sphere allowed
for a degree of bipartisan support for a moderate president. The Conservatives who dominated the
Congress, the courts, the departmental legislatures, and city councils, believed Olaya Herrera
would maintain the political order of the last few decades long enough for them to reconcile their
differences within the Conservative Party and return to the presidency in four years. Third, the
Catholic Church also accepted the election result. Lastly, the military, despite its Conservative
roots, had acted as the country’s electoral police since 1910, and for the previous two decades it
had become committed to ending the election-prompted civil wars of the nineteenth century.125
With the Liberals now at the head of the government, significant change regarding the
relations between the state and workers became a primary political objective. Aiming to capture
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the support of a growing urban working class, the Olaya government formulated legislation that
guaranteed the basic rights of workers. The new legislation recognized labor unions and their
right to unionize, established the eight-hour day and the forty-eight-hour working week, and
clearly outlined the legal responsibilities of employers. Those measures helped Liberals capture
popular support. The labor reforms enacted under the Olaya government were made effective by
the incoming administration headed by Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, whose presidency is commonly
referred to as the “Revolution on the March”. During his tenure in office, the state was given a
constitutionally guaranteed role in economic development and diversification of exports.126 Legal
measures were enacted to protect domestic industry, strengthen credit institutions and levy a
graduated income tax as well as taxes on excess profits and patrimony. Tax reforms enabled the
state to break from its exclusive dependence on external trade as the primary source of income,
although the powerful coffee bourgeoisie limited the scope of governmental intervention in
economic and social life. In this way, the state did not actively promote industrialization, but
provided conditions under which entrepreneurs could take initiatives.127
Between 1933 and 1938, industry grew at an average annual rate of 10.8 percent. As
industrialization occurred, urbanization gave rise to a cheap and cooperative labor force. The
Lopez administration was limited in its ability to be involved in the affairs of the industrialized
sectors of society, however, it viewed labor as “social obligation” and sought protect it. During
this time, the number of unions, union members, and labor demands increased. Suffrage was
extended to all adult males aged 21 or over by eliminating the literacy requirement established by
the 1886 constitution. In 1936, the left (Liberals, Socialists, and Communists) came to dominate
an important segment of the unions through the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia
(CTC). As such, the CTC ostensibly came under the purview of the Liberal Party, with its main
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base of support being workers who depended directly or indirectly on the state.128As a result,
union organization, labor rights, and Liberal electoral support were all intertwined.
Ironically, Lopez’s labor program had a devastating impact on the workers’ movement.
Rather than augmenting the strength and autonomy of the unions, workers increasingly relied on
state intervention to resolve their disputes. This arrangement resulted in the virtual subservience
of the unions to the state.129 In addition, issues regarding the peasantry and their access to land
also formed part of the Liberal-left platform. Culturally diverse, geographically dispersed, and
working within various agrarian labor systems, the peasantry, although discontented, was unable
to successfully mobilize. Moreover, agrarian reforms that guaranteed the provision of public land
to individuals working on it went largely unenforced. Eventually, these reforms were altered in a
way that strengthened the juridical position of large landowners at the expense of the peasantry.
By 1937, the Lopez Revolution on the March had aggravated factional divisions within the
president’s party. As such, by the 1937 congressional elections, the Liberal party was irreparably
split. Following the elections, Lopez threatened to resign under intense opposition from
landowners, merchants, industrialists, the Catholic Church, and leaders from both parties.
Although a moderate liberal captured the presidency in 1938, Lopez would return to the executive
position in 1942 to resume his March. However, by this time powerful private associations of
landowners and businessmen called, gremios, had begun to insert themselves into the political
sphere. The gremios - the most influential being the National Federation of Coffee Growers served to augment the private sector’s ability to monitor and direct state intervention within
acceptable limits. The proliferation of the associations effectively restricted the autonomy of the
state and ensured its commitment to economic liberalism. Opposing Lopez and his March, the
factions along with an uncompromising congress worked to block his liberal agenda. In 1944,
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Lopez was seized by a military garrison in Pasto as part of an attempted coup. The insurrection
was carried out by an isolated group of officers without the support of the military establishment.
After its failure, Lopez resigned from the presidency in 1945, convinced that a bipartisan
government would unify the nation. Alberto Lleras Camargo acted as the interim-President until
new elections were held in 1946.
The 1946 elections represented the second transfer of power between the two parties in the
20th century. Due to the profound split within the Liberal party, two candidates, Gabriel Turbay, a
moderate, and Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a populist, competed against one another for party control.
Ultimately, the last-minute candidacy of conservative Mariano Ospina Perez led to his election,
although he did not receive a majority of the popular vote.130 Politicization, polarization and
violence accelerated after the elections, with Liberals fearing a resurgent Conservative party and
Conservatives apprehensive of Liberal domination. Moreover, the social and economic changes of
the previous two decades had facilitated the emergence of more economically integrated and
politically mobilized groups. As a result, party control over the state became critical, not only for
patronage and regional favoritism, but also for economic and political security for favorable
administrative and judicial decisions.131 Local violence erupted in the elections leading to the
death of some 14,000 people in 1947 alone.132
From 1946 until 1948, Gaitan headed a popular movement that focused on urban growth
and inflation. He condemned the Liberal Republic and the oligarchy for ‘betraying’ the nation.
Based on his claim that the oligarchy had monopolized the wealth and political power under the
guise of advancements in social justice and economic equality, Gaitan called for their demise and
the empowerment of historically marginalized groups. His message resonated with a substantial
portion of the Colombian electorate and with elements of the middle classes. On April 9, 1948,
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Gaitan was assassinated in the streets of Bogota, leading to a massive urban insurrection dubbed
the Bogotazo in which, “mobs burned commercial buildings, destroyed churches, and attacked
government buildings in the capital city; riots spread to other cities”.133
By 1949, the Conservative Ospina regime was on the verge of collapse, as both Liberal
and Conservative leaders refused to negotiate in good faith. Following the failure to reach a
bipartisan accord, the Liberals decided to withdraw entirely from the upcoming presidential
election, which had been moved up as a means of restoring political order, and began
impeachment proceedings against Ospina. The result was regime breakdown. Responding to the
Liberals, Ospina declared a state of siege, closed Congress, banned public meetings and censored
the press. Running unopposed, Laureano Gomez – a radical conservative obsessed with erecting a
corporatist state in Colombia along the lines of Franco’s Spain – was elected to the presidency in
1949.
The period encompassing Gomez’s tenure in office is referred to as La Violencia.
Primarily a rural phenomenon, La Violencia was an amalgamation of social, economic, and
political factors, reinforced by partisan conflict. According to the Colombian social scientist, F.
Leal Buitrago, “the strength of the parties was such that they were essentially acting as a channel
for a culmination of small social and economic processes originating in the provinces; the parties
managed to convert isolated problems into a great political aggregation of national character,
which came, at a given moment to endanger the very stability of the regime.”134 La Violencia,
which lasted from 1949 until 1953, was characterized first by terror and then by resistance. Under
the Gomez regime, the government adopted a widespread policy of overt terrorism, primarily
organized by local political bosses and landowners. Those groups supported the government and
its crusade against communism and liberalism in the wake of the destruction caused by the
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Bogotazo.135 In addition, the regime tightened censorship, increased repression against labor, and
intensified violence against Liberals and Protestants – sometimes with the cooperation of the local
clergy. Though Gomez’s repressive policies claimed the lives of an estimated 145,000 people, the
country also experienced healthy economic growth as export crops reached the ports and urban
industrial areas were relatively unaffected.136
As the reign of terror against the liberal peasantry progressed, many guerrilla groups
formed to resist the state-sponsored persecution. Openly confronting government forces, the
guerrilla groups were primarily composed of a militarized peasant class and Communists. Clashes
between the guerrillas and the military significantly augmented the level of violence occurring in
the countryside. By 1953, virtually all factions of both parties supported the removal of Gomez
from power. Opting to find a way to facilitate an end to the violence, leaders from both parties
supported a military coup d’état, and installed the commander in chief of the army, General
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to the presidency. The military takeover was expected to be solely a
transitional phase until rule of law could be restored. Although the Rojas government took
immediate steps to bring an end to La Violencia, it became clear that Rojas intended to prolong
his stay at the helm of the government. By 1957, Rojas had begun to construct his own popularly
based political movement to permanently supplant the traditional parties by taking away their
mass support.137 Cognizant of Rojas’s play for power, many prominent Liberal and Conservative
leaders came together and negotiated the basis of a pact between the two traditional parties. The
pact called for the establishment of a consociational arrangement in which the two traditional
parties would alternate in power every four years for a minimum period of 16 years.138 A ‘civic
front’ was also formed to oppose Rojas and his administration. The front included the Church,
trade associations, labor unions, banks and other institutions that actively pressured Rojas to
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resign in favor of a military junta. Finally, in 1958, the junta held a plebiscite that resulted in the
ratification of the party pact and the establishment of the National Front.
Founded on the tenets of parity of power and presidential alternation, the National Front
attempted to synthesize the Liberal Republic and the neoconservative regime in order to bring
about an end to party-based violence. The National Front was a political arrangement steeped in
the concept of consociationalism, in which national power was to be divided equally between the
two parties in order to provide for a period of political stability.139 Over the duration of 16 years,
the National Front brought about a substantial increase in presidential authority, specifically the
use of state-of-siege powers with the constitutional reform of 1968. Because they feared that
leftist would jeopardize the alternation of political power from Liberals to Conservatives,
members of both parties agreed to exclude third parties from direct participation in the political
system. The pact allowed for the entrenchment of clientelism as the primary method of interaction
between elected officials and civilians, and led to elections that had no real effect on the
composition of elected bodies since parity within the government had already been
predetermined.140 Furthermore, the arrangement made it easier for private sector interests to
influence disproportionately political decisions. As a result, state intervention in various sectors of
the economy as a means of reducing inequality or providing sufficient benefits and wages to the
poor was kept to a minimum. This development ultimately enabled the private sector to block
reforms that may have given the state the ability to provide for broader social welfare.141
From the 1960s until the 1980s, Colombia underwent massive economic, social, and
demographic changes. Between 1960 and 1980, the total population increased by approximately
13.5 million, and became concentrated in several cities – mostly the regional capitals of Bogota,
Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla.142 Between 1973 and 1985, younger workers, who increasingly
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had access to educational facilities, previously only accessible by workers in the formal sector of
the economy, entered the labor market. By 1988, 72 out of every 100 people looking for work in
the four main cities (Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla) were under thirty. Of that group, 70
percent had at least some secondary education. Unable to find employment in the formal economy
due to privatization and state retrenchment programs that were being uniformly adopted in most
Latin American countries during that period, the informal sector of the Colombian economy,
which covered a wide range of both legal and illegal activities, experienced rapid and unregulated
growth.143 The growth in the informal sector often occurred within or on the periphery of cities,
leading to record levels of rural migration to urban centers. By 1980, 64 percent of the total
population was urban, whereas in 1960 only 48 percent of the population lived in cities. Due to
this drastic population shift towards urban centers, Colombia rapidly became ‘a nation of cities’,
and agriculture ceased to be the principal source of economic growth.
As the urban labor force expanded, the demand for food to sustain the growing urban
population as well as the need to generate export earnings for industrial expansion, facilitated the
proliferation of large-scale commercial farms. As a result, during the 1960s and 1970s, the
traditional latifundia were transformed into highly mechanized modern enterprises. This
transformation significantly disadvantaged the rural peasantry. Pushed off the land to
accommodate the commercial farms, widespread unrest amongst the rural peasantry incited
extensive debates regarding agrarian reform and rural modernization. In an attempt to address the
unrest, the first two National Front administrations enacted agrarian reforms. Led by the
Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA), the reforms were designed to eliminate and
prevent the inequitable concentration of land, give small tenants and share-croppers greater
guarantees of security of tenure and ownership, and elevate the level of living of the rural
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population amongst other guarantees. This program was eventually supported, and in part
financed, by the United States with its Alliance for Progress.144
The reforms largely failed to achieve the aforementioned objectives, resulting in high
levels of popular discontent, and a narrowly averted national strike in 1965.145 Liberal president
Carlos Lleras Restrepo once again considered agrarian reforms in 1966. This time, his
government made an attempt to accelerate the pace of land distribution by eliminating the legal
and financial restrictions that had slowed or prevented the application of provisions of the
previous administrations. In addition, Lleras established a mass movement, the Asociacion
Nacional de Usurarios Campesinos (ANUC), to apply pressure from below. However, the
renewed effort did not have its desired redistributive effects. It failed primarily because of the
presence of internal divisions within the ANUC, as because of poorly designed land tenure
policies. The failure of the land reforms led thousands of peasants to mobilize in order to halt the
expansion of cattle ranchers and commercial farmers during this period.146
In addition to the growing pains associated with industrialization, coffee exports stagnated
from around 1940 to 1975, and economic growth that was largely dependent on coffee earnings
slowed down tremendously. This slowdown was caused by the fluctuation of world prices in a
period of free or only partly regulated markets (1948-1963), by competition from emerging
producers in Africa, by restrictions imposed by international coffee accords, and by the
deterioration and destruction of coffee farms during La Violencia in key production areas.147 The
reduction in coffee exports led to a fall in real wages, which generated a wave of labor agitation
between 1957 and 1966. Attempting to address the drop in real wages as well as the labor
movement, the government enacted Decree-Law 444 in 1967, which marked the commencement
of a growth strategy based on dependent development with an emphasis on export diversification.
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Simply put, diversified exports, rather than either coffee exports or import-substitution
industrialization, which had reached its limits in Colombia due to the stagnation of intermediary
goods and capital-goods sectors, were targeted to become the ‘motor’ for development.148 Minor
exports, such as bananas, cotton, sugar, tobacco, gold, paper and cardboard, meat, wood, shoes,
seafood, glass, oilseed cakes, chemicals, furs, cement, hides, precious stones, tires, books, freshcut flowers, and dog toys grew rapidly, and by 1974, these goods had become more important
than coffee. The new set of exports, along with coffee earnings, brought about higher levels of
foreign exchange and allowed for the purchase of consumer, capital and intermediate goods.149
Moreover, Decree-Law 444 established a “crawling peg” exchange rate that sharply reduced
political conflicts over devaluation and provided the means for a partial reorientation of the
economy from an import-substitution model to one of export promotion.150
Although the new reforms helped the overall state of Colombia’s economy, they did not
do much to rectify real wages or decrease economic inequality. Moreover, during this period, the
physical expansion of cities, the proliferation of regionally-based labor actions, a growing
division between elite interests and popular interests, and self-censorship within the media,
reduced the exposure and interest of the urban population to the conflicts emerging in the rural
areas. As the government increasingly ignored the demands of the various labor movements as
well as the leaders of the two established labor federations - the CTC and the Union de
Trabajadores Colombianos – the UTC - regionally based independent confederations controlled
by the left began to emerge. By the end of the 1960s, General Rojas, Colombia’s one-time 20th
century dictator, had created a populist movement – Accion Nacional Popular (ANAPO) that
nearly won the 1970 elections. Rojas ran on a platform of “socialism on Christian bases in the
Colombian manner.” It called for free education, free medical and dental service for the poor,

71

bank credit for small entrepreneurs, the unification of the labor federations, a new plan for
housing for the poor, and an exchange rate regime that pegged the peso to the dollar. Supported
by urban and rural workers as well as politicians who had become disenfranchised with the
National Front, ANAPO’s rapid growth signified the erosion of the consociational coalition’s
popular support. Over time, many of the popular opposition groups would provide the foundations
for revolutionary guerilla movements, drawing their support from the ranks of discontented
laborers and union members situated in the rural regions of the country.151
In short, the National Front was a political and economic system designed to protect the
interests of the elites at the expense of the rest of the country. By limiting political participation,
bolstering the powers of the executive in the context of weak judicial and legislative bodies,
allowing for unfair and predetermined elections, and advancing economic inequality, the National
Front substantially inhibited the development of a democratic regime. According to Harvey F.
Kline, by 1974, 16 years of coalition government produced: 1) a lack of political space for
individuals unaffiliated with either the Liberal nor the Conservative parties; 2) a failure to resolve
many economic problems associated with underdevelopment; 3) continued violence in the
countryside, although no longer in the name of traditional parties; 4) a lack of sufficient resources
to allow for the poor to earn a decent wage; 5) a relatively small group of political and economic
leaders living lavishly in the cities; 6) a government even less able to enforce its laws than before;
and 7) a weak and politically divided labor movement in which a majority of the urban and rural
poor were not well organized.152
In this context, voter participation in national elections decreased sharply, popular
confidence in the ability of the government to provide for the Colombian people waned, and the
centrality of the parties in the country’s political life declined. Nevertheless, towards the end of
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the National Front era, a new generation of provincial politicians emerged, providing electoral
legitimacy to the state without having to adhere to social pressures or confront the mounting
internal conflict within the nation.153 The result was the proliferation of non-electoral opposition –
namely labor confederations independent of the two parties and civic protest movements.
The end of the National Front era in 1974 had initially been characterized by optimism as
a progressive administration dedicated to “Closing the Gap” (alluding to an agenda that
prioritized addressing poverty and attacking inequality) was elected into office. However, an
unanticipated influx of foreign currencies generated by a boom in coffee prices as well as the
rapid expansion of illegal drug exports subjected the economy to intense inflationary pressure and
made monetary control the primary concern of economic policy. Thus, plans to “close the gap”
had to be delayed or cancelled.154
In addition to record levels of inflation – the annual rate of price increases was 33.1
percent by 1977, the prevalence of leftist guerilla revolutionary movements such as the FARC
(the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (the National Liberation Army)
within Colombia dramatically increased.155 Having roots in the labor movements of the 1950s,
1960s and early 1970s, the guerilla movements drew on the support of an increasingly disgruntled
peasantry, marginalized lower classes, and disenchanted middle income groups, who perceived
the politically elite to be corrupt and unfit to govern. In the late 1970s, the government adopted a
hardline approach against the violent non-state actors. Embarking on a campaign to eliminate
them groups, President Julio Cesar Turbay (1978-1982), greatly expanded the power and
authority of the military. In the following years, accusations of humans rights violations by the
armed forces proliferated, right-wing death squads, many with military ties, appeared, and in
some rural areas large landowners resorted to violence in order to acquire land from the

73

peasantry.156 After decades of fighting, a lack of oversight, and enduring weak state institutions,
the military gradually disassociated itself from the two parties and became a more coherent
institutional force.157 Additionally, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the expanding influence of
drug cartels became yet another obstacle that challenged the regime both directly via violent
confrontation as well as though bribery and corruption. Both cartels and the military have been
charged with colluding with right-wing paramilitary groups, who have primarily targeted the
leftist guerilla organizations.
The 1980s brought about a comprehensive restructuring of the economy built on policies
introduced by orthodoxy economists originating primarily from Western neo-classical theory. The
policies aimed to reduce government inefficiency, bolster production and economic growth,
augment the competitiveness of domestic industries, and reduce poverty and inequality, through
the establishment of free markets.158 The way in which those objectives were to be achieved was
through a process of financial liberalization, deregulation of state-protected industries, and
cutbacks in government expenditures.
The 1980s, a period popularly referred to as the “lost decade”, was also a time in which
much of the global south – especially Latin America - suffered extensive debt crises that led to a
global recession. President Belisario Betancur, who ruled between 1982 and 1986 sought to
eliminate the government deficit via the drastic reductions in public expenditures and the gradual
devaluation of its then-overvalued peso. The end result was that the poor disproportionately bore
the burden of stabilization, as state employees were let go, and state funding for social programs
was significantly curtailed.
In addition, the Betancur administration changed its anti-guerrilla tactics. Rather than
supporting a campaign of unconditional extermination, the government sought political re-
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accommodation and a negotiated peace with the country’s major guerilla groups. Although the
peace process achieved some early successes with the passing of an amnesty law in 1982, as well
as negotiated peace agreements with the FARC, M-19, and the EPL, by the end of the Betancur
administration in 1986, the M-19 had briefly taken over the country’s Palace of Justice.
Additionally, most of these guerilla organizations were once again engaged in open conflict with
the state.159 Although his administration did not accomplish much in regards to political reform,
Betancur amended the constitution to establish mayoral elections by popular vote beginning in
1988. This reform was supplemented by various fiscal measures aimed at increasing the flow of
resources to the departmental and municipal levels. As such, a decade after the end of the
National Front, politics were now partially open to the public.
The late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by efforts to end the tradition of
coalition government and by effect, establish a single-party government with the presence of
opposition parties. This government-opposition scheme, however, proved to be a tedious
endeavor since a legitimate opposition party simply did not exist. Aside from the Liberal and
Conservative parties, which after decades of coalition rule were ideologically and politically
similar and sought power by means of broker clientelism, the Union Patriotica (UP) was the only
other legitimate opposition party. The UP, composed of former members of the FARC, the
Communist Party and other leftist activists, advocated social change through participation in the
political process. However, many critics perceived the UP to be a political extension of the FARC
and as such, between 1985 and 1991, more than 1,000 of its members were assassinated.160 Thus,
the political system remained devoid of a legitimate opposition party. Moreover, factionalization
and personalistic tensions left both traditional parties disorganized and in political disarray. The
absence of more disciplined, and organized political parties with distinct programs, as well as the
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lack of protection for opposition politicians, greatly undermined the legitimacy of the political
system. Moreover, the proposition to establish government-opposition regime was ultimately
rejected by Congress.
In 1989, the expansion of drug trafficking and the rapid growth of drug cartels resulted in
a drastic increase in violence throughout the nation. Several prominent Colombian political
figures, most notably, Luis Carlos Galan – a popular Liberal senator and the clear favorite to win
the presidency in 1990 – were assassinated, prompting a massive state crackdown of the cartels.
The Medellin cartel, under the leadership of Pablo Escobar, issued its own declaration of war and
initiated a campaign of terror designed to destabilize the Colombian state and intimidate its
society.161 Intense internal conflict combined with the profound reluctance of both political parties
to transform the political regime, gave rise to a broad-based student movement, which demanded
constitutional reform by means of a popularly elected National Constituent Assembly outside the
bounds of Congress.162 The National Constituent Assembly, supported by a plebiscite, took place
in 1990 as a new administration took office. The composition of this assembly varied, with the
two traditional parties controlling less than half the seats. Many analysts have attributed the
surprisingly low voter turnout for this assembly to the fact that most legislators chose not to run
for a seat in the assembly and thus did not activate their broker clientele networks. Nevertheless,
with the traditional two parties holding a minority stake in the constituent assembly, the coalition
that came to dominate within the Assembly was composed of Liberals close to the president, the
Moviemiento de Salvacion Nacional (MSN), and the representatives of the Alianza Democratic
M-19 (AD M-19).163
The Constitution that was created removed all remnants of the coalition governance, and
instituted electoral, participatory, and institutional reforms. In the electoral sphere, popular
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elections of departmental governors and the vice-president were implemented, a runoff system for
presidential elections was established, electoral ballots were distributed officially, non-resident
voting was barred in municipal elections, the election of alternate delegates to public office was
negated, and the provision of special seats for the election of indigenous and black representatives
were instituted. In terms of bolstering participation, the new Constitution called for the
implementation of a recall vote for governors and mayors, a mechanism for “poplar consultation”
at all levels of government, referendums to repeal national laws or amend the constitution, and the
right to organize and participate in political parties and movements. Finally, it reduced
presidential power, weakened veto power, placed limits on “extraordinary powers” to issue legal
norms, curtailed state-of-siege emergency powers, significantly transformed the judicial branch to
counter chronic problems of weakness, corruption and lack of resources, introduced an extensive
bill of citizen rights, as well as a variety of judicial mechanisms that citizens can employ to
protect these rights, and strengthened political and legislative powers of Congress. 164
Despite the dramatic changes promised by the 1991 constitution, the reformation of the
armed forces and the party system was intentionally avoided. The existing military apparatus had
been responsible for numerous human rights abuses and had become increasingly autonomous
from the government. The Assembly chose not to enact reforms of the armed services out of fear
of provoking them. Moreover, the existing electoral procedure in which seats in representative
bodies were allocated by factional lists rather than by official party lists, had helped to foster the
extreme factionalism and clientelism characteristic of the political party system. The
unwillingness to adopt official party lists for the allocation of representatives ostensibly allowed
for clientelism to continue, and thus to remain a significant method for the acquisition of political
power.
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Despite the promulgation of a markedly liberal Constitution, throughout the 1990s the
state remained unable to end the political violence that ravaged the nation. In addition, criminal
violence became uncontrollable, and bribery and corruption continued to characterize Colombian
politics as politicians at all levels were forced to either confront or acquiesce to narco
traffickers.165 For example, in 1995, the administration of President Andres Samper became mired
in a serious drug scandal tied to the Cali cartel. This speculative collusion with the Cali cartel
severely undermined the legitimacy of the regime, which in turn, complicated efforts to
consolidate the country’s democratic transformation.166 Under mounting pressure from the United
States to crack down on the drug trade, which by the late 1980s had become a major domestic
industry, the Samper administration strengthened penalties for drug trafficking and reformed the
1991 constitution to allow for the extradition of Colombian citizens to stand trial abroad.
Nevertheless, Samper’s preoccupation with the drug scandal and the accompanying loss of
credibility inhibited him from addressing the internal armed conflict. By then, both left-wing
guerrilla movements and right-wing paramilitary organizations had expanded significantly,
mostly due to their increased financial dependency upon the drug trade.167
The implementation of Plan Colombia in 2000 signified an attempt by the Colombian and
United States governments to bilaterally eradicate illicit crops, negotiate settlements with the
guerilla movements, revive the stagnant Colombian economy, and provide aid for judicial
institutions, human rights, and alternative development.168 Once adopted however, Plan Colombia
became mostly a means whereby the United States could supply the Colombian government with
military and police assistance. Between 2000 and 2010, the United States provided $7.3 billion in
aid to Colombia, making it the largest recipient of U.S. aid outside the Middle East and
Afghanistan.169 Under this plan, the Uribe Administration (2002-2010) strengthened the state
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security forces and deployed them aggressively against the FARC and ELN guerillas. Unwilling
to negotiate with the various guerrilla organizations, by 2010, Uribe’s aggressive tactics had
produced significant results. There had been a considerable decline in most indicators of violence,
including kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, and massacres, along with the extensive
demobilization of right-wing paramilitary units across the country. In recent years, while there has
been a surge in the number of paramilitary groups operating within Colombia, lengthy
negotiations with the FARC beginning in 2012 have resulted in a historic cease-fire agreement
enacted in 2016. This ceasefire marks the end of 50 years of internal armed conflict between the
FARC and the Colombian government. However, attempts to establish a post-conflict transitory
regime have been slightly setback due to the recent failure of a national peace agreement
referendum.

Exploratory Conclusions: Democracy in Colombia
Although the Colombian constitution has bolstered political pluralism and inclusion in
recent years, the establishment of liberal democracy in Colombia remains contingent upon the
broader capacity of the state to ensure the protection of civil liberties, address corruption,
engender the complete subservience of the military to civilian rule, and bring about an end to
internal conflict and the proliferation of autonomous intrastate actors. Moreover, a politically
insulated elite class that has perpetuated a culture of exclusion and non-representative democracy
ever since the post-independence era has hindered democratic consolidation. These conclusions
have been reinforced by recurrently low voter turn-out rates, as well as declining confidence in
political parties and their ability to affect change. As mentioned before, Colombians
overwhelming approve of democracy over any other form of government. However, liberal
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democracy has been unable to flourish in Colombia, and will continue to be elusive so long as
the aforementioned conditions endure both within the state and the political system.
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CHAPTER II
Venezuela: Reversion to Authoritarianism in the Twenty-First Century

Introduction
On January 10, 2007, President Hugo Chavez began his inaugural speech by proclaiming:
“Fatherland, socialism, or death – I swear it”. Promising to accelerate the march toward
socialism, he announced the imminent nationalization of three foreign controlled economic
sectors -- telecommunications, electricity, and “heavy oil” petroleum industries located around
Venezuela’s Orinoco Tar Belt. A day later, Chavez invoked a 1999 constitutional provision that
allows the executive to assume all legislative powers exercised by the National Assembly (Ley
Habilante). Determined to enlarge his power further, Chavez used an executive order to push
through a constitutional amendment that repealed the two-term presidential limit. The new
amendment authorized the indefinite reelection of the executive. Since then, the Venezuelan
regime has become markedly more authoritarian in nature, as almost every aspect of political,
economic, and civil life has come under the jurisdiction of an overbearing, executive-led
bureaucracy.
With decision-making authority concentrated in the executive, the ability of citizens to
shape government policies and proposals has been significantly curtailed. Economic crisis has
exacerbated the political situation. Recent decreases in the international price of oil have
engendered increases in inflation, unemployment, scarcity, and poverty. In response to the
political and economic instability afflicting the country, the Venezuelan regime under president
Nicolás Maduro has tightened its control over every aspect of society. Widespread protests have
resulted, which have been met with state-sponsored violence. In the process, civil and
associational rights have been repeatedly infringed upon. Through an analysis of the evolution
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of Venezuela’s political, economic and social systems, beginning with the pre-colonial period, I
will explain in this chapter how and why Venezuela managed to create a democratic system, and
how why said system reverted to authoritarian rule

Pre-Colonial and Colonial Times
Just like the Colombian case, in order to fully understand the processes of state-creation
and democratization that have transpired in Venezuela, the analysis must begin with an overview
of the nation’s geography and original human population. With its mountains, valleys, plains,
deserts, jungle, rivers and coastline, Venezuela is geographically and topographically similar to
Colombia. Although it is smaller than Colombia (ranking seventh in size among Latin American
nations), it can also be succinctly divided into various regions based upon distinctive
physiography, climate, culture, populations, and economic systems.170
Venezuela’s landscape is dominated by a sweeping chain of Andean mountain ranges in
the west (bordering Lake Maracaibo to the Northwest), highlands towards the east that give way
to another mountain range which parallels the coast until it is broken up by the Orinoco Delta in
the northeast, large expanses of plains (llanos) located east and south of the Andes as well as the
Central Coastal Range, and the Guayana highlands – an area dominated by low mountains, rich
grasslands and extensive tropical forests.171 Within this panorama, six major provinces have
emerged in the context of three geographically distinguishable regions; the northern region,
separated from the southern region by the Andes as well as the lesser range of mountains that run
to the northeastern corner of the country. The southern region, consisting of the territory south of
the Central Coastal Range - the llanos, that extend to both the east towards the Orinoco River
and the west towards the Colombian border, and the Guayana highlands in the southernmost
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region of the nation.172 Historically, the different geographical characteristics of these regions
have facilitated uneven economic development across most provinces, which has in turn proved
to be a considerable setback in achieving the consolidation of the power of the state.

Pre-Columbian Societies
The indigenous peoples of Venezuela created political, economic and social systems that
differed immensely from the empires of the Inca on the continent’s western region, or the Aztecs
in the central valley of Mexico. Rather than hierarchical and centralized empires, native
chiefdoms were found in much of Venezuela north of the Orinoco River, although enclaves of
tropical-forest farmers occupied some of the lowlands adjoining Lake Maracaibo, while nomadic
hunters and gatherers lived along the Orinoco River on the southern borders of the chiefdoms.173
In western Venezuela, the chiefdoms primarily produced manioc, maize, and sweet potatoes,
while in the east, the indigenous groups relied exclusively on bitter manioc. When harvests were
poor, the native population subsisted on the rich game resources. Trade was considerable
between the northern Venezuelan peoples with some groups bartering gold for pearls obtained
from a distant coastal region. Most of the larger chiefdoms retained an elaborate political
structure with a primary chieftain and lesser chieftains presiding over a class of nobles,
distinguished warriors, and wealthy men whose status seems to have been hereditary. Occupying
the lowest socioeconomic status were slaves who consisted of captive children.174 Although there
were many indigenous groups who lived in Venezuela, almost all of these peoples were
vanquished by the Spaniards early in the colonial period, and the area was greatly depopulated.
Those who survived were often enslaved under harsh conditions or “entrusted” by the Crown to
the missionaries in the interior.175
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Spanish Conquest and the Colonial Period
The Spaniards arrived to Venezuela by around 1500, and had first attempted to extract
wealth from the territory by forcing the natives to dive and retrieve pearls from the waters near
the Island of Margarita off the northeast coast. Once the pearl beds had been exhausted, the
absence of large mineral deposits on the scale of those found in Mexico, Peru or even New
Granada compelled many settlers to move westward. Those who remained began to subjugate
the native population by the means of the encomienda system; a system of forced labor based
upon the concept of tribute, that was uniformly implemented in the Spanish colonies of the New
World. The first area that the Spaniards colonized was Venezuela’s northern region. Discovering
gold in Yaracuy - located in Venezuela’s northwestern region - the Spaniards attempted to utilize
the indigenous population as a cheap and easily subdued labor force. However, the native
population diminished rapidly due to exposure to disease, armed resistance against the Spanish
interlopers, and horrendous working conditions. As a result, the colonizers sought to import
African slaves as a way to augment their dwindling labor force. Soon thereafter, slave-trading
became a major source of revenue.176
Lacking substantial mineral wealth as well as a large, organized, and easily exploitable
indigenous population (the importation of slave labor was costly), Venezuela quickly lapsed into
the periphery of the Spanish Empire.177 Considered to be a quiet and unimportant backwater of
the empire, in 1528 the Spanish Crown rented Venezuela to the German commercial banking
firm of Welser, which by 1546, also deemed Venezuela to be unprofitable. As such, the settlers
primarily embraced agricultural production, which was primitive and largely intended for
internal consumption. The colonizers cultivated a variety of crops in Venezuela’s northern region
ranging from tobacco, indigo, cotton, coffee, wheat and sugar cane. In short time, however,
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cacao became the colony’s most important crop. By the end of the 18th century, cacao production
dominated the domestic economy as well as accounted for almost all of the colony’s export
earnings. In addition to these crops, the early economy was based upon the production of cattle
on the southwestern llanos. Cattle ranchers primarily relied upon the meat from the herds to
provide for the local market, while they also sold the hides they produced on both domestic and
international markets.178 Labor for the ranches as well as agricultural activities was supported
using the encomienda system, and later, by the imported slave population. Since encomiendas
typically occupied large swaths of land, wealth was highly concentrated in the hands of a few
encomenderos. This proclivity for wealth consolidation would become a salient aspect of
Venezuelan society well into the 20th century.
By 1620 cacao had gradually become Venezuela’s principle export, and would remain so
for the next two centuries. Its effects on Venezuelan colonial society were substantial. The
production of cacao generated sizable profits, which attracted for the first time in Venezuela’s
history significant numbers of Spaniards, including relatively poor Canary Islanders. Moreover,
seeing that there was little indigenous labor available, the crop’s plantation culture facilitated a
great demand for African slaves during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. As such,
those who owned the means of production came to constitute a ruling class, occupying the
highest strata of colonial society. These elites were subsequently divided into two factions: the
peninsulares, who were associated with Spanish colonial rule and the mantuanos, who were the
American-born progeny of the Spanish colonizers. They were followed by white Canary
Islanders, who typically worked as wage laborers. Next came a large group of racially mixed
pardos. As white Canary Islanders, African slaves, and the natives worked closely with one
another either on plantations, or on small landholdings, miscegenation became commonplace. As
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a result, by the late eighteenth century, pardos constituted more than half of the total population.
Finally, occupying the lowest position in society were African slaves, who constituted about 20
percent of the population, and the native population, who constituted less than 10 percent of the
total population by the time of independence.179
By the mid-seventeenth century, Venezuela had been incorporated into New Granada.
However, occupying a relatively marginal position in the empire, it retained considerable
political autonomy.180 As such, communication and commerce flowed relatively freely between
the three primary regions. The northern region, with its access to the Caribbean Sea, became an
important hub of commerce through which most of Venezuela’s imports and exports, such as
cacao, wheat, and tobacco, passed through. The southern and eastern regions, albeit not as
important, supplied crucial linkages to New Granada, as well as access to both the Atlantic
Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. These regions that relied primarily upon the production of cattle
and related commodities (hides, and other livestock items) generally augmented the flow of
trade.181 Spanish indifference to Venezuela was such that the colonies provided a larger market
for Venezuelan cacao than did Spain. Moreover, the profits obtained from the triangular trade of
African slaves for Venezuelan cacao, which was then shipped across the Caribbean and sold
primarily in Veracruz (for consumption in New Spain), made the Venezuelan coast a frequent
port of call for Dutch and British merchants.182 As a result, illegal intercolonial trade flourished,
while Dutch and British merchants profited.
By the start of the 18th century, the Spanish crown took an active interest in regulating
commerce as part of an attempt to stem imperial decline. Attempting to crack down on the level
of contraband flowing through the Caribbean as well as to enhance profitability, the reformist
Bourbon dynasty granted the Compania Guipuzcoana, or the Caracas Company, a complete
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commercial monopoly on cacao in 1728.183 In return for this monopoly, the Caracas Company
agreed to suppress the contraband trade, defend the Venezuelan coast, stimulate the regional
production of cacao, and provide slaves to the colony.184
In addition to the reform that granted the Company monopoly rights on the cacao
industry, the Spanish Crown had implemented four additional measures designed to augment
revenues as well as strengthen its control over Venezuela in the late eighteenth century. The first
of these reforms occurred in 1776 when the Bourbon Monarchs placed the six provinces of
Venezuela under the fiscal jurisdiction of the Intendencia de Venezuela. A year later, the
Captaincy General of Venezuela, corresponding roughly to the present national territory, was
created with Caracas as its capital.185 This institution was established to consolidate the defense
of the Venezuelan provinces under the jurisdiction of a central office located in Caracas.
Desiring greater centralization of judicial, political and administrative functions within
Venezuela, the Crown created the Audiencia de Caracas in 1786 to regulate the activities of
colonial authorities; these functions had previously been handled by the audiencias of Santo
Domingo and Santa Fe de Bogota.186 Finally, in 1793, Spain established the Consulado Real de
Caracas. The Consulado was charged with the adjudication of mercantile cases and the
promotion of economic growth in Venezuela.187
Although the reforms were enacted primarily to bolster the administrative, social and
economic authority of Caracas over the six provinces, Venezuela continued to be a two-tiered
society divided along the self-reinforcing cleavages of wealth, ethnicity, and locality. At the top
of the socio-economic hierarchy was a white elite composed of high-ranking Spanish officials,
mantuano hacendados and rancheros, and a few wealthy merchants as well as professionals, all
of whom primarily resided in Caracas. On the other hand, pardo agriculturalists, day laborers,
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artisans, and slaves, who jointly constituted the lower strata of Venezuelan society, lived
predominantly in the surrounding provinces. They enjoyed relative political autonomy and
controlled their respective channels of commerce. As such, these regions became increasingly
reluctant to accept the greater prominence of Caracas and its emergent elite.188 By the end of the
18th century, regional antagonisms bolstered by sentiments of socio-economic autonomy would
greatly intensify the chaos and violence experienced during the Wars of Independence, which
lasted from 1810 to 1821.

Independence and its Aftermath
Napoleon’s occupation of Spain in 1808 provided the impetus for independence that
spread throughout Spanish America in the early 19th century. With Charles IV and his son
Ferdinand VII forced to abdicate the throne in favor of Napoleon, Spanish authority in the
colonies came under immense scrutiny from a relatively critical creole elite. Refusing to
recognize the French usurper, the Caracas cabildo (a city council which was primarily composed
of creole leaders) instead pledged their allegiance to the royal Spanish junta. However, this did
not deter a faction of creoles from questioning the political legitimacy of the hastily-formulated
Spanish junta. Moreover, for them, the immediate future of the colonial system was rife with
insecurity, uncertainty and tension, especially within the upper echelons of society. In April
1810, the Caracas cabildo, meeting as a cabildo abierto (town meeting), ousted the governor of
Caracas, the intendant, several Audiencia justices and the military forces. Shortly thereafter, the
leaders of the rebellion formed a junta that repudiated the authority of the Council of Regency in
Spain, abeit governed in the name of the deposed Ferdinand VII. The cabildos of three major
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cities – Coro, Maracaibo, and Guayana – were the only regional elites to not join Caracas;
instead, they vowed to remain loyal to Spain.189
On July 5, 1811, a congress convoked by the junta declared Venezuelan independence
from Spain, despite the lack of a completely unified central authority. Five months later, on
December 21, 1811, the congress drafted a constitution, marking the official beginning of
Venezuela’s First Republic. Known by Venezuelan historians as La Patria Boba, or the Silly
Republic, the First Republic of Venezuela lasted approximately six months. From the outset, it
was clear that the constitution preserved the privileges of the elite as well as enhanced their
control over the government and society by limiting suffrage to property owners. Moreover, it
abolished slave trading and legal ethnic discrimination, but not slavery itself. Finally, the new
republic suffered from an overwhelming unwillingness on the part of the surrounding localities
to become subservient to the caraqueno elite, either because they still adhered to the authority of
the Crown or because they thought themselves fully capable of self-government.190 Ultimately,
the caraqueno elite desired the political authority wielded by the Spanish Crown, with no change
to the existing socio-economic order. As such, those who remained loyal to Spain utilized
widespread social unrest among slaves and pardos to their advantage; these groups were more
interested in freedom, or land, than in the grand political principles elaborated in proclamations
and newspapers. Rallying these disenchanted factions of society with the promises of liberation
and civil equality, Spanish authorities ruthlessly crushed the independence movement.191
By July 1812, royalist forces defeated the national forces led by Simon Bolivar, captured
the leader of the new republic, Francisco Miranda, and reinstituted the colonial government.
However, once in power, the royalist government instituted an oppressive military occupation
that rekindled creole resentment of the centralized, colonial system of authority.192 As such, the
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rebels embraced a new strategy of military campaigns from the periphery to regain control over
Caracas. Capturing Caracas in 1813 with the support of an eastern front as well as a second front
from New Granada, Bolivar re-entered the city. However, as a member of the Caraqueno creole
elite, he too desired the preservation of a system whereby blacks remained at the bottom of the
social hierarchy. Writing in 1813 about the Royalist triumph over the nascent Republic in 1812,
Bolivar primarily focuses upon blacks and the role they played in the destruction of the First
Republic: “…a revolution of blacks, free and slave, broke out in the eastern coastal valleys,
provoked, supplied, and supported by agents of Monteverde. These inhuman and vile people,
feeding upon the blood and property of the patriots…committed the most horrible assassinations,
thefts, assaults and devastation.”193 In addition to this proclamation, a year later, Bolivar openly
supported a policy that ordered the capturing of escaped slaves to safeguard the supply of labor.
Making his intentions to keep blacks socially subjugated public, Bolivar essentially
pushed blacks, whether they were freedmen, slaves or fugitive slaves to offer their services to
royalist forces as to avoid remaining oppressed under a new system. The royalists, with a force
of 10,000 to 12,000 troops, only 160 of whom were Spaniards, began to terrorize those in the
llanos and eventually marched into Caracas in July 1814, defeating Bolivar’s forces and
restoring Venezuela to the Spanish Crown.194 Ousted from Caracas, Bolivar came to realize that
his intentions of maintaining a system that restricted blacks to the lower strata of society would
have to change if he was to triumph over the royalist forces and free Venezuela. Moreover, from
his defeat, it became clear that while control of Venezuela’s political and economic center was
imperative, dominance over the hinterland was also of vital importance.195
Acting upon these two lessons, upon his return to Venezuela in 1816, Bolivar secured
support from the llaneros – namely Jose Antonio Paez, while also promising to abolish slavery if
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newly freed slaves aided in the effort for independence from Spanish Colonial rule.196 Although
the Venezuelan army effectively became a conglomeration of regional armies primarily fighting
for the protection of their respective localities, from 1817 on, the leaders of the various regions
were united by one common goal: to defeat the Spaniards. By 1819, although Caracas remained
controlled by royalists, the Venezuelan army was gaining momentum. In the same year, the
Congress of Angostura (present-day Ciudad Bolivar) established the Third Republic, naming
Bolivar as its first President. Bolivar and his army then quickly marched across the llanos and
into the Andes, where he managed a decisive victory in Boyacá. Soon thereafter, he marched
triumphantly into Bogota – liberating New Granada from the yoke of Spanish imperial rule.
Nearly two years later, in June 1821, Bolivar’s troops triumphed over royalist forces at
Carabobo, resulting in the liberation of Caracas from Spanish rule. That August, delegates from
Venezuela and Colombia met at Cucuta to formally sign the Constitution of the Republic of Gran
Colombia. Bolivar was named the first provisional president of Gran Colombia, Francsico de
Paula Santander was named Vice-President, and the capital was placed in Bogota.197
The Republic of Colombia was formally proclaimed in 1819, consisting of the territories
of Venezuela, New Granada and Ecuador (when it was eventually liberated from Spanish control
in 1822). In addition to appointing Bolivar to the Presidency and Santander to the Vicepresidency, the Congress of Cucuta in 1821, duly reaffirmed the legitimacy of the fledgling
republic, adopting a highly centralized system of government. The constituent nations were
divided into provinces and departments whose head administrators were appointed Bogota
officials. Furthermore, this document provided for strict separation of powers, allowing the
executive to retain ultimate authority over the other branches of government in cases of
emergency – adhering to the tendency of emerging Latin American countries to
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disproportionately concentrate power in the executive. In terms of who would be able to
participate in the political process, socioeconomic restrictions implemented by this constitution
limited the right to vote to at most, 10 percent of free adult males - a fairly standard procedure at
the time.198 Citizens were also guaranteed a list of basic rights, albeit not included in this list was
freedom of worship – leaving the issue of religious toleration to be decided upon at a later time.
Surprisingly, the Congress also adopted a nationwide free-birth principle that was designed to
gradually abolish slavery, as well as a provision that relieved natives of any obligation to pay
tribute or provide involuntary labor.199 This constitution generally reflected Bolivar’s vision of
an ideal republic; unified under the auspices of a quasi-monarchical centralized government, and
headed by a powerful executive. However, almost immediately, the new government was
hindered by disunity among various existing political factions and economic interests within the
Republic. Over the duration of ten years, the Republic experienced gradual economic and
political fragmentation, generating along with it, trans-national as well as internal conflict.
During the 1820s, Bolivar continued the fight for the liberation of Spanish America,
leading his forces against the royalist troops that remained in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. In his
absence, tensions between various factions of the new Republic began to foster a sense of
Venezuelan nationalism, as many of the caraqueno elite came to be resentful of the fact that they
were being governed once again, by a distant power – this time located in Bogota. In addition to
tensions between Venezuelan and New Granadan elites, confrontations between a predominantly
Venezuelan military and New Granadan civilian leaders as well as between political factions that
had consolidated around either Santander or Bolivar came to characterize the existing political
order of the Republic. In 1826, these tensions culminated in a separatist movement lead by the
llanero chieftain Antonio Paez, who desired Venezuela’s independence from the Colombian
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Confederation. Unable to defuse the separatist movement and quell tensions between rivaling
factions, Gran Colombia disintegrated as regional military chieftains (such as Paez) took
advantage of discontent to seize power.200 In 1830, Paez officially declared Venezuela’s
independence from Gran Colombia, and would subsequently dominate politics for the first
twenty years of the new republic.
Beginning with Paez, the dissolution of the Republic engendered the rise of various
regional leaders called caudillos to political and economic prominence. For the remainder of the
19th century, these leaders would construct a quasi-federal framework in which regional elites
would wield substantial autonomy. However, Caracas would ultimately remain the economic and
political seat of power. Robert Gilmore in his seminal study of caudillismo in Venezuela, defines
it as, “…the union of personalism and violence for the conquest of power. It is a means for the
selection and establishment of political leadership in the absence of a social structure and
political groupings adequate to the functioning of representative government.”201 Simply put,
these caudillos were local strongmen who relied on the backing of regional militias as well as the
loyalty of local oligarchs to consolidate their own economic and political power within the
context of a war-torn nation with a history of weak central institutions. As a result, Venezuela’s
post-independence era from 1830 to approximately 1920 can best be understood as a competition
among various social and regional factions over the control of the Caracas-based bureaucracy, to
consolidate the wealth derived from the coffee trade with North Atlantic and European
nations.202
From 1830 – 1845, Paez would preside over an initially prosperous Venezuelan economy
as coffee became the country’s principal source of revenue. This was primarily due to high
European demand for coffee, as well as the increased availability of international credit, that
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spurred further investment into the coffee industry.203 As the demand for Venezuelan coffee
increased, so did the need for more domestic labor. However, the Wars of Independence which
had lasted for approximately two decades had substantially decimated Venezuela’s working
population. To address this lack of labor, coffee planters advocated to delay the liberation of
slaves as well as forced the enactment of laws designed to reduce the mobility of rural workers
from coffee plantations to subsistence agriculture.204Additionally, under the leadership of Paez, a
new constitution was ratified in 1830, which separated the government into three powers
(judicial, executive, legislative) although the executive became inherently, and unsurprisingly,
more powerful than the other branches. Eleven provinces also acquired legal status with the
ability to retain their own governors and local assemblies. However, the provinces remained
subservient to the central government by use of force as well as through the allocations of money
derived from the state budget.205
Although Venezuela experienced rapid economic growth in the early years of postindependence, three factors limited the possibility of sustained economic development:
staggering external debt accumulated during the wars of independence, the insecurity of land
property, and competition from cheap manufactured imports, which debilitated the artisan
sector.206 While public expenditure grew from 5 million bolivars (Bs.) to Bs. 18 million over
Paez’s fifteen-year presidential term, inherited debts and lack of an effective tax system served to
undermine the fiscal viability of the central government. By 1839, the external debt had grown to
ten times the value of exports and servicing it absorbed 40 percent of public expenditures.
Moreover, fifty percent of the state budget was used by Paez to keep unruly local caudillos and
their militias in line at the expense of a strong, central army.
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The reluctance of Venezuela’s economic elite to break with their coffee monoculture (by
region) and their dependence upon imports of manufactured European goods made the economy
highly vulnerable to the volatile commodity markets of the western metropoles. Therefore, when
European and U.S. demand for Venezuelan goods contracted in the 1840s, peasants and
landowners were driven further into debt, while merchants and financiers in the cities eagerly
foreclosed on their properties.207 As a result, a lasting political division amongst two elite
factions began to form.208 In one camp, controlled by Paez, were the Conservatives, or the godos,
composed primarily of merchants, creditors and agents of foreign commerce. Opposing the
godos were the Liberals – a group of largely indebted coffee planters, allies of Bolivar who
regarded Paez as a traitor to Republican and Pan-American ideals, and rival caudillos who feared
the economic power of the established commercial and financial elite. The liberals advocated for
a more decentralized state, the expansion of suffrage, freedom of the press, and checks upon the
power of the Church among other reforms. This faction coalesced around the leadership of
Antonio Leocadio Guzman.
Perceiving Guzman as a threat to his continued Conservative rule, Paez imprisoned him,
and in 1847 selected fellow godo, Jose Tadeo Monagas, to become Venezuela’s next president.
However, Jose Monagas began to gravitate towards the liberal party. After passing a series of
debt-relief laws and granting protection against foreclosures to protect landowners, Paez sought
to overthrow Monagas. By then, however, Paez had lost much of his political power and was
soon exiled to the Caribbean and then the United States in 1849. After Monagas had exiled Paez,
he and his brother Jose Gregorio initiated close to a century of dictatorial rule which centered
around land and labor reforms. Unable to unify the country with these policies, a global
economic crisis in 1857-1858 led to the ultimate demise of the Monagas dynasty. As the prices
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of leather fell by 30 percent, coffee 20 percent, and cacao 50 percent, both Conservative and
Liberal caudillos took advantage of growing discontent in the countryside to drive the ruling
Monagas family from power. However, no new government emerged to fill the void.209
The period between 1858-1863 is commonly referred to as the Federal Wars. The result
of intense ideological conflict amongst Venezuela’s elites, this five-year military campaign
claimed the lives of approximately 5 percent of the population.210 These wars were primarily
fought as a means of determining whether Venezuela should adopt a federalist or unitary system
of governance. Coming to an end in 1863 when General Juan C. Falcon and his adviser, Antonio
Guzman Blanco achieved control over Caracas, the Federal Wars had profoundly impacted
Venezuelan society, while solving few of its problems.211 Falcon would eventually be replaced
by Guzman in 1868, who would thus assume the singular role as Venezuela’s provisional leader.
Initiating approximately eighteen years of formal and informal dictatorial rule from 1870 to
1887, Guzman substantially altered Venezuela’s state structure.
Determined to achieve “eternal peace,” strengthen the Venezuelan economy, and provide
for the construction of essential infrastructural works, Guzman embarked upon an agenda that
would destroy the Conservative oligarchy and pacify his Liberal allies, revive the coffee trade
and appease the financial and commercial elites, and induce foreign investment for the
construction of various public works, transportation projects and national electrification. Guzman
and his administration seemed to deliver on their promises. They concretely expanded coffee
production, augmented the availability of foreign loans, established new contracts with foreign
companies, amassed a Federal army to address potential sources of dissent, arranged for the
construction of highways and transportation, and even established an educational system.212
Moreover, Guzman rebuilt the city of Caracas, developed a modern governmental bureaucracy
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with the capacity for inter-regional communication and transportation (roads, railroads, telegraph
lines etc.), and pushed for the approval of a constitution that reduced the number of states from
twenty to nine in 1881.213 This reform diminished the number of caudillos participating in
government, making it substantially easier to exercise total control over the national territory.
However, despite eighteen years of expensive, foreign-financed projects, the national income
derived from export earnings had remained where it had been at the start of his rule.214 Thus, by
1897-1898, the amount of foreign and domestic debt that Venezuela had accumulated was
immense, while only 19 percent of the population was literate. As one caudillo took over the
reins of the central government from the next, it was not until 1899, when a drop in the price of
coffee again facilitated political and economic upheaval, that Cipriano Castro would assume the
presidency - paving the way for his protégé Juan Vicente Gomez to facilitate the initial process
of state creation.
With General Castro ousted by a coup supported by the United States in 1908, Gomez,
assumed the presidency. Posthumously known as the “Tyrant of the Andes,” Gomez has been
remembered for his particularly repressive regime and recognized as the founder of the modern
Venezuelan state. He organized the first national army, built up a highly-centralized bureaucracy
and established a government monopoly in the fiscal arena.215 Remaining president for the next
27 years, he deployed his well-trained and well-armed troops to defeat regional caudillos and
establish himself as the nation’s single, dominant caudillo.216 More importantly, Gomez was
fortunate enough to be in office when the petroleum industry came to Venezuela. As early as
1909, concessions for the right to explore large swaths of territory for oil were granted to foreign
companies, with a representative of a British company being awarded concessions for twentyseven million hectares – a little less than one-third of the national territory.217
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Following the end of World War I, U.S. corporations moved to battle for the concessions,
influenced by a government policy designed to preserve domestic supplies through the
exploitation of foreign oil. Aware of the potential profits to be made with increased competition,
in 1918, the Gomez regime drafted an oil law that raised royalties to 15 percent and reduced the
number of new concessions. Warned by the U.S. companies that they would not invest if the
terms were to hold, President Gomez acquiesced, cognizant that he could not afford to alienate
the companies. In 1922, the Venezuelan Congress legally gave the President sole authority to
extend concessions, set royalties at 10 percent, confer titles for 40 years, and grant customs
exemptions for industry-related imports.218 Later that year, Shell’s oil drillers struck the first
enormous gusher and Venezuela was forever changed.219
The development of the petroleum industry from the 1920s on made for radical
discontinuities with the past.220 From 1922 to 1945, Venezuela became the world’s first great
exporter of petroleum and the world’s second producer after the United States.221 Between 1921
and 1925, petroleum exports rose from Bs. 5.26 million to Bs. 259.15 million, while by 1936, oil
earnings were Bs. 676.77 million, more than twenty-one times coffee earnings – coffee being
Venezuela’s primary source of export income before the discovery of oil.222 With these
petroleum revenues Gomez was able to pay off the national debt by 1930, finance the
construction of an extensive new highway system and other public works, provide subsidies to
Venezuela’s constituent states during the economic depression, support the expansion of the
armed forces, government employees and benefit his political allies. Although the wealth
generated from this initial petroleum boom facilitated many important structural changes, the
greatest flow of wealth went to Gomez, his associates, and members of the armed forces.223
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Oil expansion also engendered a massive rural-urban migration that crippled the
agricultural sector as both agricultural workers and land-owning elite desired a piece of the
nascent petroleum industry. While peasants fled brutal conditions and rural indolence for new
opportunities in oil camps and cities and rural elites sold their land to oil companies to make a
fortune, the result was the creation of both a new working class, as well as a small mercantile
bourgeoisie.224 However, with the agricultural-led export sector now destroyed, these new socioeconomic classes became increasingly dependent upon the investment decisions of the foreign
oil companies for profit. Imports increased, the bolivar appreciated against the dollar resulting in
an overvalued exchange rate which further promoted importation, inflation increased and real
wages declined. Moreover, since oil production is a capital-intensive industry and does not
require a large labor force, the initial expansion of the industry did not necessarily equate to an
increase in employment; the resultant expansion of the service sector, however, captured some of
the excess supply of labor. Alberto Adriani, a Venezuelan politician who served on the cabinet of
Gomez’s successor called the oil industry, “…a foreign, provincial enclave within the national
economy… [one that] exercises a relatively insignificant influence over the prosperity of our
people.”225 Ultimately, if the revenue derived from petroleum had been invested in public
education, health care, domestic industrialization and agricultural diversification, it is possible
that the absolute dependence upon foreign investment and international oil prices could have
been mitigated. However, this did not happen, and Venezuela’s oil enclave economy would
persist well into the 20th century.
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Initial Considerations of Venezuela’s State Creation Process
Like any other Latin American country, for Venezuela to become a modern state, its
divisions had to be formerly coordinated with one another through a centralized administrative
apparatus; this apparatus had to be autonomous and able to enforce its authority throughout its
territory; and finally, it must have been able to mobilize and integrate the polity into national
political life.226 By the beginning of the twentieth century, Venezuela had been able to fulfill the
first condition and part of the second, while the third remained elusive. As posited by Charles
Tilly in his state-building paradigm, the probability that a territory would have success in
satisfying the aforementioned requirements relied upon the presence of seven important factors.
Of these seven, the most relevant to Venezuela have been related to the nation’s absence of large
quantities of mineral wealth as well as an extensive and easily subdued indigenous population
(condition one), the proliferation of inexperienced caudillos to head of government (condition
three), the varying degree of heterogeneity in ethnicity, religion and class (condition five), and
the inability of economic and political elites to unify and subject themselves to the authority of a
centralized entity (condition 6).
As a result of the oil expansion in the early 19th century, more rapid structural changes
occurred in Venezuela between 1920 and 1960, than had been seen in the years between 1780
and 1920.227 Utilizing Venezuela’s newly found oil wealth, Gomez bought weapons, built a
permanent standing army, and laid the foundation for the first effective central state apparatus in
Venezuelan history.228Military and administrative power allowed Gomez to decimate his
enemies and close the books on nineteenth-century political life.229 Moreover, oil revenues
provided him with the monetary capability to centralize power, embark upon substantial public
works and transportation projects, eliminate external debt, and retain the allegiance of the
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military with decent salaries and sizable benefits. At this juncture, the power of the state had
been fully consolidated, however the legitimacy of the state was yet to be achieved.

The Twentieth Century until the Present
As mentioned before, changes in the economy and the state had a profound impact upon
the social structure of Venezuela. The new social groups and forces being created by the rise of
the petroleum industry had little connection to older elites or to the social and political structures
of the past. As such, they were effectively marginalized by the oligarchic political system
perpetuated by Gomez, and could neither find legitimate avenues of organizational expression,
nor reliable allies within the regime to represent their interests. Since agrarian elites had lost their
base of support due to extensive rural-urban migration, it was incredibly difficult for them to
establish powerful political organizations able to dominate the political arena, as was the case in
neighboring Colombia. On the other hand, the peasantry that had migrated the cities became
particularly receptive to the calls of politically-charged university students disenchanted with the
Gomez regime. This was because these groups saw little hope for their own socio-economic
advancement under the current system.230 After a series of protests in 1928 where university
students were arrested and exiled, one member this “generation of 1928”, Romulo Betancourt,
whose name would become synonymous with the struggle for electoral democracy, developed a
plan to replace Gomez with a government broadly representative of Venezuelan society.231 His
strategy was eventually incorporated into the doctrine of the Accion Democratica (AD) party –
as it was called upon its legalization in 1941 – and consisted of: 1) anti-imperialism whereby
foreign oil companies would be challenged and a “just share” of profits accrued for the nation; 2)
the utilization of those profits to modernize and diversify the economy as well as to provide
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essential state-funded services such as healthcare, public education, subsidized housing etc; and
3) universal suffrage, and a direct vote for the president as to provide an opportunity for
democratic governance.232
With Gomez’s death in 1935, exiles were permitted reentry to Venezuela, and returned
eager to expand politics and opposition beyond student protests. Gomez was succeeded in office
by his minister of war General Eleazar Lopez Contreras, who sought to maintain the gomestica
political structure, but also manage the revolutionary zeal engendered by Gomez’s death and the
return of the political exiles. After Lopez Contreras enacted a law in 1936 that formally
sanctioned the right of works to create their own unions, The Movimiento de Organizacion
Venezolana, formed by Betancourt, organized petroleum workers who then launched a national
strike with support from the Communist Party, the Partido Democratico Nacional (the precursor
to AD), and the Caracas middle classes.233 In response to the strike, Lopez Contreras banned
political parties and incipient trade unions, forcing them underground; he prohibited open mass
activities, and also retained many gomecista generals in the tops ranks of the military - to the
consternation of many professionally trained officers.234 Moreover, he curtailed political
participation by limiting suffrage to adult, literate males and by establishing indirect elections
whereby the oligarchy continued to dominate local and state politics.235 In 1941, Lopez
Contreras was succeeded by his minister of war, General Isaias Medina Angarita. Once in office,
Medina began a process of liberalization. Seeking a base of support independent from Lopez,
and perhaps influenced by the climate of democratic struggle in World War II, Medina gradually
re-authorized the creation of political organizations and unions.236 In addition to legalizing AD in
1941, he forced the foreign oil companies to revise their contracts and to accept the right of the
government to raise their taxes. Venezuela’s share of oil profits increased from about one eighth

102

to over one half. Medina also pushed through an agrarian reform law designed to address
economic and social discontent in Venezuela’s rural areas.237
During the Medina period, the AD created a vigorous, effective, and close-knit political
organization. Party organizers mobilized and established industrial as well as peasant unions – by
1945, the AD had out-expanded its political competitors (namely the Communist party) and
generally had the upper hand in popular organization.238 Although the party had grown
exponentially, power continued firmly in the hands of the gomecista military and state elites.
Mass organization yielded no real power, elections remained indirect, and suffrage limited. At
the end of his term in 1945, Medina reached an agreement with AD for a gradual transition to
full democracy. However, the transitional, compromise candidate suffered a nervous breakdown.
Under pressure to name a successor, Medina chose a civilian, which effectively ended decades of
gomecista military rule; however, it did not guarantee a clear promise of free elections.239
Unknown to Medina during the time of his negotiations with AD, a group of young
military officers - including future president Marcos Perez Jimenez – had approached AD party
officials with a proposal for a coup. During the early years of the 20th century, the Gomez
administration, like the Lopez Contreras and Medina administrations after him, maintained a
large, highly-trained, standing army to neutralize the power wielded by the regional caudillos
and various dissenting groups. As such, to augment the military’s power as well as retain its
allegiance to civilian authority based in Caracas, the Venezuelan state allocated a significant
portion of its oil revenues to the military as to improve the standard of living of its officers, to
purchase new and more sophisticated weapons, and to allow many young officers to gain
technical skills and advanced training by studying abroad.240
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Influenced by the professionalism and modernization of their Latin American
counterparts, many of Venezuela’s young officers were eager to cleanse the institution of the old,
unprofessional Gomez hierarchy represented by both General Lopez and General Medina.
Moreover, they believed that the military was the only domestic organization with the integrity
and capability to protect the national interest – a common sentiment found among many military
forces operating in Latin America at this time.241 As a result, these officers formed the Union
Patriotic Militar (UPM) and entered into an agreement with the AD. If successful, they would
turn control over the government to AD, with the understanding that free elections would be
held, control of the military would be depoliticized, and professional criteria would be used in
promotions, assignments and other military affairs.242 After Medina named his successor, the
adecos (AD members) accepted. On October 18th, 1945, the military conspirators ousted Medina
and transferred power to a provisional junta headed by four members from AD, two officers, and
one independent civilian. The three years that followed, known in Venezuela as the trienio,
marked the definitive introduction of mass politics into national life.243
Almost immediately, the provisional government passed laws that lowered barriers to
participation, and guaranteed universal suffrage to all citizens over eighteen. Moreover, the
government began to aggressively pursue the implementation of education reform, limited land
reform, peasant and labor organizing, housing construction and public investment.244 In
December 1947, AD won control of the new Congress and elected novelist Romulo Gallegos to
the presidency with 70 percent of the vote. Whereas only 5 percent of the population voted
before 1945, the electorate expanded to 36 percent immediately thereafter. Free, direct elections
prevailed at all levels, from municipal councils and state legislatures to the national congress and
the president. Although AD captured most governmental positions, new parties were formed, the
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most significant being COPEI (a Christian Democratic group), and Union Republicana
Democratica (URD), which was a non-Communist leftist faction that had supported Medina.
Continuing the policies set forth by the provisional junta, AD leaders utilized the profits accrued
by the oil bonanza to provide services such as education, health, water and communication to
poor and peripheral groups and regions. Moreover, they sought to bring about a rapid democratic
revolution, including: the full establishment of a liberal democracy; a significant increase in the
state’s royalties on petroleum products; the promulgation of labor laws favorable to unions, and
the institution of secular educational reform.245 While the policies advanced by the government
under the AD garnered massive and long-lasting popular support, they also systematically
alienated a number of powerful groups. Opposition consolidated on the right, represented by the
Catholic Church, by new political parties such as COPEI, and by conservative elements in the
military, in business (foreign and domestic), and in the U.S. embassy.
Business interests – the oil industry in particular – contested policies favoring labor and
restricting company profits. Rural elites resisted land reform and vehemently objected measures
bolstering the participation of peasant unions in the implementation of rural policy. The Catholic
Church was strongly averse to education reforms that promoted public schools and restricted the
autonomy of Church-run institutions. Finally, the same military leaders who had orchestrated the
coup against General Medina resented attempts by the civilian leaders to relegate them to
subordinate, apolitical roles. Confident in its vast electoral majorities and its perceived alliance
with the military, the AD largely ignored the opposition coalition that had begun to form. On
November 24th, 1948, the AD government fell to a military coup. The three-year experiment with
democracy would subsequently give way to a decade of bloody dictatorship.246
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After the coup, a junta composed of three colonels – Marcos Perez Jimenez, Carolos
Delgado Chalbaud (minister of defense during the trienio), and Felipe Llovera Paez – was
installed as a provisional government. Of the three, Colonel Delgado was chosen president, albeit
his tenure in that position only lasted until November 23, 1950 when he was assassinated. For
two years, Perez Jimenez, who had been appointed the minister of defense under Delgado,
consolidated control over the military. After leading a new military junta, Perez Jimenez
declared himself provisional president in 1952. On November 30th of that year, Perez Jimenez
manipulated a National Constituent Assembly to declare himself the constitutionally elected
president for the period 1953 – 1958.247 Under the leadership of General Marcos Perez Jimenez,
public policy was rolled back across the board. Educational, labor, and agrarian reforms were
rescinded, the press was censored, and the labor syndicates and peasant unions that had formed
the base of AD support were replaced with nonpartisan unions.248 Nuancing this heavy-handed
authoritarianism with populist policies, Perez Jimenez launched a state initiative that allocated
large amounts of money for the creation of major urban centers and massive housing projects.
Money was also allocated for the transformation of transportation and communication
infrastructure, and the development of basic industries such as iron and steel.249
By 1957, several factors converged to undermine military rule. First, the Catholic Church
which had openly endorsed military rule in 1948 as “salvation”, turned against the regime,
legitimizing opposition to the military. Second, a general economic downturn combined with
notorious corruption – especially in public works- stimulated public criticism by professional
societies (engineers, lawyers etc.).250 Moreover, the business community became increasingly
alienated as the regime reneged its debts and contracts.251 Third, exiled party elites from the
major parties (AD, COPEI, URD, and the Communists) formed an opposition bloc, the Junta
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Patriotica, that relied upon the underground activities of, and collaboration between, younger
party cadres to oust the dictator, and create the conditions for a revolutionary transformation in
Venezuela.252 Finally, although many military officers benefited from the regime’s lavish
spending and rampant corruption, others had become concerned with the long-term viability and
integrity of the institution. As such, on New Year’s Eve 1957, a group of officers staged a coup
against Perez Jimenez. This attempted insurrection disintegrated the façade of unity that had
been enforced by the military regime. Although the coup failed, it prompted Perez Jimenez to
unleash a wave of repression that resulted in the further alienation of the armed forces. 253
As the weakness of the regime became more apparent, underground political forces, now
united under the Junta Patriotica, orchestrated massive public demonstrations and street fighting.
Unable to control the masses, the regime collapsed quickly and Perez Jimenez was forced to flee
the country on January 23, 1958.254 Following the flight of Perez Jimenez, a junta, composed of
five men (two military and three civilian) assumed provisionary control over the government.
The transition of power from the dictator to this provisionary junta did not immediately generate
an end to public demonstrations and violence. The demonstrations continued until the two
military officers, who had been closely associated with the dictatorship, were discharged. In
February, a new junta took firm control; it was composed of Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, two
other military officers, and two civilians. However, the political situation remained far from
stable. Under pressure from more conservative officers as well as political parties, a brief period
of political negotiation and maneuvering followed. Finally, the junta decided to call for elections
by the end of the year to stabilize the political arena as well as to address Venezuela’s economic
woes - the petroleum market was contracting and the construction and financial sectors were in
crisis. Cognizant of the various challenges facing Venezuela, the leaders of the nation’s three
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main political parties – AD, URD, and COPEI – signed a series of pacts that culminated with the
promulgation of the Punto Fijo Pact.255
With this pact, key party leaders agreed to defend constitutional government against any
possible coup d’état, to form a coalition government of national unity whereby no one party
would dominate the president’s cabinet, to establish a minimum common program to be enacted
regardless of which party won office, to guarantee a financial subsidy and legal autonomy to the
Church, and to enforce civilian oversight over the military as well as assure that officers would
not be subject to prosecution for their past actions. Moreover, the signatories agreed to exclude
the revolutionary left, namely the Communist Party, from participating in government.256 The
power-sharing agreement was signed in October 1958, just before the December elections. The
result of the elections propelled Romulo Betancourt, the leader of the AD, to the presidency.
Moreover, his party won 73 of the 132 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 32 of the 51 seats
in the Senate, with voter turnout being above 92 percent.
The agreement reached by the main political forces and socioeconomic elites ensured that
the vital interests of all major social interest groups (AD and COPEI, other political parties,
socioeconomic elites, military officials, ecclesiastical groups, labor and peasant coalitions) were
represented through the establishment of implicit concurrent majority rule. This “pacted
democracy” significantly enhanced governability in Venezuela, as well as lowered political
tensions through the deliberate toning down of partisan discourse. As such, citizens and social
actors not affiliated with either party recognized the elections as legitimate, and accepted the
results without conflict.257
Political change in 1958 was driven by the lessons that relevant social actors had chosen
to learn from earlier experiences. Key members of the political class perceived the fall of Perez
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Jimenez to be a second opportunity for democracy; a chance to avoid the political disasters of the
trienio. These included: polarization, a sense of controlled conflict, and the alienation of
powerful minorities. Relying upon these experiences, Venezuelan political leaders understood
that substantive social and economic change could not occur solely through methods of mass
mobilization. Moreover, they believed that through mass mobilization (as was seen during the
trienio), either power became too concentrated in the dominant party – which led to a virtual
dictatorship - or that conflict was so profound as to make governing impossible.258 As a result,
the political class decided to act with caution in constructing the post-1958 settlement. Five
points characterized the political system of the fledgling democratic regime over the next decade:
(1) pacts and coalitions; (2) inter-elite consensus; (3) program limitation; (4) encouragement of
participation, but controlled and channeled; and (5) exclusion of the revolutionary left.259 After
1958, barriers to participation dropped and active political involvement was not only encouraged
but facilitated. Registration was easy and voting was obligatory.260 Moreover, a strong
associational life bolstered political participation, while the highly-institutionalized party
structure established by the Punto Fijo pact helped to legitimize electoral competitions and those
who competed in them.
According to Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, since parties control access to
policy-making positions, the way they function and are organized become central components to
the performance and viability of Latin American democracy.261 As such, Latin American
countries that retain a highly-institutionalized party system – in that parties become well
established, competition among them is universally accepted, and confidence that the system is
legitimate and will prevail into the foreseeable future is unwavering - are often the ones with the
longest traditions of stable democratic governance. In order to ascertain the degree to which a
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democratic party system is either institutionalized or inchoate, the authors relied upon four
essential criterion. The first is regularity of party competition as measured by Mogens N.
Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility, which gauges the net change in the seat or vote shares of
all parties from one election to the next. The second criterion of institutionalization stresses that
parties must develop somewhat stable roots in society. This dimension addresses linkages
between parties, citizens and organized interests. A third criterion emphasizes, “that citizens and
organized interests must perceive that parties and elections are the means of determine who
governs, and that the electoral process and parties are accorded legitimacy.”262 Lacking relevant
cross-national surveys, the authors offer survey data based upon rough estimates that assess key
aspects of this criterion. The fourth and final criterion is that party organization in countries with
institutionalized party systems must be solid. Aggregating these four dimensions to measure
party system institutionalization in Latin America, Mainwaring and Scully place Venezuela
among the top four countries in the region, only behind Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay.263 They
go on to mention that:

Parties have been the central actors in Venezuelan democracy since its inception in 1958.
Parties are institutionalized, disciplined, and centralized. They control the process of
candidate selection, and they are the key actors in political campaigns. Organized groups
in society have strong linkages to parties and are often dominated by them. Party voting
and party identification are strong.264

Although a highly-institutionalized party system reduces the number of problems associated with
inchoate or disorganized party systems – such as corruption and personalism - Mainwaring and
Scully assert that a high level of institutionalization does not necessarily mean that stable
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democratic governance will be achieved. It simply means that where a party system is more
institutionalized, parties are key actors in structuring the political process. Thus, political actors
in institutionalized systems usually control candidate selection for the head of government, are
generally oriented toward winning electoral competitions and coming to power through peaceful
means, facilitate governability while allowing for groups to express their interests, and attenuate
conflict in ways that do not overwhelm the political system. Moreover, an institutionalized
system also enhances electoral accountability and generally reduces the incidence of corruption,
which makes for more effective government because, “corruption thrives on disorganization, the
absence of stable relationships among groups and of recognized patterns of authority...
Corruption is most prevalent in states which lack effective political parties…In a modernizing
polity the weaker and less accepted the political parties, the greater the likelihood of
corruption.”265 To summarize, although a high degree of party institutionalization does not
necessarily lead to democratic governance, stable democracy is more likely to thrive when the
party system is institutionalized, than when democratic institutions are weak and uncertainty is
pervasive.266
In the post-1958 period, although stability and governability had been achieved through
the institutionalization of Venezuela’s party system, the consociational or quasi-consociational
experiment that emerged also imposed considerable constraints on the decision-making process.
Due to the fact that most important sectors were given a virtual veto power on matters affecting
their respective fundamental interests, policy making was rather lengthy and generated slow
advances in terms of redistributive legislation.267 Moreover, until the 1980s, associational life
was encapsulated and dominated by the major political parties, namely AD and COPEI (URD
left the coalition in 1960). Therefore, in general, voter choice and participation in elections were
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constrained by both electoral and legal systems, which also afforded leaders of the dominant
parties significant influence over all stages of the electoral process.268 Finally, the Betancourt
administration, as well as the administration of Raul Leoni that succeeded it, worked assiduously
to isolate and exclude the Communist party and other leftist factions from government. In
response to their marginalization, and inspired by the recent success of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the
Communists and the leftist factions of AD and URD moved quickly to armed opposition in 1960.
However, by the late 1960s, the insurgency had been defeated and many of the former guerillas
accepted amnesty and integrated themselves into political life as members of peaceful political
parties of the left – most notably the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and the Revolutionary
Left Movement (MIR).269
From 1958 to 1973, gradual fragmentation of the party system due to doctrinal disputes,
generational rivalries, and conflicting personal ambitions led to the steady decline of AD, the
uninterrupted growth of COPEI – with Rafael Caldera, the first opposition candidate to win an
election doing so in 1968 – and the rise and fall of various personalist vehicles that sought to
gain legitimacy.270 During these years, the Venezuelan political system in some regards
flourished, as elections became more competitive and political parties proliferated. However, this
competition lacked coherence or enduring structure. It was not until the 1973 elections that
fragmentation disappeared with the share of presidential votes going to “Other” (not to AD or
COPEI) dropping from 42.6 percent in 1968 to 14.6 percent in 1973.271 The significance of this
transformation was the consolidation of the political system into a two-party-arrangement, as AD
and COPEI successfully pushed their rivals to the margin. Although a growing number and
variety of groups during this period sought official representation in government – with three
candidates competing for the presidency in 1958 while twenty-three competed in 1988; and eight
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parties presenting legislative slates in the first election compared to seventy-eight approximately
thirty years later – AD and COPEI are the only parties to have enjoyed substantial time in
power.272
John D. Martz in his study of the characteristics of party maturation in Venezuela from
1973 to 1983 posits eight reasons for the unwavering political dominance of these two-parties.
These are: (1) the costs of campaign competition which hindered the potential success of minor
or of personalistic challenges; (2) the ability of major parties to control internal conflict without
leading to outright division due to prior extensive experience doing so; (3) the centrist
proclivities of public opinion that forced the two dominant parties towards the middle of the
political spectrum, effectively crowding out all competitors; (4) the diminished appeal of radical
parties on either the right or the left due to the catch-all methods of AD and COPEI; (5) the
solidification of the democratic system that underlined the commitments of the Punto Fijo pact in
which AD and COPEI were the main beneficiaries; (6) party loyalties that took precedent over
nonparty personalities; (7) centralized party organizations that functioned in democratic manner;
and (8) the hegemonic turnover of governments between the two main parties.273 By the early
1980s, years of shared political dominance between these two parties had allowed them to
essentially monopolize the political space at local, regional, and national levels. As a result, this
Partidocracia, or rule by parties, became a major source of frustration in Venezuelan politics as
well as a primary target of opposition and reform by the late 1980s. Dissatisfaction with the
political system continued to mount during the 1980s and 1990s as the inability of the political
parties to guarantee a better standard of living for Venezuela’s growing population became
increasingly apparent in the context of continued economic downturn.
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The 1973 Middle East oil embargo and the correspondingly high prices for oil on the
international markets greatly augmented the revenues of the Venezuelan government; in late
1973 oil prices quadrupled and by 1974, oil earnings had increased from $2.6 billion in 1973 to
$8.9 billion.274 This dramatic increase in government income allowed newly-elected President
Carlos Andres Perez to raise the minimum wage, eliminate unemployment entirely, create vast
steel and aluminum industries, subsidize industries and agriculture, and expand social benefits.
Moreover, inflation was controlled at a fixed exchange rate (Bs. 4.3 to the dollar), which made it
relatively cheaper to obtain dollars as well as imported goods. Although the sustained petroleum
boom had earned Venezuela over $150 billion - which was augmented by the nationalization of
the oil industry in 1976 - by 1978, the positive balance of payments generated by the boom had
been overtaken by the export of capital abroad, by imports for consumption as well as by imports
for the expansion of basic industries. To continue industrial expansion projects and cover the
balance of payments deficit, the government contracted several large, short-term loans, which
came due just as the price for petroleum on international markets experienced a drastic
decrease.275
In the early 1980s, general overproduction, reduced demand resulting from a recession
lasting from 1981-1982 and widespread conservation efforts facilitated serious decreases in
petroleum prices, which subsequently affected the economies of the oil-exporting nations,
including Venezuela.276 As prices fell, income from petroleum exports dropped from slightly
below $20 billion in 1981 to $11 billion in 1983. Since petroleum still accounted for over 90
percent of export earnings, the government heavily depended upon those revenues to fund social
programs, public works, construction and subsidize nascent domestic industries.277 Therefore, as
petroleum prices decreased, wages and salaries stagnated in both public and private sectors, real
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income decreased and government services experienced a significant decline in quality as well as
accessibility. As real income from wages and salaries dropped, the proportion of households in
poverty and extreme poverty grew significantly.278 Moreover, inflation, which had begun to rise
incrementally during the Perez administration skyrocketed over the course of a few years.
As Robert Alexander points out, “On the basis of 1970 as 100, the index number for the
general price level had risen from 119.7 in 1974, the first year of the Perez administration, to
153.0 in 1978, the last year Carlos Andres Perez was in office. It then rose from 184.2 in Herrera
Campins’s first year to 303 in 1983, the last full year of the Herrera period.” 279 Unable to
effectively counter hyperinflationary pressures, on February 28, 1983, a day known to
Venezuelans as “Black Friday”, the government was forced to devalue the Bolivar from Bs. 4.3
per U.S dollar to Bs. 8 per U.S dollar. With this devaluation, investment and employment in all
industries that depended upon foreign exchange slowed or declined. Additionally, domestic
consumers saw their ability to purchase imported goods cut in half over the course of six
weeks.280 Unemployment and poverty reached record highs while purchasing power steadily
plummeted (by the end of 1998, the exchange rate was around Bs.560 per U.S. dollar).281
Between 1987 and 1989, oil exports earned only $8.5 billion on average, and two additional
devaluations took place in 1985 and 1987. This was problematic considering that in 1988,
Venezuela’s income from oil exports accounted for over 80 percent of the total value of the
country’s sales. Furthermore, the central government obtained around 60 percent of its resources
from the state operation of the oilfields.282 Overall, between 1981 and 1989, GDP fell by 3.8
percent – almost 25 percent in per capita terms. In 1989, the GDP contracted by more than 8
percent, inflation reached 81 percent, unemployment reached 50 percent, and foreign reserves
had been severely depleted.283

115

Moreover, the massive amounts of revenue that had been acquired by Venezuelan
government due to the oil bonanza had largely resulted in considerable waste and corruption.
During both the administrations of Luis Herrera Campins (1978 – 1983) and Jaime Lusenchi
(1983 – 1988) mismanagement, corruption and politically bloated bureaucracies significantly
diminished the credibility and transparency of the transactions being made within all levels of
government. The proliferation of these problems in the political sphere subsequently initiated the
gradual decay of Punto Fijo system, which had been characterized by disciplined party
organization and a general responsiveness to the interests of a variety of social groups.284 By the
late 1980s, corruption was endemic as generals, senators, ministers, and business elites siphoned
millions of dollars into their pockets and then safely abroad; while petty corruption became a
way of life at the grassroots level.285 To make matters worse, by the time Hererra Campins left
office in 1983, the foreign debt owed by the Venezuelan government, banks and other enterprises
was officially estimated to be $27 billion. By 1985, total foreign debt (private and public) was
estimated to be about $35 billion.286
As Venezuela was dealing with one crisis, another one emerged that would further
debilitate the existing political system. For the first three decades after the 1958 Punto Fijo pact,
national elections garnered unprecedently high rates of voter turnout. As such, parties and party
leaders had been able to promote an agenda and implement policies that were reflective of the
desires of a large majority of the population. However, despite the introduction of electoral
reforms in 1978 that established separate municipal and state elections to diversify choice and
spur voter interest, by 1988, voter abstention increased to over 18 percent and to almost 49
percent in the 1993 presidential elections.287 Furthermore, abstention in regional races was
measured to be over 25 percent in 1979, increasing to over 50 percent in 1989.288 With voting
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mandatory and a ballot that discourages ticket-splitting, such behavior on the part of the
electorate is indicative of overwhelming discontent with the party system.289 Moreover, with less
of the electorate performing their civic duty, the capacity of parties and leaders to channel
conflict, control organizations, and mobilize votes suffered tremendously. Ultimately, party
coherence decayed and new organizations emerged to challenge the dominant parties’, “hitherto
unquestioned role as the only legitimate vehicle for public voice and representation.”290 These
organizations – ranging from middle-class neighborhood associations, to nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) – no longer relied upon the parties to gain access to information and
acquire means of political action. More significantly, they operated via networks of FAX and
electronic mail and acquired independent access to radio, television, and print media.291
In 1988, Carlos Andres Perez was re-elected president after campaigning as a populist
who promised to restore Venezuela to the prosperity of the 1970s. To the surprise of the
Venezuelan polity, Perez announced the implementation of an austerity program and structural
adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund in exchange for a $4.5 billion
loan.292 The implementation of neoliberal reforms in Venezuela immediately provoked public
unrest, especially since the economic crisis in the 1980s, coupled with the end of the Cold War,
left the government with no other choice but to embrace orthodox macroeconomic policies and
dismantle the protectionist structures that had previously been in place.293 The confluence of
both economic and political crises led to a sudden outbreak of violence on February 27th, 1989
when a rise in gasoline prices was to be absorbed by an increase in bus fares and the cost of basic
goods.294 Known as the Caracazo, widespread demonstrations, rioting and extensive looting
gripped Venezuela, and by the end of the day, twenty-two cities had experienced some kind of
public demonstration. Unable to contain the protests with the traditional mechanisms of social
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control (such as party or trade-union networks), Perez sent in the military to address the
demonstrators. Ultimately, the situation took a turn for the worse, and it is estimated that almost
a thousand Venezuelans – mostly civilians perished.295 Following the Caracazo, public support
for the government decreased drastically, while demonstrations and protests continued on a daily
basis.
In light of the government’s use of the army as an ‘urban shock force’ during the
uprising, a growing cadre of young military officials attempted to overthrow the Perez regime in
1992. Upon the failure of the attempted coup, massive demonstrations in support of the military
insurrection propelled its leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez among them, to national
fame. In November of the same year, there was another failed coup attempt led by military
leaders who had formed an alliance with a collection of small leftist groups. The fact that these
two coups occurred within such a short time of one another sent a clear signal that normalcy had
not yet returned to Venezuela.296 Additionally, these coups served to undermine the legitimacy of
the existing democratic regime. In 1993, Congress found Perez guilty of a relatively minor
misuse of public funds and voted successfully to remove him from the presidency. Moreover, the
political dominance of AD and COPEI came under considerable attack in the early 90s, as the
whole democratic regime was portrayed and perceived to be corrupt and fraudulent.297
The hostility towards the political system – specifically AD and COPEI’s hegemonic
governance – allowed Rafael Caldera, running as an independent, to claim the presidency in
1993. Leaving COPEI, which he had founded 50 years earlier, Caldera had formed an alliance
with several minor leftist parties to establish a movement called the National Convergence.
Relying upon an anti-neoliberal and anti-party discourse, Caldera promised to return to the days
of consultative consensus building as well as establish an interventionist state. However, from
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the outset, his administration faced a financial crisis of enormous proportions. He thus accepted
support from AD and implemented a second structural adjustment package based upon neoliberal
policies, effectively reneging on his campaign promises.298 In 1998, a sudden drop in oil prices in
the international market engendered an economic and fiscal disaster in Venezuela. This
economic downturn served to augment existing frustrations amongst the masses. In turn, this
frustration was channeled into a repudiation of the traditional elites, the parties and neoliberal
doctrine.
The opportunity to make dramatic changes in what most citizens considered to be an
unresponsive political regime presented itself with the national elections of 1998. Hugo Chavez,
who had been pardoned by the Caldera administration in 1994, surged to national prominence
with an electoral movement called the Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR). Garnering massive
support amongst discontented factions of society, Chavez utilized a radical and polarizing antineoliberal discourse that offered to eliminate corruption and incompetence, as well as bring
about profound social and political change.299 Winning 56 percent of the vote, Chavez assumed
the presidency in 1999.
During his first two years in office, Chavez prioritized the dismemberment of the old
institutions that supported the continued hegemony of the traditional parties. Convoking a
Constituent assembly legitimized by a national referendum, Chavez and his supporters worked to
neutralize the most important institutional checks upon the President’s ability to construct a more
robust ‘democratic regime’. By 1999, a new Constitution had been ratified. It created two new
branches of government – the Citizen Power and the Electoral Power – in addition to the
Executive, the Judicial and the Legislative branches. This was done to promote direct and semidirect participation by the people, and by doing so, enhance the efficacy of decision making and
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the management of public policies. The constitutional text also incorporated four types of
popular referenda and provided for legislative initiatives, assemblies and other participatory
measures.300 Political parties were not specifically mentioned as vehicles for political
organization and public financing of parties was prohibited.
Moreover, the Constitution significantly augmented the power of the Executive, who
presides over the central government and is eligible for election to a second consecutive six-year
term. The president also has complete authority over the armed forces, and can appoint and
remove at any time the 25 ministers that comprise his cabinet, as well as the Vice-President.
Furthermore, the Constitution substituted a unicameral National Assembly for the bicameral
Congress mandated by the 1961 Constitution. In addition, the document significantly curtailed
the autonomy and power of the legislative body, and granted the President the ability to dissolve
the National Assembly and call for new elections if it proves recalcitrant. Finally, the
Constitution does much to shield the entire judiciary from the influence of political parties as
Justices are elected for terms of 12 years without the possibility of reelection and are forbidden
to engage in partisan political activity during their time in office.301 In 2004, the National
Assembly expanded the Supreme Court from 20 to 32 members which ostensibly granted greater
judicial authority to the Assembly and to the National Executive.302
The Constitution also reaffirmed the centrality of the state, the validity of the universal
principle of social rights, and the inherent duty of the state to create the conditions to guarantee
these rights.303 State ownership of oil resources was enforced, which reversed the tendency
towards privatization that had occurred under the Caldera administration. Chavez’s policies and
programs were also primarily directed at the marginalized sectors of the population, which came
to constitute his exclusive base of support.304 As a result, the political changes introduced by the

120

new Constitution along with the redistributive policies enshrined within the Bolivarian
Revolution generated significant resistance from economic, political, media, religious, and trade
union interests who were reluctant to lose their privileged positions in society. In prioritizing the
interests of the poor over those of previously privileged groups, Chavez created a ‘zero-sum’
framework for governing, whereby one group’s losses were the other’s gains. Therefore,
capturing and controlling the state became essential for contending social groups to ensure the
protection of their interests. This contention between social interests whereby the middle and
upper classes were pitted against the lower classes, mitigated any possibility of negotiation and
compromise.305 The result was intense social polarization and political conflict that divided the
country between supporters and opponents of the democratically elected government.
Between 2001 and 2003, the opposition attempted to either force the ouster or resignation
of Chavez. The first of these attempts manifested as a coup in April 2002. This coup occurred
after hundreds of thousands of disgruntled citizens marched in Caracas. Ending in bloodshed, the
incident became an excuse for military officers to remove Chavez from office and install Pedro
Carmona Estanga, the head executive of a prominent business confederation to the Presidency.
Carmona presided over a short-lived administration in which he abolished the National
Assembly and attempted to establish a right-wing dictatorship. Shortly thereafter, Diosdado
Cabello was appointed to the presidency who in turn, reinstituted Chavez. In December of that
year, a general strike orchestrated by Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) – an organization that
produced around 80 percent of Venezuela’s export revenues – attempted to force Chavez to
resign. In response, Chavez fired the workers on strike and replaced them with non-union
employees loyal to the regime as well as foreign laborers supplied via international cooperation
from the OPEC countries.306
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Failing to remove Chavez from office, the influence wielded by these opposition groups
significantly diminished. Conversely, Chavez consolidated power and attracted significant
support from the poorer factions of society. A final effort to force Chavez from power occurred
when the main anti-chavista organization, the Coordinadora Democratic (CD) comprised of both
traditional parties, many smaller leftist parties of the Punto Fijo era, leaders of the Venezuelan
Workers Confederation (CTV) and other less-influential middle-class parties and civic
organizations, called for a recall referendum in 2004.307 Upon their defeat, the CD collapsed and
Chavez was reelected to his third term in 2006.
Contributing to Chavez’s re-election was vigorous and sustained economic growth
beginning in 2004. After almost two decades of economic stagnation, an increase in international
prices of oil as well as domestic oil reforms greatly augmented the state’s fiscal resources.
Greater oil rents allowed for increases in public expenditure through social programs which
contributed to an overall decline in poverty and extreme poverty as well as official
unemployment.308 At this juncture, the Bolivarian movement led by Chavez had clearly
consolidated itself as the nation’s most important political force, and was supported by a broadbased consensus driven by the lower-income and working class cleavages of society.309
Determined to further consolidate his power, Chavez proposed a Project for
Constitutional Reform in 2007 that extended the presidential term from six to seven years as well
as allowed for the indefinite re-election of the president among other reforms. In December
2007, the proposal was rejected in a national referendum by a slight margin – 50.65 percent of
the votes being ‘No’ and 49.34 percent being ‘Yes’. The abstention rate was around 44 percent.
In a referendum held in February, 2009 however, a constitutional amendment was approved that
removed the legal obstacles to the continuous reelection of the president and all other elected

122

positions. Chavez and his political alliance considered the passing of this amendment to be a
victory and an indication of public support for the continuation of their socialist project.310 Over
the years, Chavez and his party utilized their control over the state, including the state media, to
reward friends, quell dissent, and propagandize in favor of the regime during campaigns.311
Moreover, many scholars have noted the drastic departure from the participatory model of
democracy proposed by Chavez upon his election to the presidency in 1998 and the socialist
model advanced by his regime after the 2006 elections.312 According to Margarita Lopez Maya:

Until 2006 the government was guided – not without contradictions – by ideas of
participatory democracy, which involved a mixed economic model. It was redistributive
in the social sphere and combined liberal institutions of representation with mechanisms
of direct democracy…after 2006 the government initiated a new phase, emphasizing its
statist tendencies in the economy and maintaining its redistributive orientation.
Politically, there was a turn toward the construction of a highly centralized state
apparatus, which concentrated power in the hands of Chavez and was characterized by
growing authoritarian features.313

The progressive centralization of political and economic power in the executive branch was also
accompanied by a general weakening of liberal institutions. There ceased to be separation of
powers, fully competitive elections, and boundaries dividing state, government, party and the
participatory social organizations that operated from above.314 The various channels of
participation that characterized the first period were repealed and replaced by communal
councils, while civil and political rights suffered.
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The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its impact on international oil prices
generated a significant blow to the viability of Chavez’s socialist project. Once again, the
weakness of the Venezuelan economy was made evident as it suffered from the typical boom and
bust cycle characteristic of mono-export oil economies.315 As oil rent decreased, the state was
increasingly unable to redirect the wealth derived from oil towards the poor - amplifying the
regime’s failure to decrease the nation’s dependence upon oil. The consequence was mounting
frustration among the masses, reflected in surveys that demonstrated social discontent and
declining popularity of the president.316 Ultimately, the global crisis revealed the institutional
weaknesses of Chavez’s political agenda as well as the regime’s redistributive mechanisms. 317
Although ill and with re-election uncertain, Chavez ran again and won his fourth
consecutive presidential term in 2012. Shortly thereafter, he died from cancer. His successor,
Nicolas Maduro was elected by a small margin in April, 2013. Again, in 2014, as international
oil prices declined and Venezuela’s economy suffered, Maduro’s popularity deteriorated rapidly.
National Assembly elections in early December 2015 saw high voter turnout as well as a change
in majority rule in the Assembly as the centrist-conservative opposition overtook Maduro’s party
for the first time in 16 years. In April 2016, the Supreme Court ratified a constitutional
amendment proposed by Maduro’s opponents designed to reduce the presidential term from six
to four years. However, the court noted that since the amendment was ratified after Maduro’s
election, it could not be applied retroactively to his administration. Disregarding this caveat, the
National Electoral Commission authorized Maduro’s opponents to initiate the paperwork
required to begin his recall. Soon thereafter, they had collected more than nine times the number
of signatures they would need to initiate the recall process.
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In response to these actions, Maduro decreed a state of emergency, claiming that rightwing elements working jointly with foreign powers were threatening the security of the state.
The National Assembly however, rejected Maduro’s decree who subsequently declared the
Assembly illegitimate and disregarded its vote of approval. Ultimately, under Chavez and
Maduro, authoritarian tendencies have come to characterize the current regime as the executive
retains extensive control over the other branches of government. As such, democratic institutions
have deteriorated, freedom of expression has been increasingly suppressed, and political
polarization has intensified.318 In 2016, Venezuela ranked next-to-last when compared to other
Spanish American states in regards to the strength of its democracy – Cuba was last.319
As of 2015, both the World Bank and the CIA cited that oil revenues accounted for
almost all export earnings and nearly half of the government’s revenue.320 As a result, due to the
collapse in international oil prices in 2014, Venezuela faces major domestic restrictions, with a
fiscal deficit estimated at 20 percent of GDP at the end of 2015 and external financing needs
estimated to be between US$25 billion and US$35 billion.321 Furthermore, a combination of
price controls, limitations on access to foreign currency, and the collapse of the private sector in
the provision of basic goods, led to drastic increases in inflation that had skyrocketed to 121.7
percent by the end of 2015 - one of the highest rates of inflation in the world. This inflationary
pressure prompted the Venezuelan government to transition from a multiple exchange rate
system with additional controls, to a dual system whereby the lowest official rate was devalued
by 37 percent (from 6.3 bolivars per dollar to 10 bolivars per dollar) and the other rate was left
floating. Due to this devaluation, Venezuela now faces major stagflation and importers are
increasingly unable to obtain sufficient dollars to purchase goods.322 The overall result of
Venezuela’s overdependence on the petroleum industry for revenues – complemented by
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misguided macroeconomic stabilization policies – has been rampant inflation, widespread
shortages of basic consumer goods, medicine and medical supplies, violent crime, high
unemployment, and political instability.

Exploratory Conclusions: The ‘Deepening of Democracy’ in Venezuela
In Venezuela, democracy is treasured but not practiced. This is in part due to the culture
of corruption that has encumbered the Venezuelan state ever since the discovery of oil in the
1920s. Becoming particularly apparent in the wake of the oil boom, the economic and political
dominance of oil corroded the efficacy of the state as well as its political culture. The “get rich
quick” mentality that came to characterize the Venezuelan political elite following the rapid
influx of petrodollars normalized and expanded clientelistic behavior as well as augmented the
levels of governmental corruption. Despite Hugo Chavez’s claim that he would eliminate
corruption it remains widespread.323 In 2016, Venezuela was ranked as the tenth most corrupt
state in the world, and the most corrupt nation in Latin American region.324
The extreme polarization of the electorate also continues to be a salient issue regarding
the quality of democratic governance in Venezuela. Opposition to the social and political reforms
entailed by the Bolivarian Revolution has emanated primarily from the middle and upper classes
of society who vehemently contested the redistribution of their wealth and the undermining of
their political and social influence. Ever since Chavez’s reelection in 2006, this opposition has
faced political exclusion and the repression of civil liberties. On the other hand, support for the
Bolivarian project has continued to be drawn from a large majority of the population in
predominantly lower-class areas. This demographic has historically been the target of the various
social and political reforms implemented by the government. Although these two camps
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constitute a large portion of the population, there also exists a mass in the middle that either
supports or opposes the government according its perception of its performance. 325 In recent
years, a growing majority of Venezuelans have come to be increasingly dissatisfied with the
performance of the government. However, the high intensity to which Venezuelans either
support the current regime or oppose it, remains a divisive reality whereby a culture of
accommodation and moderation cannot thrive.
Finally, the quality of a nation’s democracy is measured in part by the institutionalization
of a system of checks and balances able to prevent the consolidation of power in a single
governmental apparatus. In Venezuela, and in Latin America in general, the executive has
historically wielded significant authority over the powers of the state – either to protect the social
order or to direct social or economic transformation.326 Upon being elected President, Hugo
Chavez played into promises of widespread social and political reform to strengthen his authority
and retain control of the executive branch for a longer period than originally stipulated. While his
push to further increase presidential longevity in 2007 was blocked by Congress, he was
ultimately able to amend the constitution a few years later via executive decree. The apparent
legislative and judicial subordination to presidential authority in the absence of effective
institutional checks has in turn led to the uneven consolidation of power in the hands of the
executive.
Although democratic governance in Venezuela continues to be inhibited by endemic
corruption and clientelism, the intense polarization of civil society and the increasingly
authoritarian characteristics of the Bolivarian regime, the democratic aspirations of the
Venezuelan people remain. Until solutions to these problems are reached however, Venezuela
will continue to be plagued by acute political and social instability.
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CHAPTER III
A Comparative Analysis of Colombia and Venezuela

The Process of State Creation
The regimes presently operating in Colombia and Venezuela are far from being stable,
liberal democracies. However, in both nations, experimentation with consociational regimes,
pacted democracy, and partyarchy have signaled a desire at the elite level to create stable and
inclusive governance, while grassroots mobilization, the proliferation of civil organizations, and
public demonstrations (often in response to elite political arrangements) indicate a substantial
yearning for democracy on the part of the masses. Both Colombia and Venezuela possess formal
constitutions that express each nation’s commitment to the establishment of participatory
democracy, and incorporate extensive bills of citizen rights and judicial, and state mechanisms
for the protection of those rights. Nevertheless, the absence of a clear connection between
democratic governance and the democratic ethos of the existing constitutions is also very much
apparent. Democracy is treasured, yet it remains unconsolidated or marginally practiced. In order
to discern the reasons why the state-building and democratization experiences in Colombia and
Venezuela have faltered, I will conduct a comparative analysis of their respective processes of
state creation and democratization.
At this stage, it is important to reiterate that the consolidation and legitimization of the
state is one of the critical requirements for the establishment of a stable democratic regime.
Regarding the task of state-building in Latin America, David Eugene Blank asserts that in
becoming a modern state, any Latin America country must deal successfully with the
establishment of a stable boundary with the external world; and with the construction of an
effective national administration able to enforce the authority and autonomy of the state
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throughout its national territory.327 Frank Safford adds seven distinct factors to Blank’s statebuilding paradigm. They are: 1) economic geography; 2) political geography, including
geographic and transportation conditions affecting political integration; 3) relative economic and
fiscal strength; 4) the degree to which the public accepts the political systems; 5) the
subservience of the military to civilian rule; 6) the role of the Catholic Church; and 7) protection
from external attack or pressure.328 The presence or absence of the aforementioned factors and
their respective influence on state-building varies from case to case. As such, the ability of a
centralized body to overcome the challenges presented by these conditions constitutes the task of
state-building, or as Blank notes, “the creation of institutions and differentiated structures with
sufficient authority to penetrate effectively, and integrate politically, the national territory.”329
Colombia’s substantial size, accentuated by its multiple topographical attributes and
regional variances in climate, have consistently obstructed its drive to achieve economic and
political integration and thus to consolidate and legitimize the power of the state. Upon their
arrival, the Spaniards discovered a relatively large indigenous population dispersed throughout
the country. The Spanish conquest of the various indigenous groups changed little from one
region to the next one. The conquistadores only settled in the places where they could utilize the
indigenous population as a workforce – or where they could mine gold. The result was the
existence of a considerable amount of distance between each colonial settlement, which
generated a collective sense of mutual isolation and autonomy. Moreover, as each region
developed distinctive economic roles, demographic shifts corresponding to different regional
specializations engendered noticeable social transformations that also varied from region to
region. Augmenting this sense of regional economic and social differentiation was the existence

129

of pervasive transportation and communication difficulties due to the rugged terrain of the
Andes.330
This sense of isolation and relative independence affected the drive to create the Republic
of Colombia in 1820. Though the initial intent of the elites was to unify and strengthen the
relatively susceptible and disorganized nations of Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia, the
political differences and economic interests they inherited from the colonial period hindered their
ability and willingness to consolidate the power of the state.
Throughout much of the 16th and 17th centuries, because the Venezuelan economy was
based on ranching and plantation agriculture, and lacked mineral wealth and a large centrallyorganized (and thus easily exploitable) indigenous population, the Spanish Crown paid limited
attention to its development. The absence of close supervision enabled the northern, southern,
and eastern regional elites to engage in unrestricted trade within the Atlantic and the Caribbean,
as well as with New Spain, and for each to develop a strong sense of regional independence.
Caracas, however, quickly became the dominant center of commerce. This development became
increasingly evident to the Bourbon Monarchs, particularly during the cacao boom in the early
17th century.
As Spanish colonies, both Venezuelans and Colombians constructed their societies on the
concept of limpieza de sangre - where white Spaniards and creole elites occupied the upper strata
of society while pardos, African slaves and native peoples constituted the lower levels. Because
Venezuela was considered to be an “unimportant backwater of the Spanish empire,” it did not
attract as many Spaniards as did Nueva Granada. As a result, much of the wealth generated by
the cacao industry in Venezuela was amassed by creole elites, most of whom resided in Caracas.
Moreover, by the end of the 18th century, both nations retained a substantial mestizo population
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due to centuries of miscegenation between different racial groups. Fearful of the potential
destructiveness that the predominantly mestizo masses could have upon the existing social order
if mobilized, the Spanish peninsulares, as well as the creole elite, favored the strict enforcement
of the existing socio-economic hierarchies over the implementation of homogenizing reforms.
By the time of independence, Venezuelan society remained divided along the lines of class,
locality and ethnicity, while in Colombia, strong regional identities as well as a general proclivity
to resist centralization at both the elite and grassroots levels emerged. These distinctions and
differences would help obstruct the creation of a national identity shaped around collective
ideals, which in turn, would hinder the consolidation of the power of the state.
The wars of independence had several relevant effects on the ability of Colombia and
Venezuela to consolidate the power of the state. First, they spurred the destruction of what
passed for a local aristocracy. Second, they wrecked the basis of colonial wealth, and third, they
initiated a series of civil wars and armed conflicts that continued throughout the nineteenth
century.331 According to John Lombardi:

In the mature colonial society before the war, conflicts of interest at all levels were
resolved through an elaborate, formal, and bureaucratized system. Disputes over
land or authority, over precedence and honor, over concessions or profits – whatever
the problem, a formal procedure existed to resolve it…. For all its failings and
injustices, it did manage a complex society. With the wars of independence, this
system disappeared during the clash of bandit armies and the confiscation and
reallocation of property.332
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In this context of political, economic and social instability, the creole elites in Venezuela,
Colombia, and Ecuador sought to construct a regime that would protect their respective interests.
According to Stein Rokkan and Charles Tilly, who both advance their own state-building
paradigms, an essential condition to the process of state creation is a period of political,
economic and cultural collusion amongst elites in which, “…a series of bargains are struck and a
variety of cultural bonds are established across networks of local power-holders and a number of
institutions are built for the extraction of resources for common defense, for the maintenance of
internal order and the adjudication of disputes, for the protection of established rights and
privileges and for the elementary infrastructure requirements of the economy and the polity.”333
The failure of the landed elite in the newly formed Confederation of Gran Colombia to establish
these bonds can be attributed to: 1) the inability of new creole elite to govern effectively, or to
design a political system capable of coping with regional fragmentation and administrative decay
associated with gaining independence, and 2) the inability of the creoles to agree upon a stable
political system that would satisfy their collective economic interests.
The absence of elite cohesion, mostly due to the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian elite’s
resentment towards the creole elite in Colombia, led to the subsequent dissolution of the
Confederation of Gran Colombia, and set the stage for the rise of two dominant political parties
in Colombia, which consolidated their power at the expense of the state. In Venezuela, for much
of the 19th century, caudillos such as Paez, the Monagas brothers and Guzman Blanco, seized
Caracas, enlarged their power, and each established a system whereby as the national caudillo
each presided at different times over a quasi-federalist state. The success of these national
caudillos remained contingent upon their personal political skills, their ability to retain a
powerful militia, and a booming economy.
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The wars of independence destroyed the cacao plantations of the colonial era. After
independence, the coffee economy grew rapidly. This was primary because production expanded
onto the mountain slopes of the relatively untouched Andean region. By controlling the ports of
Caracas, its caudillos essentially monopolized trade with the North Atlantic and European
powers, whose demand for Venezuelan coffee enticed regional elites to work with, rather than
against Caracas. As foreign loans proliferated and credit became easily accessible, the expansion
of the domestic coffee industry allowed Venezuela to recover part of its wealth that it had lost as
a result of the wars for independence. However, when the demand for coffee had abated,
Venezuela’s inability to repay its debts and attract new investment undermined the stability of
the Paez regime, which became increasingly unable to keep unruly regional caudillos in line.
Furthermore, tensions between the caraqueno elite and the landowning regional elite due to the
economic downtown engendered the creation of the nation’s first political parties, although the
differences between them were marginal. After the deposition of Paez, the Monagas brothers,
who were equally reluctant to share political power or shy away from export-led growth based
upon the production of a single commodity, suffered the same fate in 1858.
In Colombia, the dissolution of the confederation in 1830 was accompanied by a
substantial reduction in the size of the national armed forces. An emerging liberal elite who
strongly advocated for the decentralization of state power supported the action. Its immediate
impact was the proliferation of regional militias. With its power further curtailed after a brief
military dictatorship in 1854, the Colombian military was unable to function as an independent,
authoritative political force for the rest of the nineteenth century. The relative weakness of a
national military or a domineering military force led to a number of violent and highly-polarizing
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civil wars.334 Ironically, the absence of an external enemy may have also helped slow down the
development of a national consciousness and political consensus.335
The relative historical weakness of the Colombian military, combined with persistent
regionalism and political instability, allowed for the installment and perpetuation of a violent
two-party system that would fuel internal armed conflict as well as define the nature of the
political struggles in the decades to come. As noted by Kline, other “cleavages, (such as social
class and regionalism) became secondary to the party one. Although the elite of either party was
often divided in terms of ideology, economic interests, personal loyalties, and even regional
allegiances, in the face of a challenge from the other party, factional differences were set
aside.”336 As a result, in the absence of substantive periods of stabilizing military rule, as was
commonplace in most other nineteenth century Latin American countries – particularly Mexico
and Peru, the Liberals and Conservatives were able to mobilize all factions of society to engage
in numerous civil conflicts that only served to further polarize Colombian society along party
lines.337
Contributing significantly to polarization throughout the nineteenth century was the status
and occupation of the Catholic Church in society. Whereas Liberals generally advocated
ecclesiastical reform as well as the diminished role of the Church in society, Conservatives
portended that the Church was important for social stability and should hold influence in all
areas of life. This profound division created by the religious question was apparent even within
the lowest social classes, serving to intensify the various internal conflicts. According to the
Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda,
[The] religious struggle – emotional, bitter, and personal – made the
consciousness of social class pass to a second level and eliminated the conflicts
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based on popular self-identification. The Colombian political parties were
converted to simple agglomerations in which there remained together both
members of the elite and of the lower classes who had their inclinations…. For
this reason, far from being an “element of national unity” and of “social order as
the Constitution says, the Catholic religion has really been a source of conflict and
a root of the bitter disunity among Colombians. 338
The role that the Catholic Church should play in society became the most salient
distinction not only between the traditional parties, but also amongst the masses. By the mid-19th
century, political participation (which had been extended to all men via the constitution of 1853)
had become a function of party loyalty in which a majority of voters gave no heed to a specific
party program, or to the image of their party’s candidate.339 In Venezuela, on the other hand, the
ecclesiastical structures of the Catholic Church were largely absent. As such, issues regarding the
role of the Catholic Church in society did not divide the nation to the degree that it did in
Colombia.340
The instability generated in Venezuela by the Federal Wars of 1858-1865 did not end
until Guzman Blanco seized power in 1870. During his tenure in office, his national campaigns
to ‘modernize’ Venezuela helped strengthen the power of the state. However, by the end of his
rule in 1888, the Venezuelan population was comparatively worse off. As Judith Ewell writes,
“the Venezuelan population on the brink of the twentieth century was unhealthy, illiterate,
unmarried, rural, concentrated on the coastal belt, and numbered just over 2 million.”341 Ewell’s
overview illuminates the conditions of life in a nation where the ability of the state to provide
even basic health and public education services had been greatly curtailed. Although a
centralized and autonomous administrative apparatus had been formed in Venezuela by the turn
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of the century, the state remained unable to enforce its authority throughout its territory.
Moreover, as evidenced by the frequent military campaigns throughout the 19th century, the state
never garnered the capacity to mobilize and integrate the long-divided citizenry into national
political life. As such, the process of state creation would not fully commence until after the
discovery of oil in the early years of the 20th century.
Lastly, as a Spanish colonial possession, Colombia’s economic significance had been
primarily as a producer of gold. Additionally, the port of Cartagena served as a key base for the
Spanish navy in the Caribbean as well as a major entry point for both African slaves and
European imports destined for the interior of the country. However, Colombia’s economic
development was stagnant throughout the colonial period, and it never developed any significant
exports outside of gold. In the post-independence era, Colombia’s economy, devastated by the
war, continued to be reliant upon gold as a primary export although it was seriously constrained
by high transportation costs. It was not until the mid-1860s, however, when economic elites
began to experiment with tropical commodities such as tobacco, that gold was surpassed as the
primary export. Eventually, coffee would become Colombia’s most important export commodity
during the nineteenth century. From the end of the nineteenth century until the early twentieth
century, a sustained coffee boom would provide the Colombian government with sufficient funds
to cover its expenses as well as to begin to consolidate the power of the state.342
In Venezuela, on the other hand, to control the northern region, primarily Caracas,
political leaders had to have access to most of the wealth generated within the colony as well as
control over lucrative commercial ties. As such, throughout the second half of the nineteenth
century, while regional caudillos made it their objective to capture and control Caracas in order
to consolidate their power and establish a quasi-federal system, in Colombia, civilian-led
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political parties relied upon deep-seeded regional antagonisms to consolidate their power at the
expense of the state.
It was not until the promulgation of the 1886 Constitution that the consolidation of the
Colombian state began to occur. The victory by Rafael Nuñez Moledo, the Independents and
their Conservative allies in 1886, signified the triumph of centralism, strengthened institutional
authority, and close church-state cooperation. Nuñez and his followers utilized the greatly
enhanced power of government to thwart opposition, create a strong executive as well as a more
representative legislature to combat regionalism, and maintain a large standing army. This initial
move towards consolidation coincided with the rapid expansion of the coffee economy, which
bolstered customs revenues and allowed the government to meet its fiscal obligations.343
Nevertheless, although the power of the state had seemingly been consolidated, by the end of the
nineteenth century, Colombia was thrust into one of the largest and bloodiest civil wars to ever
occur in its history.

The Process of Democratization
The state provides the legal framework within which the exercise of citizenship and
social conflicts are managed. A well-structured and legitimate state ensures the provision of
basic services; monopolizes the use of legitimate force; defends its citizens from external and
internal threats; finances public projects by collecting taxes, mobilizing savings and allocating
resources, and preserves territorial integrity.344 Partially due to the early consolidation and power
of the two traditional parties, the state in Colombia has been historically weak. During the 20th
century, the role of the state in society became even more limited as the confluence between an
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emerging economic elite, due to the coffee boom, and the existing political elite, created an elite
social class that strived to retain control over the nation and its economy. As explained by Kline:
The social dimensions of the Colombian state before 1958 were built around two
principles: (1) political power in the hands of one of the two traditional parties
each of which, in turn, controlled vast numbers of dependent people, primarily
through sectarian methods; and (2) a social-class system, with a small elite
dominating both the economic and political structures.345
By the 1960s, increased international assistance, especially from the U.S. government,
substantially augmented the state’s economic and technical capabilities.346 However, the
orientation of governmental agencies and policies were significantly tailored to serve the
interests of private international and domestic businesses, the military, and the political parties.
As a result, the state was charged with providing support for private businesses as well as
creating a collegial investment climate for international interests. While fiscal conservativism,
privatization and international investment allowed the Colombian government to mitigate the
impacts of regional and international economic crises so common in most other Latin American
nations, those policies also hindered the ability of the state to provide a strong, and
comprehensive network of social programs (education, healthcare, social security) aimed at
poverty alleviation, and inequality reduction that were more or less implemented in neighboring
Latin American countries. The result was the proliferation of organizations on the left that
demanded greater social equality as well as greater political participation.
Facing political exclusion and repression due to the restrictive political framework of the
National Front, a number of groups radicalized and established the foundations of the guerrilla
movements that have up until recently operated throughout much of the nation. In the 1990s, the
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adherence to neoliberal doctrine further curtailed the size and power of the state, and its ability to
address the underlying socio-economic factors contributing to internal conflict. Although poverty
has declined markedly since the late 1990s -- from 50 percent in 2002 to 28.5 percent in 2014 -currently, income inequality in Colombia remains amongst the highest in the world.347 The
persistence of high-income inequality as well as the increased concentration of land in the hands
of a small minority since the 1980s, have contributed to the longevity and the intensity of
protracted civil conflict. The conflict itself, in turn, has had a profound impact upon the
development of Colombian politics, economy, society and culture over the last 50 years. As
such, although a peace deal has been recently ratified between the FARC and the Colombian
government, and there now exists many leftist political parties that compete in elections, many
analysts speculate that the possibility of continued internal conflict persists as long as this high
degree of inequality remains unaddressed.348
One way to begin the analysis of the process of democratization in Venezuela is by
examining the impact that petroleum has had on the formation and development of the state. As
Terry Karl asserts, “in the Venezuelan case, petroleum is the single most important factor
explaining the creation of the structural conditions for the breakdown of military
authoritarianism and the subsequent persistence of a democratic system.”349 Once oil production
and export got underway after 1920, oil propelled the expansion of the state.350 Revenues
expanded tremendously under the Gomez regime, who utilized the oil earnings to pay off foreign
debt, stabilize the currency, strengthen the military, underwrite an extensive bureaucracy and
public-works program, destroy his regional enemies and provide his cadre of loyal caudillos with
high salaries and benefits.351 Since oil-mediated integration into the world market allowed for the
continuous expansion of the nation’s capacity to import, the pressure to industrialize and the
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tendency towards populism that other Latin American nations were experiencing during the great
depression in the 1930s was conspicuously absent in Venezuela. Unlike most nations in the
region - insulated by oil wealth and its strong import capacity - Venezuela did not embark on
import substitution industrialization, nor did it witness the rise of populist elements in society
until the end of World War II.
According to the resource curse theory, the leaders of a state rich in minerals often
neglect to invest in the necessary infrastructure needed to develop alternative forms of
production as well as invest in new industries. Rather than diversify, leaders opt to encourage
isolated investment into and development of a specific resource or technology used to extract or
process that resource. In the absence of basic industries as well as a more diverse economy, a
state becomes dependent upon other states for the provision of goods and services. Not only does
the state become dependent upon other states to supply essential goods, but the growth of its own
economy increases its dependence on the external market demand for its product. Therefore,
when the market for the product declines, or the resource is exhausted, the economy suffers.
More specifically, this problem emerges when a commodity, in this case petroleum,
facilitates an increase in income and investment within one sector disproportionate to the rest of
the economy. The increase in one particular sector engenders the distorted growth in services and
other non-tradables, which cannot be imported, while simultaneously discouraging the
production of tradables, which are then imported. As the demand for domestic services and
imports increase, prices rise and the domestic currency appreciates. Thus, consumers find that
foreign goods are now cheaper than the same domestic goods, and consumption becomes heavily
reliant upon imported goods. This in turn, creates a cycle of importation and service-based
growth that discourages the growth of other sectors of the economy as well as a strong domestic
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consumer market. As a result, those nations that confront this problem are highly susceptible to
price changes in one particular commodity – oil in the case of Venezuela - and are increasingly
unable to diversify their economy.
Although the rapid growth of the oil industry paradoxically deterred domestic
industrialization until after World War II, the timing of industrialization was of particular
importance to the establishment of democracy in Venezuela. As already explained, before 1920
Venezuela’s economy was almost entirely based upon agriculture. However, due to the lucrative
opportunities that accompanied the advent of the oil industry after 1921, every line of
agricultural production and export dropped sharply; both agricultural workers and rural elites
moved into the primarily urbanized sectors of commerce, manufacturing and services. As a
result, by 1950 the agricultural sector’s share of GDP sank from one-third in the mid-1920s to
less than one-tenth – the smallest contribution in all of Latin America.352 While urban areas
experienced profound growth and the proliferation of a younger and more educated electorate,
the countryside practically emptied. The decline of agriculture in Venezuela had myriad social
and political implications.
First, as the attractiveness of rural investment declined, Venezuelan landowners sold their
property to the oil companies and came to constitute a commercial and financial urban
bourgeoisie deeply invested in the importation of consumer goods. Bonds between foreign
capital, domestic capital and the state – frequently enforced by clientelistic relationships – were
established and strengthened with time. Second, without a rural base, the Venezuelan agricultural
elite was unable to have a significant impact in the political realm. Although it would support the
formation of a conservative Christian Democratic Party, this class did not wield nearly as much
political influence as did the agrarian elites in other Latin American nations – namely Colombia.
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Similarly, the ability of the Catholic Church to mobilize and politicize rural factions was also
significantly curtailed by the oil-induced rural-urban migration. As such, Venezuela lacked a
party organization that could, “…shift the political spectrum to the Right in a future electoral
arena.”353
Third, since oil production is a capital-intensive industry, the working class grew slowly
as the number of jobs generated by the industry was minimal. Although they were militantly
organized by the Communist party of Venezuela, this industrial working class was small as well
as isolated in camps located far from urban centers. These factors subsequently hindered the
ability of the working class to have a powerful political impact to a degree equivalent to that of
the Socialist and Communist parties in Argentina or Chile.354 Finally, the introduction and
consolidation of the oil enclave economy engendered the emergence of an urban middle class
that grew in tandem with the rapid expansion of the service sector and the state bureaucracy.
During the 1940s and 1950s, direct foreign investment in Venezuela increased from $938 million
to $3.71 billion – the largest concentration in any Latin American nation. As the manufacturing
industry grew, so did the number of small artisans and white-collar workers in the service sector.
As a result, foreign and domestic economic and political forces became increasingly intertwined.
Due to the weakness and small size of the leftist working class as well as of the traditionally
conservative rural and ecclesiastical elites, the aspirations and demands of the nascent middle
class dominated the political arena and led to the trienio period.
After a brief experiment with democracy that was centered upon “sowing the petroleum”,
or using petroleum revenues to diversify the economy and provide for basic social services, the
military resumed control over the state and governed in authoritarian fashion for a period of 10
years. From then on, Venezuela’s acute dependence on oil revenues to finance the rapidly
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expanding functionalities of the state continued, contributing to its classification as a petro-state
– a state built upon a mono-export petroleum economy that uses distributive strategies to sustain
political order.355

Party Systems and Political Structures: Competition and Participation
The models of democratization advanced by Dahl as well as by Linz and Stepan, assert
that the degree to which a ‘free and lively’ civil society as well as a ‘relatively autonomous and
valued’ political society are allowed to flourish - in that citizens are granted the freedom to form
and join organizations, to express their views, and are guaranteed access alternative sources of
information - is crucial for the consolidation of democracy. As most theoreticians of democratic
consolidation can agree, parties and competition among them are essential to the practice of
liberal democracy since they present an institutional vehicle through which citizens can exercise
their rights.356 While strong civil organizations are also essential to democracy in that they allow
for a non-institutionalized medium of political expression, political parties process and structure
the options to be made available to the electorate thereby combining a multitude of opinions and
ideologies into a collective decision about who will govern.357 As such, the study of parties and
party systems are central to understanding democracy.358
The two-party system in Colombia has remained its most dominant political feature since
the late 1840s until the early 2000s. The consolidation of this hegemonic two-party configuration
allowed the traditional parties to wield substantial influence over both political and civil
societies. As a result, powerful partisan subcultures created by the traditional parties have
divided the population, and in many instances, such as the Bogotazo in 1948, fueled violent
conflict constituting serious threats to continued democratic governance.359 On the other hand,
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strong party identification has historically facilitated national integration, impeded the
emergence of a strong military able to contest civilian rule, and led to the expansion of the
electorate in the 20th century.360 In Venezuela, although petroleum facilitated the socio-economic
transformations that created the necessary conditions for a democratic regime in the second half
of the 20th century, these changes by themselves do not explain the successful construction and
institutionalization of a competitive party regime. Moreover, political parties are relatively new
organizations compared to those in Colombia. For much of the 19th century and well into the
early 20th century, Venezuela was primarily controlled by caudillos, or regional military
strongmen, who sought to consolidate their own power in a dominantly authoritarian manner. As
a result, it was not until the 1940s that political parties became legitimate vehicles of political
competition and representation.
In Colombia, from 1849 until 1886, the political parties consolidated power at the
expense of the state, preferring to augment regional autonomy rather than to acquiesce to a
centralized authority. The Conservatives tended to favor strong, central government, protection
of the Catholic Church and its social and economic prerogatives, and the defense of the interests
of traditional landowners. Liberals, on the other hand, advocated for federalism, disestablishment
of the Church, and the defense of commercial interests.361 The Liberals dominated this period,
however their federalist agenda was fiercely contested by Conservative opposition, which led to
numerous bouts of internal conflict that obstructed stable governance. It was not until the
promulgation of the 1886 Constitution, which aimed to consolidate the power of the state, that
the maintenance of political hegemony became increasingly tethered to the domination of one
party over the other within government. As Robert Dix has stated, “…[T]he rule of one party has
frequently meant the almost total exclusion of members of the other from government. The

144

parties have treated government as an objective to be seized and, once won, as a bastion in which
to entrench themselves like armies of occupation, subsisting on the bureaucratic booty of
battle.”362 Until 1946, interchange between the two parties based on sectarian politics
characterized the political system, resulting in the establishment of weak state institutions, and
intense confrontation in both the electoral arena and within the electorate.
During the years of the liberal republic and la violencia, both parties were intensely
involved in the mobilization of their respective bases. The drive towards mass mobilization
facilitated the expansion of civil participation, and the incorporation of a nascent urban working
and middle classes into the traditional party structures. Attempting to fortify their respective
organizations and provide representation for the new social classes, social conflict and violence
emerged as competition between parties escalated. At the elite level, conflict was relatively
contained, resulting in slander as well as the occasional duel; at the grass roots level, however,
political polarization along the lines of acute ideological differences, especially surrounding the
role of the Church in society, led to fratricidal violence.363 According to Dix, Colombia was
among the few ‘continuous’ party systems in the region, ‘that simply have not evolved or
changed much at all over time, despite…marked increases in social and political mobilization
and the emergence of new social classes.’364 Rather than presenting a challenge to the traditional
parties by means of forming opposition groups, the emerging working classes were effectively
inculcated into the established two-party system, with the only significant opposition to the
continuous character of the system emanating from Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1946.
Following Gaitan’s assassination in 1948, and the failed attempt to restore order by
means of a military dictatorship, the consociational elements of the National Front were designed
by the traditional party elite to both regain control over the country’s political life, as well as to,
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“…consolidate their empire and to mold the society which interested them”. 365 Driven by a
general fear of mass mobilization especially by the left (evidenced by the rise of Gaitan), the
National Front agreement practically assured governmental immobility, which in turn restricted
the capacity to bring about political change and social reform.366 By the end of its constitutional
charter in 1974, the National Front regime had achieved its designed purpose of ensuring
political and social stability to Colombia. However, it did so at great cost.
A similar agreement between Venezuela’s two leading parties occurred in 1958 as they
promulgated a series of pacts that culminated with the Punto Fijo Pact. The political and
economic elites from both leading parties negotiated fundamental agreements concerning how
major decisions would be made and who would be involved making them. The agreement led to
a period of consensual and conciliatory politics in Venezuela.367 Agreeing that democracy was
the best system of stable governance, the elites created what Terry Karl refers to as a “pacted
democracy” and what Michael Coppedge calls “partyarchy”.368
Both Karl and Coppedge assert that while this variation of democracy promotes regime
stability as well as a certain degree of predictability with regards to future reforms, it does so at
the expense of the nature and quality of the democracy established. In a pacted democracy,
collusion at the elite level is predicated upon inclusion as well as exclusion, and is an implicitly
anti-democratic method of interest representation.369 The decision to exclude various interest
groups can be exemplified by the fact that although Venezuela’s socialist and communist parties
supported the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez regime in 1957-58, they were left out of the
negotiations leading up the Punto Fijo pact as well as barred from the political process. The
exclusion of these parties and other important societal actors in conjunction with the extension of
substantial compromises to the military and economic elites, severely limited the scope and
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possibility of reform. Although pact-making permits socioeconomic structures to change over
time by providing political stability, it does so by freezing a set of relationships in place. Thus,
when new politically relevant social actors emerge – products of the varied socioeconomic
conditions facilitated by the pact – they find themselves unrepresented by the elite agreements of
the past. In Venezuela, shortly after their isolation from the decision-making process, the
socialist and communist parties turned to guerrilla warfare and waged a brief insurgency against
the government in the 1960s. Although their action was most notably an expression of frustration
with the exclusionary aspects of the new regime, by the 1980s, grassroots challenges to the old
system began to proliferate as socioeconomic changes outpaced the ossified political institutions.
As dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of pacted governance became widespread, alternative
parties, business groups, unions and other organizations emerged to contest both the dominant
parties and the party system.
Moreover, Karl notes that once the original negotiators of a pact have departed from the
political arena, a new generation of leaders must be able to sustain a high degree of
communication as well as a spirit of accommodation. This task is difficult to carry out since
different generations may not be operating in the same political, social and economic context as
their predecessors. In the Venezuelan case, the “spirit of Punto Fijo” and the conciliatory manner
of politics that had characterized the first three administrations was markedly absent from the
governments of Carlos Andres Perez (1974-79) and Luis Herrera Campins (1979-84).370 Due to
the oil booms of the 1970s and 80s and the subsequent influx of petrodollars, the administrations
during this period assumed that money would no longer be a problem as long as the state kept
accumulating oil rent. As the political and economic elite adopted a ‘get rich quick’ mentality,
the spoils system that had been established by the original political and economic elites gradually
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gave way to a crisis of clientelism in Venezuela. This shift in political culture had a deeply
corrosive influence upon the efficacy and productivity of the state, which became visible when
the oil boom eventually ended.371
Although the agreement between Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia accommodated
many important societal actors, including the Catholic Church, which came to view itself as a
force of conciliation; the military, which was promised autonomy and respect; and producer
groups, which capitalized on promises of greater access to policy circles, it excluded many
others, most notably leftist groups. Lacking an institutional channel for participation, the
disillusioned factions within society radicalized and came to promote guerrilla activity as the
only means of affecting political change. Gradually, the legitimacy of the political system began
to suffer as these movements proliferated and came to control substantial portions of the
Colombian territory. Furthermore, because of state-led industrialization, massive population
growth, and high rates of rural-urban migration during the late 1980s, less than 50 percent of the
Colombians under the age of thirty-five expressed identification with either of the traditional
parties.372 Declining party identification amongst an increasingly younger, less politically
informed and less economically well-off electorate revealed the institutional weakness of the
traditional parties, as they were increasingly unable to appeal to the changing demographics.
Contributing to the decline in party identification was the inability of those who were civically
engaged to differentiate between the policies and agendas of the two dominant parties. Years of
sharing power had ostensibly erased ideological distinctions that had previously existed, and led
to little variation in the parties’ proposed social and economic policies. Moreover, the parties
came to heavily rely upon patronage-based incentives for voter mobilization, which in turn
facilitated the entrenchment of clientelism in Colombia.
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Additionally, the party structure itself proved to be problematic in that it led to political
fragmentation and factionalization within the regime. The electoral guidelines enforced by the
National Front agreement stipulated that elites from both parties were charged with negotiating
an official presidential candidate, whereby candidates for other positions would be linked to the
list of the agreed-upon presidential candidate. This process greatly divided political elites, and
subsequently reduced central party control. As such, factionalism and fragmentation came to
characterize the National Front period, giving way to intense bargaining with regional elites for
political support, the rise of intraparty competition, and the proliferation of insurgent lists at the
presidential and congressional levels.373 As Francisco Leal in his Estado y Politica en Colombia
explains, “with the National Front great traumas were produced at the national level of
bipartyism, at the same time as the regional level, which is the properly clientelist one, was being
strengthened and modified. In effect, together with the process of bipartisan depoliticization, the
role of national leadership as legitimizer of the party collectivities was being weakened.”374 In
short, the existing regime structure itself engendered internal disorder within the parties,
government immobility, the growth of clientelism and an increasingly disenchanted electorate.
Furthermore, according to the concept of democracy advanced by Dahl, a principle tenet
of democracy is participation, such that no substantial segment of the population is excluded
from the effective pursuit of political power.375 During the National Front arrangement, many
movements and organizations on the left were barred from participating in political contests,
while the power-sharing mechanism ostensibly allowed the two parties to jointly co-opt
elections. Although there did not exist any barrier to entry for alternative parties, evidenced by
the participation of Gustavo Rojas’ populist party, ANAPO, it was not until 1974, after the end
of coalition governance, that these parties were awarded seats proportional to their electoral
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results.376 This act undermined the second tenet of democracy advanced by Dahl, which
stipulates that there be free, fair, and regular contests for the support of the population.
While elections occurred frequently and were relatively free, the institutionalized powersharing agreement among the traditional two-party political elites inhibited truly ‘fair’ elections.
Furthermore, a constitutional amendment introduced in 1968 (Article 120 of the Constitution
referred to as the “desmonte” of the National Front) extended bureaucratic parity for the
presidential term of 1974 to 1978, while it also established that a “proper and equitable” share of
representation in government be awarded to the party with the second-largest number of votes.377
Essentially, a power-sharing arrangement based upon the machine-oriented clientelism of the
National Front period had been indefinitely established.378 At this juncture, the final principle of
democracy, accountability such that political rulers and elected representatives serve as “agents”
of their constituencies, was (and continues to be) blatantly ignored.
It is important to recognize that the primary objective of the agreement between the two
parties was not to establish democratic governance. In fact, it was an arrangement that
increasingly came to serve the bureaucratic and personal interests of national and regional party
leaders. As a result, clientelism, secrecy, increased presidential authority, ad hoc decision forums
and summit negotiations and government-sponsored mass organizations became the informal
“rules of the game”.379
As mentioned earlier, Michael Coppedge classifies the system that existed during the
Punto Fijo period as a partyarchy – or a dictatorship of parties. Relating Robert Dahl’s
conception of polyarchy to partyarchy, Coppedge asserts that partyarchy is the degree to which
political parties interfere with the fulfillment of the necessary requirements for polyarchy (these
being: freedom of association, expression, the right to vote and the right of political leaders to
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compete for votes, eligibility for public office, free and fair elections, alternative sources of
information and policies that depend on the vote).380 He also posits that it is possible for a
partyarchy to be considered fully polyarchic as long as 1) the parties themselves are internally
democratic and 2) there are meaningful differences in the platforms of the major parties that
offer voters a diversity of representation. Neither of these conditions were present in
Venezuela.381
To facilitate a high degree of control, the political parties permeated all facets of civil
society, mobilizing and organizing both the peasantry and urban working class into, “officially
sanctioned, non-competitive, and state-supervised interest associations linked to the traditional
parties.”382 The role of these associations was primarily to mediate as well as to contain civil
society interests before the state. At first, party infiltration of these major civil society
organizations resulted in the expansion of the electorate and massive mobilization of the polity
whereby between 1958 and 1988, voter registration never dropped below 83% of the voting age
population and of those registered to vote, 82% on average performed their civic duty.383
Moreover, party identification was very strong. Contributing to high rates of participation and
party identification, were various reforms that aimed to lower barriers to participation, simplify
voter registration, augment party identification through costly organizational campaigns, and
revamp electoral procedures. While these reforms initially buffered stability, as well as enhanced
the institutional strength of parties in Venezuela, over time, the closed nature of this
partyarchical system led to pervasive disillusionment with the regime.
First, the corporatist structure constructed by the parties allowed them to monopolize
political space through the domination of civil organizations. This imposed structure made
joining autonomous groups almost impossible. Additionally, civil participation was hindered
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under this institutional arrangement as the party leadership had complete control over candidate
selection; they also fixed the place of each candidate on the party’s slate. Moreover, the
centralized nature of internal party decision-making made it so that party activism through
primaries or caucuses was an ineffective avenue of influencing the future election of party
officials. Since party elites had complete control over the nomination and election of legislators,
members of Congress had no incentive to serve particular constituencies. Thus, rank-and-file
party members gradually came to perceive their ability to influence the political sphere to be
greatly diminished, while the dependence upon party elites for election and re-election rather
than upon the electorate further entrenched clientelistic practices. A two-part study conducted by
Enrique A. Baloyra that measured public opinion about military coups and democratic
consolidation in Venezuela in 1973 and 1983 concluded that Venezuelans were increasingly
dissatisfied with the performance of government, and desired an expansion of suffrage to correct
governmental shortcomings in the future. The study also revealed that despite their frustration
with ineffective governance, Venezuelans remained very supportive of democratic norms.384
Finally, as catchall parties aiming to benefit every sector of society, there was little
programmatic divergence between the two dominant organizations. Additionally, partisan
support depended upon effective economic management.385 In the absence of inherently different
political, economic and societal agendas, the parties ceased to be vehicles of popular expression
and became increasingly stratified along an elite-non-elite dimension. As the parties controlled
both the administrative and judicial apparatuses, a dual system of clientelism and justice emerged
that furthered the divide between the rich and the poor. As explained by Phillip:
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By the 1990s, the Venezuelan administrative system could be characterized by
operating at two levels. At the lowest level it provided a subsistence minimum of
income to a significant number of people who owed their position and any
prospects they might have had to political connections…this can be seen as a
system of mass clientelism. At the highest level the state was run by an elite of
several thousand people to whom the law did not really apply: one might call this
elite clientelism.386

In the judiciary, a similar system materialized where the politically unconnected poor
were subject to stricter judicial punishment, while the well-connected and wealthy elites were
essentially immune from law enforcement.387 This division left much of the Venezuelan
electorate demanding institutions that would represent the populous, not just a few elites.
Although a 1973 survey showed that 66 percent of those polled agreed with the statement: “It
matters a lot which party is going to win this presidential election,” after more than a decade of
economic stress and revelations of corruption the choice between the two parties had become
less meaningful. This trend was reflected by increasing electoral abstention, with abstention rates
jumping from 12.4 percent in 1978 to 18.1 percent in 1988, as well as by a dramatic decline in
party identification. A survey showed that while 18 percent of those polled in 1988 did not
identify with either party, by 1991 the percentage had increased to 45 percent.388
Financed by a steady stream of oil rents, the clientelistic political framework in which the
two dominant parties stifled civic participation, excluded a growing number of influential
societal actors, and exercised hegemonic control over the entire system started to lose legitimacy
as the price of oil declined in the mid-1980s. By the 1990s, the failure of the regime to stabilize
the economy and bring about viable social change led to periodic rioting and public

153

demonstrations. Ultimately, the regime collapsed, opening the door to an alternative experiment
with direct democracy under the leadership of Hugo Chavez.
From the standpoint of achieving short-term political stability, partyarchy is an
efficacious arrangement that could gradually facilitate a transition towards stable democratic
rule. In the Venezuelan case this transition did not occur, because political and economic elites
deprived citizens of the ability to influence internal party decisions, while both parties
subordinated class, sectoral, and regional interests to partisan concerns. Along with pervasive
corruption and financial mismanagement that intensified in the wake of the oil booms, inherent
political exclusion, and a government that remained unresponsive to changing socioeconomic
conditions also contributed to the repudiation of the regime and the political parties in the 1990s.
As Michael Coppedge notes:

In these crises the only institutions with the power to propose immediate solutions
were the parties, but because the parties were precisely the instructions whose
leadership was unwelcome at that moment, the crises were much harder to solve.
In the long run, therefore, partyarchy can tarnish the quality of democracy to the
point where the regime’s stability may be threatened.389

Similarly, although the National Front achieved its objective in that it provided political
stability to a worn-torn nation, the quality of democracy in Colombia suffered – albeit not to the
extent where there occurred a regime collapse. Numerous challenges to governmental authority
emerged that undermined the legitimacy of the regime. First, as noted earlier, the institutionally
restrictive nature of the National Front contributed to the growth of radical guerilla organizations
that sought to overthrow the traditional political elite. These guerilla groups attracted support
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from various factions of the Colombian polity that had become increasingly disenchanted with
the traditional political order. As such, every President from 1982 to the present made a serious
attempt to negotiate an end to the insurgencies, frequently resorting to military force. During the
1980s, greater political participation was granted to a few groups who had agreed to demilitarize
(most notably the M-19 and the UP – a political faction of the FARC). However, these leftist
parties were persecuted and excluded from participating in the political system, with the most
extreme example being the systematic annihilation of the UP leadership in the 1980s and 1990s
by right-wing death squads functioning with virtual impunity.390
The political system was plunged into a deeper crisis with the rise of the international
drug trade during the 1980s, for which Colombia became a major center.391 The growth of the
drug trade – and the infamous Medellin and Cali cartels – augmented the severity and
complexity of internal conflict, as the drug cartels successfully penetrated and corrupted every
center of power in Colombian society including businesses, the police, the armed forces, the
political elite, the guerilla organizations and the right-wing paramilitary groups. The Colombian
political elite responded to these challenges with political reforms that encouraged the formation
of new parties and devolved authority to elected local officials. The electoral institutions,
mechanisms and rules established by the Constitution of 1991 and beyond were designed to
enhance political democracy through, “ballot and electoral reform, approval of referenda and
plebiscites as valid channels of lawmaking and constitutional amendment, restriction of
presidential emergency powers, prohibition of presidential reelection…and the establishment of
a Constitutional Court separate from the Supreme Court.”392 More importantly, the constitution
bolstered political pluralism and participation, significantly augmenting the number of parties
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that now compete in fair elections. These measures have ostensibly prompted some analysts to
label the regime as a liberal democracy.
While it is true that the Constitution of 1991 along with a subsequent array of
democratizing reforms created a legal framework that has swept away most of the barriers to
democratic governance experienced during the National Front agreement, a stable liberal
democratic regime has yet to be constructed. Some scholars suggest that reforms such as political
decentralization have further weakened and destabilized the central state, doing more harm than
good to the Colombia’s political regime. Furthermore, although political parties and
organizations have proliferated in recent years, what remains unclear is the degree to which these
parties have been successful in generating substantive change in the political system. 393
Ultimately, many of these parties remain weak and unorganized; they tend to lack clear political
agendas, and are usually consolidated around the personalities of a few individuals.394 As a
result, the Colombian party system paradoxically remains both unstable and resistant to change.
This reality has been reflected by the voting patterns of the Colombian electorate. From
2002 through the 2016 referendum, voter turnouts in all governmental contests have remained
below 50 percent of the registered voting-age population.395 Moreover, according to a
measurement of voter turnout in Latin American Presidential Elections from 1997 – 2007
conducted by the International Institute for Democratic Electoral Assistance, Colombia had one
of the lowest voter participation rates in the region.396 These statistics indicate an extreme loss of
confidence in the ability of the current political parties to govern in a manner that is perceived to
be beneficial to the Colombian electorate. However, the support for democracy as well as
democratic practices has been unwavering. According to a Latinobarometro survey in 2015,
close to 80 percent of those polled agreed that voting, in addition to protesting, were effective
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methods that would lead to national progress. Moreover, 55 percent of those polled preferred
democracy to any other kind of government.397 However, there remains a minority, around 24
percent, who responded ambivalently to the survey. For them it did not matter whether the
regime was democratic or non-democratic. A possible explanation for this ambivalence may be
rooted in the relative similarity of the political parties regarding their ideologies and policies, as
well as the inability of the government – regardless of which political party is in charge – to
generate comprehensive and enduring social, economic and political reforms. As most large
parties advance similar agendas and platforms, many Colombians do not feel they are being
accurately represented, have become dissatisfied with political governance due to their prior
experiences with the National Front agreement, perceive politics to be too complicated to
understand, or do not pay attention to politics whatsoever.398 As a result, voting and other forms
of civic participation have steadily declined, albeit there remains a commitment to the
democratic mechanisms as forces for change.
Although public opinion is not the sole determinant of the quality of a democratic regime,
it is a crucial factor. According to Juan Linz, legitimacy depends largely on the public believing
that existing institutions, despite their problems, are better than the alternatives.399 The case study
of Colombia reinforces this assertion. Although dissatisfaction with the government and the
political system are high, democracy seems to be the only game in town. However, the quality of
democratic governance in Colombia will continue to be low so long as the party system remains
unresponsive to voter and civil society interests, the parties in contention remain ideologically
similar, and powerful intrastate actors such as paramilitary groups, drug trafficking organizations
and guerilla forces are able to wield considerable influence over political actors.
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In Venezuela, mounting discontent and disillusionment with the established system of
representative democracy allowed Hugo Chavez to ascend to the presidency on a platform that
promised to eliminate corruption and embark upon the construction of a more participatory
democracy. The 1999 constitution established a number of institutional and political reforms that
aimed to bolster popular participation in decision-making in order to close the substantial divide
between the Venezuelan polity and the state. The constitution went further in that it mandated the
participation of civil society in the selection of the judiciary and the appointment of the National
Electoral Council, established as a separate branch of government, in addition to the three
traditional branches. Most significant, the constitution reinforced the power and autonomy of the
central government, the executive branch and the military. Presidential powers were enhanced as
the presidential term was extended and immediate re-election was permitted. Moreover, the
constitution strengthened the role of the central government in the economy and the military was
given the right to vote; military promotions were doled out solely based upon presidential
approval and the military was made to be subordinate only to the president.400
Over the years and especially from 2007-2009, Chavez’s regime became more radical,
resulting in the inequitable balance of the conditions of electoral competition, diminished
freedoms of expression including the media and the press, the consolidation of power in the
hands of the executive, the dependence of civil society upon a central leader, and the complete
exclusion of the opposition in government.401 These shortcomings indicate the existence and
development of authoritarian traits that have damaged Venezuela’s prospects of consolidating
liberal democracy. Yet, based upon a 2007 Latinobarometro survey regarding confidence in
democracy, Venezuelans considered their country to be a democracy. Moreover, 76 percent of
Venezuelan citizens felt confident that democracy could create “conditions for prosperity”. The
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survey found that Venezuelans were only slightly behind Uruguayans in their evaluation of
democracy in their country in the region of Latin America.402

The Role of the Military in Democratic Governance
One of the main pillars of a democratic state is the full, and absolute control over the
armed forces exercised by a democratically elected civilian government. Unwavering control
over all the defense and security-related institutions indicates a high level of political maturity in
the government, as well as the willingness of the military to be subordinate to civilian rule and
indifferent to changes in polices.403 The subordination of the military to democratic civilian rule
bolsters the legitimacy and sovereignty of a democratic regime. In Colombia, the armed forces,
having presided over the National Front negotiations, gradually became more professional and
distanced themselves from the two traditional parties. With a mandate from the Colombian
government to take aggressive measures against insurgent guerrilla groups, by the mid-1970s,
the military had become increasingly autonomous, and had developed a strongly anti-communist
discourse. Therefore, many within the military have been staunchly opposed to the various peace
initiatives with guerilla organizations proposed over the years, including the peace negotiations
with the FARC in 2016.
In 2008, dozens of senior army officers were fired after it was revealed that the
systematic killing of civilians had been carried out to inflate guerrilla death tolls. As of mid2015, more than 900 soldiers had been convicted of similar crimes while thousands of security
personnel remained under investigation. Nevertheless, most high-ranking officers escaped
punishment. In 2012, a constitutional amendment that expanded the jurisdiction of the military
justice system to address this problem was passed, repealed a year later, and then reintroduced in
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2015 with many of the most controversial provisions omitted.404 Instances such as these
exemplify the degree to which the military in Colombia continues to operate with relative
autonomy. Limited civilian oversight of the armed forces has thus gradually undermined the
legitimacy of the democratically elected civilian-led government; less regulation has
undoubtedly led to more violence and increased tensions between the military and civilian
leaders. These tensions are troublesome for they indicate that the military is not completely
subordinate to civilian rule, as well as that many top military officers maintain an independent
political agenda which must be taken into consideration for the sake of regime stability.
Further undermining the legitimacy and efficacy of the state has been the continued
presence of private paramilitary organizations. With the military being traditionally weak, in
1968 the government ratified legislation that permitted and encouraged the formation of privately
armed civilian self-defense groups under the supervision of the armed forces. Gradually, these
paramilitary forces proliferated and began to operate with virtual impunity. Neither the armed
forces nor the politicians in charge were able to keep them in line, nor actively attempted to do
so. Some analysts have suggested that the relationship between the state and these paramilitary
actors was ambiguous so that the state could avoid the accusations of human rights violations
that accompanied the brutal campaigns waged by these paramilitaries against the guerrillas.405
Over the years, the paramilitaries have viewed themselves as the only security force able
to deal more effectively with the guerrilla organizations. From the 1990s until 2005, various
paramilitary units coalesced under an umbrella organization called the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC), but many continued to operate independently from this group. In
2000, it was estimated that the AUC committed approximately 70 percent of Colombia’s
political assassinations. The AUC financed itself by collecting rents from wealthy landowners,
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narco-traffickers, and multinational corporations. It is estimated that at least 70 percent of these
finances were derived from the drug trade.406 The AUC targeted not only the guerrillas, but also
suspected civilian supporters of the guerrillas, including trade unionists, peasants, indigenous
peoples, teachers and journalists. As a result, the AUC was considered to be the top perpetrator
of human rights abuses in the country. Since 2005 several paramilitaries including the AUC have
demobilized upon signing a ceasefire with the Uribe administration. Still, many units continue to
operate with impunity in some regions. Responsibility for combatting these groups lies with the
police. Because of the lack of support from the military or the state, members of the policy force
are frequently accused of collusion with criminals, and are largely absent from many rural
areas.407
In Venezuela, ever since 1958, the military has been relatively subservient to civilian
rule. Only in moments of intense political crisis, such as in the early 1990s, did the military
attempt to intercede. As George Philip asserts, “military coups occurred when enough senior
officers and civilian allies (the civilian aspect was important) decided that the current political
situation was desirable and that change was necessary.”408 Even though the 1992 coups were
orchestrated mainly by military officials, they were positively received by the public. It was this
sentiment that helped bolster Hugo Chavez’s popularity as he headed into the 1998 elections.
Since Chavez’s ascension to power, the power and size of the military has grown substantially,
and has come under the complete jurisdiction of the executive. In 2010, General Henry Rangel’s
announcement that the army would not accept an electoral defeat of the Bolivarian Revolution
was meet with harsh criticism by the secretary general of the OAS. In response to this criticism,
Chavez appointed Rangel to General-in-Chief.409 Moreover, during his tenure in office, Chavez
provided the military with a modern arsenal and economic enticements, which have contributed
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to the military’s unwavering support for the continuation of the Bolivarian Revolution under
Nicolás Maduro.

The Impacts of Clientelism, Corruption, and the Drug Trade on Democracy
It has been underscored that “corruption in a democracy” is “corruption of democracy,”
because “those who benefit from corrupt actions, decisions, or exchanges do so by excluding
those who, under democratic norms, have a claim to inclusion.”410 Although this contention is
sound, democracy and some corruption can coexist. Luigi Manzetti in his study of corruption in
Latin American differentiates between democratic systems that have low corruption, with
functioning checks and balances, internal constraints, and an exigent civil society, and those with
high corruption where institutional checks against corruption are weak or not used, there is no
self-restraint when profiting from corruption, and corruption is so widespread that it has to be
accepted and tolerated at any societal level.411
As explained earlier, a rentier state is one that obtains all or a substantial portion of its
revenue from rent received from the sale of single natural resource to external actors.412 Since
Venezuela had been one of the top producers of oil in the world, whenever the state needed more
revenue, all it had to do was pressure the foreign-controlled oil industry (up until 1976) rather
than its own population. Moreover, the distributive nature of the state, whereby resources would
be transferred from the oil sector to other parts of the economy, ostensibly mitigated tensions that
would have eventually required a reduction in wages and benefits for labor. Oil revenues allowed
for the maintenance of political stability, as well as subsidized both business and popular sectors.
Moreover, revenues protected the country from the inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties
that plagued other party systems with similar economic projects. On the other hand, the massive
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amount of rent accumulated via the oil industry deterred economic diversification and inhibited
the independent economic development of Venezuela’s constituent states.413 Furthermore, petrostates are prone to administrative inefficiency and corruption due to the relative absence of
institutional checks and balances.414 This was especially apparent in the wake of the first and
second oil booms in the 1970s and 1980s that flooded the state with petrodollars; much of this
money, after being used to fund public sector services, was subsequently distributed to important
societal actors to ensure the stability of the political regime.
Also as noted earlier, from 1958 until the end of the oil bonanza in the mid-1980s,
clientelism flourished and politics became a positive-sum game whereby both patron and client
were able to arrive at mutually beneficial arrangements. 415 However, the ability of the
clientelistic political machine to endure, as well as the state’s capacity to fund social programs
and public projects, remained contingent upon the continued flow of oil revenues at a stable rate.
When oil prices and revenues declined, as was the case in the mid-1980s and 1990s, the state’s
distributive capacity suffered and the clientelistic ties became strained. Moreover, from 1970 –
1994, Venezuela’s foreign debt rose from 9 percent to 53 percent of the GNP, while from 1982
to 1989 poverty increased by 32 percent. In 1989, 22 percent of the population lacked the
resources to meet basic needs,416 and in 1996, Venezuela was one of the few countries in the
world where per capita income was lower than it had been in 1960.417 As oil rents decreased, the
Venezuelan economy deteriorated, social conditions worsened, and the existing political system
teetered on the verge of collapse.
In addition to the existence of guerilla groups, paramilitary organizations and an
increasingly autonomous military, the growth of the drug trade in Colombia in the 1980s and
1990s and its enduring presence have further intensified the erosion of state autonomy. Since the
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colonial period, the geographic location of the nation between two seas, in addition to its
extensive network of tributary channels that have served as important transportation mediums,
have provided the ideal environment for the growth and entrenchment of contraband. Flourishing
in the absence of strong state institutions, the consumption of illegally sold goods and services
became a socially accepted practice in Colombia, and in many cases, the only way to obtain
certain goods. Between 1930 and 1990, high import tariffs and tight foreign exchange controls
augmented the reliance upon black market items for much of the population. In addition to the
reliance upon illegally imported goods, the smuggling of a wide variety of manufactured
products, coffee, emeralds and even human beings became commonplace, facilitating the
development of an export contraband culture. Together, these factors produced an environment
in which the illegal drug trade could thrive.418
The drug industry in Colombia has financed indirectly both the guerrilla organizations
and the paramilitary groups, thus enhancing the capacity of both actors to actively resist state
authority. Although the size and number of these groups have substantially declined in recent
years, there still exists areas in Colombia that are highly insecure as well as areas considered to
be drug-trafficking corridors. One lasting implication of drug-trafficking has been the presence
of corruption within society – especially within the political arena. More prevalent during the
1990s, narco-traffickers have been effective in infiltrating the political system and establishing
clientelistic relations with numerous politicians operating on both local and national levels. They
have done this by financing election campaigns, influencing local level election outcomes, and
by bribing, threatening and terrorizing elected officials. The most notorious case of corruption, as
already stated, was the support the Cali cartel extended to President Ernesto Samper in 1994.

164

The impact of corruption on the quality of Colombian democracy has been two-fold. It
has negated the ability of citizens to access and have a part in collective decisions and actions,
and it has eroded the basic foundations of trust upon which democracy must rest. Due to public
outrage over the levels of violence and corruption in Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, a former member
of the Liberal Party won the presidency in 2002 on a platform that called for the reestablishment
of state authority throughout the Colombian territory by reinforcing the military and working
closely with the U.S. government. Under his administration, many paramilitary forces were
demilitarized, while the guerrilla groups were increasingly pushed out of urban areas. With an
approval rating of nearly 80 percent by the end of his term, President Uribe was elected to a
second term in office after a constitutional amendment was passed that allowed the executive to
serve for two consecutive terms. However, a 2008 scandal in which approximately 60
congressional representatives were arrested or investigated for alleged links to paramilitary
forces tarnished the administration’s reputation.419 Similarly, the 2014 legislative elections were
plagued by accusations of fraud, vote buying, and connections with criminals.
Although in 2011 the Colombian government promulgated anti-corruption legislation and
established an anti-corruption office in the presidency - the nation still faces collusion between
the public and private sectors, clientelism and policies dictated by organized crime, the lack of
state control and weak service delivery in remote areas of the country, and the inefficiency of the
criminal justice system.420 Furthermore, both the legislative efforts and the executive reforms
aimed at combating corruption and improving transparency have yet to significantly reduce
corruption. Instead, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the
country went from being ranked 57th in the world in 2002 to 90th in 2016 with little to no change
in ranking from 2012 to 2016.421
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Civil Liberties and Associational Rights
The freedoms of organization, assembly, expression as well as the right to alternative
sources of information are essential to democracy. The degree to which these freedoms are
respected and enforced is indicative of a regime’s dedication to ensuring civilian participation in
government as well as crucial for the equitable representation of the public in the decisionmaking process. Nevertheless, even in nations that possess markedly democratic constitutions,
the ability of citizens to effectively exercise their freedoms without the fear of persecution, and
with confidence that their interests will be heard, can be significantly curtailed by the presence of
internal conflict, intra-state violence, corruption or even a highly institutionalized political
system. As such, when these rights are upheld, the quality of democracy increases. Conversely,
when they are infringed upon, the quality of democratic governance suffers.
The drug trade in Colombia has been a major source of intense violence. Between 19821991, Colombia’s homicide rate reached 86 per 100,000 inhabitants - one of the highest murder
rates in the world. In the early 1990s, violence between the government and the major drug
cartels intensified after the implementation of extradition policies as well as the federal
confiscation of property from known drug-traffickers. By the mid-1990s, a combination of
effective negotiation and extermination policies had led to the demise of the drug cartels.
However, Colombia’s drug trade continues to thrive as several medium-sized trafficking
organizations have taken over the decentralized industry.
The 1991 Colombian constitution guarantees freedom of expression. Opposition views
have been commonly expressed since then via media outlets unaffiliated with the government.422
And yet, freedom of the press in Colombia has declined. It is estimated that between 1990-2010,
some 77 journalist have been killed, many for reporting on drug-related activities.423 This
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number is one of the highest in the region, signaling that one of the most fundamental
requirements for constitutional democracy is still severely infringed upon.
Ironically, the number of journalists killed between 1990-1999, when the cartels wielded
the most influence in society, was lower than between 2000-2010, after the drug cartels had been
dismembered. In 2015, a media watchdog organization recorded at least 144 threats and other
abuses against the press, while three journalists – Luis Carlos Peralta, Edgar Quintero, and Flor
Alba Nunez – were murdered after experiencing previous problems with local officials and
criminals because of their reporting. The pressures placed upon the media have had significant
implications on the quality and diversity of information available to citizens.424 Persistent
violence has engendered a culture of censorship and self-censorship, which has negatively
affected the quality of the electoral process.425 Moreover, most civil liberties, including
associational and organizational rights, individual rights and personal autonomy, as well as
freedom of expression and belief, are being undermined by the persistence of violence. The
integrity of elections has also come under speculation, as the 2014 legislative elections were
marred by rumors of corruption and collusion. Additionally, impunity for crime in general is
rampant, with convictions achieved in only 10 percent of murders.426 As such, the failure on the
part of the state to both ensure the protection of these fundamental rights, as well as to enforce
the law if these rights are to be infringed upon, is exemplary of the low quality of democracy
experienced within Colombia.
The 1999 Venezuelan constitution stipulates that the state is responsible for the protection
and development of the individual. It also claims “respect for the dignity of the individual, [and]
the democratic exercise of the will of the people…427 These rights have been significantly
undercut by presidents Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Maduro.

167

In 1999, the Bolivarian political project initiated by Chavez emphasized the regime’s
commitment to the enforcement of civil liberties, the exercise of political rights, as well as social
justice and social equality.428 However, after consolidating his support in the 2006 elections,
Chavez reformed the constitution to enhance the powers of the executive as well as to augment
the size and scope of the state apparatus so to ‘dictate the will of the people’ from above. As
Roberta Rice points out, participatory democracy is not something that can be legislated from
above – it must come from below. Moreover, in Venezuela, since decision-making authority is
concentrated in the executive branch, the absence of well-defined mechanisms for citizen input
implicitly contradicts the concept of participatory democracy. Finally, a lack of autonomy of
civil society groups from the state has resulted in the inability of self-constituted organizations to
express their interests without the fear of repression.429 The validity of this assertion was
enforced most clearly by Chavez’s refusal to renew the broadcasting license of the Radio
Caracas International Television network, one of his harshest political critics in 2007.
Since then, freedom of the press has steadily deteriorated in Venezuela as the government
has gradually acquired most major sources of alternative information. Moreover, currency
controls that prevent publishers from acquiring newsprint, rules requiring private media to air
state promotional advertisements for free, and the risk of administrative and legal actions against
private outlets that anger the government further threaten media independence.430 In 2014 and
more recently, antigovernment demonstrations have been met with violence, which have
augmented existing tensions between those who remain loyal to the regime and those who
oppose it. Journalists covering the demonstration in 2014 were subject to arrests, harassment, and
violence, while more than 40 people were killed and approximately 900 were injured.431
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Political Culture
Many theorists who advocate a cultural approach to democratic consolidation assert that
to develop and maintain a democratic regime, a culture of moderation, cooperation, bargaining
and accommodation amongst the elites as well as at the grassroots level, are necessary.
Furthermore, such theorists argue that together, those orientations facilitate the development of
tolerance for opposing political beliefs and positions, pragmatism and flexibility in the political
arena, trust in other political actors, an intrinsic willingness to compromise, and greater civil
discourse. The degree to which those behavioral orientations are embedded in the culture of a
particular society greatly affects the viability of stable democratic governance within a nation. 432
This argument becomes more complex when one considers the ways in which culture
takes root and changes within a society. According to social constructivists, actions initiated by
agents are culturally constituted. As posited by Larry Diamond, political culture can be
summarily defined as “distinctive predispositions or ‘orientations to action’.” The orientations
that influence the actions taken by social agents can be: 1) cognitive – involving knowledge of
and beliefs about the political system; 2) affective – consisting of feelings about the political
system and 3) evaluational – including commitments to political values and judgments about the
performance of the political system relative to those values. As such, political actors rely upon
existing knowledge, feelings and commitments to reaffirm and deepen culture within the
objective dimensions of political life: the political system, the political process, and policy. 433 In
some instances, this reaffirmation can transform these dimensions thereby altering its culture;
this transformation, in turn, has the potential to influence the future actions of other agents in the
system.434
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Culture is not static. While cultural change depends in part on existing structural and
material conditions, those conditions vary from one societal group to another. As a result,
distinctive types of beliefs and norms may prevail in different socioeconomic and institutional
settings. Thus, political subcultures greatly nuance the relationships that form and the
transactions that occur between different social factions. In Colombia, by the late 1960s and
early 1970s, popular resentment toward the National Front regime had intensified, because of the
exclusive nature of the arrangement. Such an arrangement contributed to the proliferation of
guerrilla movements within the nation; to the decline in party identification as the ideological
distinctions between the two traditional parties became negligible and socio-economic changes
produced an urban population increasingly disinterested in party politics; to the internal
factionalization, and clientelization of the state; and to an increase in governmental
inefficiencies.
Initially, it seemed as if the agreement between the two parties reflected the development
of a political culture based upon the tenets of moderation, cooperation, bargaining and
accommodation amongst the political elites.435 Although consensus amongst the elites had been
reached, ultimately the exclusive nature of the regime with regards to other social groups,
weakened the power of the two traditional parties. Moreover, the high degree of factionalization
that occurred during this period is indicative of an elite culture steeped in sectarianism rather
than one based upon moderation and accommodation. This form of governance, in fact,
represented the continuation of the partisan political culture that was present during the 19th and
early 20th centuries. As such, even under the National Front agreement the consolidation of a
stable democratic regime in Colombia remained elusive.
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Over the course of 70 years, Venezuela has experimented with democracy on three
separate occasions. The lessons learned from the trienio period from 1945-1948 with regards to
the destabilizing impact of political exclusion were, in turn, utilized to construct stable
governance. From the promulgation of the Punto Fijo pact in 1958 until the Caracazo that
followed the 1988 elections, the Venezuelan regime was accentuated by consensual and
conciliatory politics founded upon a strong commitment to democracy above partisan
interests.436 The spirit of the Punto Fijo pact was predicated upon elite moderation and
accommodation, which allowed for the establishment of a regime built on democratic ideals,
practices and institutions. Contributing to the stability of the regime was an impressive flow of
financial resources generated by the export of oil that allowed for sustained economic growth
over the course of three decades. Drastic material and social changes generated by the booming
petroleum industry facilitated the reinforcement of a culture favorable to democracy. Moreover,
this system was characterized by a particularly strong distributive and statist discourse that
became widely socialized by Venezuelans, and an important component of their political
culture.437 As a result, a significant portion of the wealth generated by oil exports was utilized by
the state to provide jobs and social services, eradicate poverty, embark upon housing and
construction projects, augment basic industries and import consumer goods. This configuration
between the state and the Venezuelan citizenry gradually led to the solidification of a political
culture and to the belief that democracy was the route to social justice.438 This sentiment towards
democracy continues to be deeply engrained in Venezuela’s political culture.439
Social, economic, and generational changes in Venezuela gave rise to two different sets
of leaders – those who continued to maintain the rigid partyarchicial system and those who
challenged it. Although elections were held regularly, and people voted, freely expressed their
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views, and had access to alternative sources of information, the parties continued to monopolize
nominations, to penetrate and politicize civil society organizations, to centralize authority in a
small circle at the top, and to tightly control the legislative process.440 The rigidity of the political
system led to the formation and consolidation of political subcultures along an elite-non-elite
axis that intensified in the 1980s when the regime came under public scrutiny for widespread
corruption. The revelation of endemic corruption eroded the regime’s legitimacy, as well as
public trust in the existing governmental institutions.
Although Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution enjoyed substantial backing in its efforts to
enhance participatory democracy and eliminate corruption in Venezuela, by 2012 popular
support for his regime had begun to decline. By August 2015, President Nicolás Maduro had
barely managed to retain control of the government, with his popularity falling to 24.3 percent.441
Latinobarometro concluded that in 2015 around 64 percent of Venezuelans were dissatisfied with
their government’s performance, while about only half of those surveyed thought of their country
as democratic. However, their commitment to democracy remained the highest in all Latin
America.442
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CHAPTER IV
Conclusions
Considering the various internal conflicts and violence between non-state actors that
continues to plague Colombia, the fact that the political regime better fulfills some of the
necessary conditions typically associated with democracy than the regime in Venezuela, allows
me to formulate a few arguments about democracy. By the end of the 19th century and the
beginning of the 20th century, although state apparatuses had managed to emerge in both
Colombia and Venezuela, they possessed limited authority over the national territory, and their
autonomy was routinely contested by regional antagonisms and civil wars.443 This is important to
emphasize since a consolidated and legitimate state is one of the critical requirements for the
establishment of a stable democratic regime. While both nations’ colonial experiences did much
to establish national boundaries that solidified after the dissolution of Gran Colombia,
institutions designed to facilitate the economic and political integration of autonomous regions
into the national territory remained either non-existent or weak. This was primarily due to
divisive topographical attributes, transportation and communication difficulties, and the
development of distinct social and economic regions with correspondingly disparate regional
identities.
In Colombia, the highly contentious role of the Catholic Church in society, the equally
polarizing influence of a strong two-party system, strong regional affiliations, a weak and
ineffective military and the absence of a profitable export-commodity able to provide the state
with a degree of economic dominance collectively curtailed the process of state legitimatization.
In a markedly divided society, a powerful state was considered to be dangerous to the myriad
competing interests within the nation. As such, from the 19th century onward, Colombia has been
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imbued with a weak, and relatively ineffective state. In the absence of strong and efficacious
state institutions, regional elites consolidated power primarily through the establishment of
political parties. These parties engendered the intense polarization of Colombian society, as party
loyalty came to constitute the basis of strong, competing civic nationalisms. By the turn of the
20th century, regional economic elites had become more or less unified by the profits generated
by the cacao boom. The subsequent emergence of powerful producer associations, or gremios,
nuanced the historically sectarian nature of the Colombian political elite. These gremios lobbied
against the greater involvement of the state in society, and actively opposed any attempt by the
government to enhance its jurisdiction over economic and social matters. Moreover,
modernization and industrialization led to the development of new social classes that desired
greater representation in government. As a result, political parties expanded suffrage and
attempted to inculcate these emergent classes into their ranks. Further politicization and
polarization of the masses led to intense and often violent confrontations within society. After la
violencia and the brief dictatorship of General Rojas, collusion between the emergent economic
elite, and the long-established political parties facilitated a virtual oligopoly of power under the
consociational elements of the National Front. Despite the inherent flaws of the National Front
regime, from the 19th century until the end of the twentieth century, the Liberal and Conservative
parties elected every president of Colombia – even after the consociational arrangement had
ended.444
Colombia possesses a long history of regularly held electoral contests through which the
parties have alternated power. This tradition of regularly-held electoral contests signifies that
Colombians view elections as being a critical component of the democratic process. The
longevity of the electoral regime also suggests that political parties, despite their flaws, are
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regarded by Colombia's citizens as being the most effective vehicles for the institutionalization
of democratic governance. Thus, although the enduring duopoly between the traditional parties
has by now run its course, the party system in Colombia, rather than collapsing has gradually
become more pluralistic and competitive, albeit fragmented and weak. Furthermore, the demand
that elections remain free and fair has been a focal point of the 1991 Constitution, and of
subsequent electoral reforms. Though corruption and collusion continue to undermine the
integrity of the process, they are generally brought to light and addressed. This assertion is
exemplified by the revelation of a recent scandal that cast into question the legitimacy of the
2014 legislative elections. In summary, the longevity of the political system, the extensive
number of successive and successful elections, and the recent trend toward electoral
accountability, help explain why Colombia today has been able consolidate democracy more
effectively than Venezuela.445
According to Robert Dahl, whose theories are discussed in my literature review, for a
political system to be considered a democracy, it must be responsive to its citizens. Moreover, it
must allow them an equal opportunity to: (1) formulate their preferences; (2) publicly manifest
these preferences among their fellow partisans and before the government, both individually and
collectively; and (3) be treated equally by the government. In short, to ensure the integrity of
democracy, political parties as well as the state must be responsive to the interests of those
governed, while also able to act responsibly for the collective benefit of society. For these basic
conditions to be met, they should be accompanied by eight essential guarantees: (1) freedom of
association, (2) freedom of expression, (3) the right to vote, (4) the ability to run for public office
barring reasonable restrictions, (5) the right of politicians to campaign and compete for votes, (6)
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multiple sources of information, (7) free and fair elections, and (8) institutions to develop policy
based on voter preference.446
Currently, Colombia meets all eight of Dahl’s conditions, albeit freedom of association,
and expression remain significantly curtailed by internal violence. Over the past few decades,
internal political violence has resulted in the death of over 220,000 people, and has engendered
the internal displacement of more than 6.7 million Colombians.447 Due to the persistence of
armed conflict in Colombia, spaces for political expression and organization remain limited, and
in some areas non-existent. Freedom of expression is further curtailed in Colombia, as journalists
are frequently treated with hostility. Since the mid-1990s dozens of journalists have been
murdered, primarily for reporting on cases involving drug trafficking and corruption. In 2015,
the Foundation for Free Press (FLIP), a respected Colombian NGO that monitors press freedoms,
reported the death of two journalists, while 60 in total received threats between January and
October of that year. Moreover, from 2011 to 2015, the government reported the murders of 121
trade unionists. While abuses and threats towards certain groups have proliferated in recent
years, the government has been invariably slow in regards to convictions and sentencings.448 As
such, impunity for crime in Colombia remains rampant, while freedom of expression and
association are routinely violated.
Utilizing Dahl’s theoretic conditions of democracy, despite persisting internal violence
and a widespread disregard for the protection of political expression and association, Colombia’s
regime would rank highly, since public participation is constitutionally unrestricted and party
competition is markedly pluralistic as well as inclusive. When considering Wolfgang Merkel’s
contributions to democratic theory, this classification becomes considerably more nuanced.
Merkel in his scholarship on democracy posits that liberal democracies consist of five partial
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regimes which are: (1) electoral regimes that permit free, fair, and regular elections, (2) freedoms
of speech and association, (3) protection of civil rights and liberties, (4) separation of powers
between executive, legislative and judicial branches and (5) protection against nonelected groups
that wish to overrule or overthrow the government.449 The first four of these regimes coincide
with Dahl’s prerequisites, while the fifth condition becomes especially relevant to my
considerations regarding the existing instability of the Colombian regime.
As mentioned earlier, for the past fifty years or so, the Colombian government has been
engaged in civil armed conflict with various leftist guerilla organizations. Beginning in the 1980s
and 1990s, right-wing paramilitaries initially introduced to neutralize these guerilla groups
gained substantial autonomy from the state. Thereafter, these paramilitaries gradually
relinquished themselves from state-control. The emergence of the drug trade and the rise of the
various cartels further complicated situation. As the drug trade began to expand throughout the
national territory, both the paramilitaries and the guerrilla groups came to be either directly or
indirectly subsidized by the cartels. Within this increasingly complex overview of Colombian
society, persistent violence caused by confrontations between the state and guerilla organizations
threatened to destabilize the Colombian regime. Regime stability was further undermined by the
bloodshed and endemic corruption associated with the drug cartels. Currently, with the cartels in
disarray and a ceasefire in place between the largest guerilla organization and the government,
the threats posed by these nonelected groups have significantly diminished. However, as long as
violence perpetrated by intra-state actors continues, the regime can never fully be stable.
Despite the violence, Colombian civil society has flourished in recent years and
opposition parties have been able to participate in the political system without fear of
persecution. As such, the Colombian regime fulfills the first two conditions that Juan Linz and

177

Alfred Stepan consider to be essential for democratic consolidation, which are: (1) the
development of a free and lively civil society, and (2) a relatively autonomous political
society.450 In addition to these two prerequisites, Linz and Stepan assert that an established rule
of law that protects individual freedoms and associational life, an effective state bureaucracy,
and an institutionalized economic society are also significant requirements for democratic
consolidation. In Colombia, while constitutional mechanisms designed to protect individual
freedoms and rights exist, civilian rights are routinely infringed upon. While it is true that the
state bureaucracy is relatively effective - in that it is coordinated throughout the national territory
and provides for basic services - its functionality is inhibited by the presence of corruption which
occurs at multiple levels of public administration. Since the judicial system also remains largely
compromised by corruption and extortion, it lacks the capacity to hold those responsible for legal
violations accountable for their actions.451 As a result, individual freedoms are marginally
protected by the state, and the rule of law in Colombia suffers.
Regarding Linz and Stepan’s final condition, greater integration into the world economy
and profound changes in economic and social structures throughout the region have prompted
various authors to consider moving beyond defining democracy as a political regime, as to
include economic and social dimensions.452 Within the field of political science, it is commonly
asserted that economic and social conditions are distinguishable from the intrinsic qualities or
attributes of political democracy. As such, economic and social factors are particularly relevant
when attempting to discern the quality of democratic governance within a nation. However, these
factors alone are not considered to be prerequisite conditions for democratic consolidation.
Nevertheless, socio-economic issues such as the persistence of poverty and income inequality
have increasingly come to threaten the viability of democratic politics in Latin America.453 While
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poverty has declined significantly since the late 1990s, income inequality in Colombia remains
amongst the highest in the world.454 Since the 1980s, the persistence of income inequality as well
as the increased concentration of wealth in the hands of a select few, has not only contributed to
the longevity of the protracted civil conflict, but has also resulted in the steady declination of
political participation and historically high abstention rates. Nevertheless, Colombia meets most,
if not all of the conditions posited by the aforementioned theoreticians, and as such can be
classified as a democracy. The stability of the current regime as well as the prospects for liberal
democratic governance have, and will become increasingly tethered to the nation’s ability to:
enforce the protection of citizen freedoms and rights – including demands for accountability and
freedom of the press -, strengthen the capacity of the state as to maintain law and order, protect
citizens and punish criminals, bolster participation through extensive reformation of the party
system, as well as implement initiatives that seek to address the sources of income inequality.
Similarly, Venezuela possesses several of the conditions that typically facilitate the
formation of democracy. For example, the country retained a relatively stable and highly
institutionalized party system, significant economic potential due to its vast petroleum reserves,
and a particularly strong national identity that acted as a homogenizing force. However, due to
rampant corruption, exclusionary policies, and long periods of economic downtown, the
subsequent breakdown of the party system in the 1990s gave way to what can now only be
described as an authoritarian regime. The authoritarian nature of the Venezuelan regime can be
attributed to two primary factors: a highly centralized, largely ineffective, and clientelistic state –
especially present during the Punto Fijo regime, as well as to the nation’s historical dependence
upon oil rents to facilitate economic development and political stability.
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In Venezuela, although political parties emerged in the 19th century, they did not become
entirely relevant until the mid-20th century. Rather, the desire of regional caudillos to consolidate
their power through the conquest of and control over Caracas laid the foundation for the
establishment of a central authority in the late 19th century. Regionalist sentiments persisted as
the longevity of each caudillo’s regime remained contingent upon their ability to both
economically subsidize regional caudillos as well as militarily dominant them. As a result, stable
governance became a function of control over a central authority. By the 1920s, the discovery of
petroleum would serve to legitimize the power of state, and engender the creation of strong state
institutions. Unlike in Colombia, where the state has been historically weak, in Venezuela,
democracy has come to be associated with the preservation of a large, redistributive state
apparatus.
Venezuela’s oil wealth has done much to bolster the redistributive ethos of the state,
which has in turn, also served to reinforce the link between social justice, paternalism, and
democracy that is so inculcated into Venezuelan political culture. From the 1920s onwards, oil
rents have filled the coffers of the Venezuelan government. First utilized to legitimize the power
of the state in the context of pervasive regionalism, the caudillos of the early 20th century also
relied upon oil rents to the fuel their personalist regimes. Economic stability due to the expansion
of oil production and exportation facilitated the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the
nation. Accompanying these processes were socio-economic developments that greatly
contributed to the formation of a national identity, as well as a collective desire for increased
representation in government. While the trienio represented Venezuela’s first experiment with
democracy, the regime isolated important elite interests and as such, suffered. The Punto Fijo
pact was more cohesive in that it included the most prominent societal actors within its
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conciliatory framework. Under this agreement, it seemed as though elite cooperation had finally
led to the establishment of an inclusive, representative and responsive democratic regime.
As a petro-state, the Venezuelan political system was the most stable when oil rents were
accumulated at a steady pace. This steady accumulation, in turn, depended upon the relative
constancy of the prices of oil on international markets. Regime stability was also contingent
upon the dominant parties’ ability to sustain their clientelistic networks. Between 1958 and 1989,
there were no elections for local governorships. These positions were distributed by executive
decree, with the entire bureaucratic structure appointed from the center.455 This highlycentralized structure not only contributed to the problem of endemic corruption, it exacerbated
bureaucratic ineptitude and inefficiency. Moreover, the system excluded the poor majority from
meaningful participation.456 During the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, while the party
machines and the legal tenure of civil servants prevented any significant shrinkage of the state,
the state could no longer prevent major declines in public sector pay.457 Maturing external loans,
a decrease in international prices of oil and reformation of price and exchange controls further
hindered the ability of the state to effectively support itself. Unable to subsidize social programs,
and maintain the clientelistic networks established by the political elite, the regime imploded.
As the number of Venezuelans living in poverty and extreme poverty increased, inflation
skyrocketed and unemployment rose substantially. Public castigation of the political parties
followed, leading to the eventual collapse of the party system. In contrast to the Colombian
experience, as soon as the Venezuelan electorate assessed the performance of the traditional
political parties in government and pronounced it as dismal, the parties were ousted from power.
Although Chavez was democratically elected to the presidency in 1998, since then, the regime in
Venezuela has become more authoritarian – ostensibly reverting to the dictatorial regimes
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characteristic of Venezuela’s troubled past. Initially proposing to create a democracy rooted in
the participation of the whole people, by the early 2000s, Chavez had begun to implement
policies that further polarized Venezuelan society, as power increasingly became consolidated in
the hands the executive.458 Currently, Maduro has coopted political power, quelled dissent, and
has attempted to maintain substantial control over civil and political society. As a result,
Venezuela has experience a radical departure from the participatory and democratic vision
enshrined by the Bolivarian Revolution.459
In this way, Venezuela fails to meet most of Dahl’s criteria for democratic regimes.
While it is true that all Venezuelans have the right to vote (barring reasonable restrictions) and
that voting is not restricted in practice, the integrity of the electoral process has come under
intense scrutiny. The legitimacy of the electoral process has been most recently challenged by
Maduro in 2015, after he utilized his executive authority to suspend a recall movement directed
at removing him from power. Additionally, the gradual consolidation of authority in the hands of
the executive has been accompanied by the redrawing of political and administrative boundaries
to curb the influence of governors, mayors and local officials.460 In 2008, the creation of the
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) served to further curtail the power of obstinate leaders
within the MVR, as well as other potential political opponents.461 Essentially, a forced merger
between all parties who supported the Bolivarian Revolution, the centralization of political
power into a single entity granted Chavez greater authority in both political and electoral realms.
As a result, although political leaders are constitutionally allowed to compete for votes, once
elected, they are virtually powerless.
In recent years, the Venezuelan regime has been accused of violating fundamental
freedoms and civil liberties such as: the freedom of association, the freedom of expression and
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the freedom of the press. Beginning in 2014, the government responded to non-violent and
relatively peaceful anti-government protests with excessive force. A year later, Maduro deployed
more than 80,000 members of security forces nationwide in “Operation Peoples’ Liberation”
(OLP) to address rising security concerns. Widespread allegations of abuse, extrajudicial
killings, mass arbitrary detentions, maltreatment of detainees, forced evictions, the destruction of
homes and arbitrary deportations in low-income and immigrant communities followed.462 In
2016, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) detained dozens of people based
upon allegations of planning, fomenting, or participating in violent anti-government actions.
However, many of these were peaceful protests.463 As public non-violent protestation continues
to be met with state-sponsored violence, abuse and detainment, spaces for conflict resolution,
compromise, and accommodation remain scarce. Without effective mechanisms to facilitate
social reconciliation as well as to freely voice dissenting views, democracy in Venezuela cannot
exist.
Additionally, although freedom of expression and the press are guaranteed by Article 57
of the Venezuelan constitution, they are not respected in practice. The continual violation of
these freedoms has also contributed to the lack of democracy in Venezuela. Amended in 2010,
the Law on Social Responsibility in Radio, Television, and Electronic Media, contains vaguely
worded restrictions that have been used to severely limit content that could “incite or promote
hatred”, “foment citizens’ anxiety or alter public order”, “disrespect authorities”, “encourage
assassinations”, or “constitute war propaganda”.464 Over the course of 2015, Maduro relied upon
this law approximately 147 times to interrupt regular programming on television and radio
stations. This was done to deliver propaganda on behalf of pro-government candidates for
parliamentary elections, announce new presidential decrees, and direct attacks against political
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opponents. With this law, the government effectively possesses the ability to censor what the
public is able view, as well as monopolizes the media to advance the interests of the regime.
Although Article 51 of the constitution guarantees the right of citizens to access public
information, journalists are also frequently denied access to official documents. Faced with
verbal threats and harassment, arbitrary arrests, physical attacks, dismissal by employers, fines
and lawsuits, many journalists frequently engage in self-censorship. Moreover, the Maduro
administration heavily regulates the spread of information that may reflect negatively on its
policies.465 The government itself officially controls 13 television networks, dozens of radio
outlets, a news agency, eight newspapers, and a magazine.466 The independent media platforms
that are left have also softened their positions regarding Maduro and his administration in
response to extensive governmental pressure to do so. As a result, access to alternative sources of
information is severely restricted in Venezuela, violating Dahl’s sixth prerequisite for the
establishment of democracy.
Finally, government policies in Venezuela depend upon the decisions of the executive as
well as a small cadre of appointed officials, rather than upon the vote and other forms of
preference expression. This was first made apparent in 2007, by Chavez’s request for a Ley
Habilitante the day after his second inauguration. Upon its ratification by the National Assembly,
this law enabled Chavez the authority to legislate by decree in 13 critical policy areas while
Congress was sent into recess for 18 months.467 Ever since, Chavez’s and Maduro’s top-down
governing and centralized decision-making style has given way to a “populist electoral
autocracy” that concedes little to no political space to its opponents.468
Venezuela also fails to fulfill Merkel’s five requirements for the establishment of liberal
democracy, while the regime uses the fifth condition – protection against nonelected groups that
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wish to overrule or overthrow the government – to justify its authoritarian policies. After taking
office in 2007, Chavez contended that “oligarchic forces” had “infiltrated” their ideas into the
1999 constitution. As such, he promised to reform these sections of the constitution, paving the
way for a constitutional amendment that would allow for the unlimited reelection of the
executive.469 Moreover, the regime has sought to identify external enemies such as the United
States, as well as Colombia to rally support for the advancement of its populist agenda.470 The
separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers in Venezuela has also come under
intensive scrutiny, as the executive has retained substantial control over the judicial system ever
since the Supreme Court was expanded from 20 to 32 members in 2004.471 Moreover, the
National Assembly has been historically weak and dominated by forces supportive of President
Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution. Although the opposition garnered a majority in the
elections of 2015, legislation aimed at curtailing or challenging the powers of the executive have
largely floundered.
The presence of a vibrant civil society and a relatively autonomous political society, two
important elements that factor into Linz and Stepan’s conditions of democratic consolidation,
remain constrained by a large domineering state which seeks to monopolize and control all forms
of political expression. Moreover, while the rule of law is strictly enforced, rather than protecting
individual freedoms and associational rights, the regime frequently encroaches upon them.
Lastly, despite Chavez’s vociferous condemnations regarding the injustices committed against
Venezuela by an inherently unequal and exploitative international economic system, the
Bolivarian regime has done little to reduce the nation’s dependence upon oil exports and to
diversify the economy. As a result, economic stability and by extension, political stability,
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remain largely contingent upon international oil prices as well as upon the ability of the regime
to attract foreign investment.
According to the paradigm for democratic consolidation in Latin American advanced by
Jeff Haynes in my literature review, an amicable international environment is of crucial
importance for democratic consolidation in the region.472 Throughout the 1990s until mid-2001,
global factors and international forces assisted and promoted democratic change with unusual
commitment and effectiveness. Therefore, the international environment was markedly
supportive of democratization in Latin America. After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon that occurred in 2001, the initiation of the “global war on
terror” facilitated a wave of changes in regional priorities for U.S. foreign policy. 473 As such,
efforts to support democratization in Latin America fell by the wayside, as the United States
along with other prominent international powers, rather focused upon confronting terrorism and
amplifying their control over Central and South Asia as well as the Middle East.474
In Colombia, however, by this time, the trans-national influence of the drug cartels had
led to the implementation of Plan Colombia – a bilateral agreement brokered between the
Colombian and U.S. governments with the objective of eradicating illicit crops, negotiating
settlements with the guerilla movements, and providing aid for judicial institutions, human
rights, and alternative development.475 After the September 11th attacks, the aid allocated to the
Colombian government under Plan Colombia was utilized to not only battle the drug cartels, but
also guerilla groups designated as terrorists or narco-terrorists.476 From 2002 until 2010, the
Uribe administration was successful in significantly curtailing the power of these intra-state
actors, which served to strengthen democratic governance in Colombia. Moreover, the aid
supplied by the United States bolstered the ability of the regime to embark upon substantial
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political and electoral reform. Currently, the United States remains the most influential foreign
actor in Colombia. In 2015, it provided approximately US$280 million in aid mostly towards the
strengthening of military and police forces.477
Conversely, the rise of Hugo Chavez and his populist regime in Venezuela was received
very critically by the United States and the international community. Working behind the scenes
with the opposition in Venezuela to oust Chavez from office, the United States unintentionally
contributed to the radicalization of the Bolivarian regime.478 Upon his reelection in 2006, Chavez
further consolidated his power, and openly condemned the United States for infringing upon the
sovereignty of the nation’s electoral and political processes. Since then, Maduro has continued
this discourse, vilifying the United States and other trans-national organizations for attempting to
intervene in Venezuelan affairs. In response to the deteriorating economic and political situation
in Venezuela, in 2015, President Obama issued an executive order imposing targeted sanctions
against several Venezuelan government officials.479 Furthermore, in September 2015, four other
Latin American nations - Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay - blocked Venezuela from
assuming the presidency of the regional trading bloc, Mercosur.480 In addition to these sanctions,
the Organization of American States has…As is made apparent by the disparate experiences of
both Colombia and Venezuela in an increasingly globalized world, democratic governance in
Latin America faces an international environment that is hostile at times and neutral at best. 481
The comparative analysis of these two cases reveals the significance of historical
legacies. The Colombian case emphasizes the link between the early consolidation of a political
system and the proclivity for prolonged oligarchic rule – especially in the absence of a strong and
legitimate state. Conversely, the Venezuelan experience highlights how the over-bearing nature
of a dominant state can just as easily contribute to the establishment of democracy as it can to its
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deconsolidation. Moreover, the consociational experiments of both the National Front and the
Punto Fijo regime, accentuate the difficulties that arise when attempting to develop a system that
accommodates separate factions of society while also mitigating political deadlock. Finally,
while Colombia functions within an amicable international environment that has significantly
contributed to regime stability as well as the government’s ability to combat violent intra-state
actors, Venezuela has been forced to operate within a rather hostile environment. As a result, the
regime in Venezuela has become more reactive and adverse to outside assistance, and has also
sought to identify external actions, particularly those that are associated with the United States
and a number of European actors, as threats to justify its authoritarian tendencies. In short, the
international environment has had a decisive, and yet contradictory effects, on the quality of
democracy experienced within both nations.
Over the past decade or so, the literature assessing the state of democracy in Latin
America has generally focused upon the current wave of political stability within the region. As
Ignacio Walker asserts, “…contrary to what has historically happened in Latin America,
episodes of political instability have not been accompanied by democratic breakdown and coups
d’etat”.482 Although the region has successfully traveled from dictatorship to electoral
democracy, the consolidation of authentic liberal democracy remains elusive. Through this
comparative study of Colombia and Venezuela, I attempted to show how a variety of factors
ranging from: colonialism, the absence of an authoritative state as well as the overwhelming
presence of a patrimonial state, paradoxically exclusionary political arrangements, competing
political sub-cultures, clientelism, and international factors have and continue to hinder
democratic consolidation and governance in Latin America. To provide a more in depth analysis
of the factors that have historically inhibited the processes of state consolidation and
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democratization in Latin America, it would be crucial to focus upon a country that routinely
achieves high marks on democracy indexes, such as Uruguay or Costa Rica. An analysis of these
two nations would greatly nuance the arguments about democracy that I have posited in this
study.
Since the third wave of democratization, almost every nation in the region currently
possesses a formal democratic regime – except for Cuba and as this study has shown, Venezuela.
In an era characterized by market liberalization, increased international integration, and the
massive trans-national movement of people, any future study of democracy in Latin America
will need to consider the formidable challenges to democracy presented by globalization –
namely the growth of income inequality and informality. These realities seek to threaten the
viability of truly representative and responsive regimes not only in Latin America, but
worldwide. The two case studies that I have considered here are pieces of a larger project crucial
to the preservation and advancement of democracy.
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